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“There will be time, there will be time
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet;
There will be time to murder and create,
And time for all the works and days of hands
That lift and drop a question on your plate;
Time for you and time for me,
And time yet for a hundred indecisions,
And for a hundred visions and revisions,
Before the taking of a toast and tea.
In the room the women come and go
Talking of Michelangelo.
And indeed there will be time
To wonder, “Do I dare?” and, “Do I dare?”
Time to turn back and descend the stair,
With a bald spot in the middle of my hair –
(They will say: “How his hair is growing thin!”)
My morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin,
My necktie rich and modest, but asserted by a simple pin –
(They will say: “But how his arms and legs are thin!”)
Do I dare
Disturb the universe?
In a minute there is time
For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse.
For I have known them all already, known them all:
Have known the evenings, mornings, afternoons,
I have measured out my life with coffee spoons;
I know the voices dying with a dying fall
Beneath the music from a farther room.
So how should I presume?”
— ”The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”, T.S. Eliot
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Preface
This thesis contains three chapters, each of which employs both reduced-form and structural
tools of applied microeconomics to answer questions collectively in the fields of education,
labour and health economics.
The first chapter considers the effect of a recent expansion of private tertiary education in a
set of six developing countries on the equity and efficiency of labour-market outcomes. While
the presence of private universities in developing countries has increased significantly in re-
cent decades, their growth experience varies widely across individual countries. This paper
seeks to explain such variation and, consequently, to consider the range of impact private
universities have on the efficiency of human capital allocation, aggregate output, and the dy-
namic evolution of income inequality. To that end, I build and estimate a structural model
of tertiary education choice using data for a group of six developing countries: Armenia,
Bolivia, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana and Kenya. I show that differences in underlying param-
eter values across countries have important implications for the composition of the graduate
workforce, the growth of private universities, output per worker and income inequality. I find
that, over time, when private universities are more productive than public ones, economies
tend to move away from the most socially efficient of these scenarios, while the least efficient
scenario is highly persistent.
The second chapter employs a structural model of endogenous education and occupational
choice to demonstrate that youth unemployment in Ghana increases in parental wealth, and
to consider the consequences of such a relationship for wage inequality, educational attain-
ment, and aggregate productivity. I argue that, in the absence of unemployment insurance,
only workers with a sufficiently high stock of parental wealth can afford to remain unem-
ployed, and do so in order to search for scarce, high-productivity jobs. This leads to high
income inequality and low match efficiency among workers of heterogeneous ability. I use
the estimation results to compare the effectiveness of two alternative policy interventions: an
education subsidy and unemployment insurance. I find that the education subsidy is most
effective at increasing aggregate productivity, but comes at the cost of increasing income
inequality, while unemployment insurance has a smaller effect on aggregate productivity but
also decreases income inequality.
The third chapter, which is co-authored with Prof. Kaivan Munshi, Dr. Soenje Reiche and
xiii
Prof. Hamid Sabourian, examines the consequences for efficiency of information cascades
among UK hospitals in organ transplant queues. While demand significantly outstrips organ
availability, we observe that 40% of livers and 22% of kidneys failed to be utilised over
the last decade. We build a structural model in which organs are sequentially assessed
by centres of heterogeneous ability, and show that herding behaviour plays an important
role in such wastage: once an organ is rejected by one or more centres, subsequent centres
emulate their behaviour, ignoring their own assessment of the organ’s quality. We employ
unique administrative data from the NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) that covers the
universe of abdominal organs donated in the UK during 2006-2016 to provide reduced-form
evidence of herding behaviour among transplant centres. Further, we undertake a set of
counter-factual analyses to demonstrate that, while herding behaviour is common among
UK transplant centres, the resulting increase in discard rates is not substantially higher
than that of the full-information benchmark. Equally, it performs the important function
of preventing centres from accepting organs of poor quality such that, overall, the benefits
derived from observing predecessors’ decisions outweigh the costs of herding traditionally
emphasised in the theoretical literature. In contrast with this literature, therefore, we find
that, in this context, herding is efficiency-enhancing overall.
xiv
Chapter 1
Private or Public?
Efficiency and Equity Implications of
Tertiary Education Choice
Abstract
While the presence of private universities in developing countries has increased significantly
in recent decades, their growth experience varies widely across individual countries. This
paper seeks to explain such variation and, consequently, to consider the range of impact
private universities have on the efficiency of human capital allocation, aggregate output, and
the dynamic evolution of income inequality. To that end, I build and estimate a structural
model of tertiary education choice using data for a group of six developing countries: Armenia,
Bolivia, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana and Kenya. I show that underlying parameter values
position countries in one of three potential scenarios, each of which has different implications
for the composition of the graduate workforce, the growth of private universities, output per
worker and income inequality. I find that, over time, when private universities are more
productive than public ones, economies tend to move away from the most socially efficient
of these scenarios, while the least efficient scenario is highly persistent.
Keywords: Higher Education Choice, Inequality, Occupational Choice, Credit
Constraints
JEL codes: J24, I24, J21
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1.1 Introduction
Private tertiary education has expanded rapidly across developing countries in recent decades.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the number of private universities grew from an esti-
mated 24 to 468 over the period 1990-2007 (Yusuf et al. (2009)), while the share of private
universities in Latin America and Asia reached 40 per cent and 35 per cent of total tertiary
enrolments in 2009, respectively (Praphamontripong (2012)). As private universities in these
regions tend to be small and highly numerous, their share in the total number of institutions is
estimated to be even larger. Nevertheless, the growth experience of private universities varies
widely across different countries. Data from the World Bank’s “Skills Toward Employment
and Productivity” (STEP) survey demonstrates these differences quite clearly: the share of
private graduates in the total tertiary-educated sample varies from less than 3 per cent in
Armenia and China’s Yunnan Province; to 10-15 per cent in Ghana, Kenya and Georgia; to
61 per cent in Colombia.
In this paper, I build a structural model to explain such variation. I then consider the man-
ner in which it underlies differences in two main outcomes: firstly, the allocation of tertiary
education across high- and low-ability workers and its effects on output per worker; and sec-
ondly, the linkage between tertiary education choice and the evolution of income inequality.
Accordingly, I estimate the parameters of the structural model for a set of six developing
countries - Armenia, Bolivia, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana and Kenya - using data from the
World Bank’s STEP survey, and demonstrate that the proportion of private university grad-
uates in the population may grow; remain at a low, constant level; or collapse to zero over
time. The observed heterogeneity of outcomes across countries may be explained by varia-
tion in underlying parameter values, which position a country in any one of three different
scenarios.
In the first, wealthy, high-ability workers always attend private university; in the second, the
same group always attends public university; and, in the third, non-zero fractions of this
group attend private and public university, respectively. This sorting behaviour determines
whether private universities in a given country are able to attract high-ability students, whose
subsequent contribution to aggregate output in the workforce leads to higher productivity,
or whether they are populated solely by wealthy students of inferior ability, who attend
private university only because they are unable to obtain places in highly-competitive public
universities. In the latter case, the contribution of private universities to productivity is
likely to be much smaller. I show that, under the assumptions of my model framework, the
first case is relatively efficient but not persistent over time, while the remaining two cases are
both relatively inefficient and persistent. This suggests a role for government intervention in
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certain situations, either to subsidise private university education or to adopt its technology
through greater investment in public education.
This paper draws on two related but largely unconnected strands of literature: a theoretical
literature on the relationship between human capital and the inter-generational perpetuation
of income inequality; and a small, primarily empirical, literature that attempts to measure
(in a variety of contexts) the wage premium to private education.
In the literature on human capital and inter-generational income inequality, a few theoretical
papers are close to the spirit of this paper. Galor and Zeira (1993) build a theoretical frame-
work to demonstrate that, with imperfect credit markets and indivisibility in human capital,
the initial wealth distribution significantly affects aggregate growth through its influence on
the human capital investment decision. Loury (1981) models the dynamics of the income
distribution across generations when credit constraints limit families’ ability to invest in hu-
man capital. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) present an OLG model in which the educational
regime is determined by majority voting; they show that income inequality declines faster
under public education than under private education. Durlauf (1996) analyses the dynam-
ics of income inequality through neighbourhood choice and its effect on public funding for
education. The theoretical framework in this paper also draws motivation from Epple and
Romano (1998), which derives the optimal admissions and pricing policies of private univer-
sities (albeit under the assumption of peer effects within cohorts, which are absent from my
model) and outlines a framework in which the best students sort into high-quality private
institutions, while the single public university admits the lowest-ability cohort.
Research on the wage premium to private tertiary education is largely concentrated in
developed-country contexts, and generally finds a sizeable wage premium for private gradu-
ates. Using US data, Brewer et al. (1999) find evidence of a large wage premium to attending
an elite private institution, and a smaller premium for attending a mid-level private univer-
sity, compared to attending a low-level public university. Dale and Krueger (2002) find no
evidence that students who attended more selective colleges in the US earned more than
students of comparable ability who attended less selective schools, but do find a substantial
premium to attending a more costly university. Chevalier et al. (2003) consider the effect
of university choice on graduate wages in the UK; they estimate a fee differential of $2950-
7250 between the graduates of prestigious and less prestigious universities, under different
scenarios, albeit without distinguishing between private and public institutions.1
Research on this question in developing countries is far more sparse, particularly at the level
1Indeed, such a distinction is not possible as all UK universities are (either government-financed or inde-
pendent) private instituitions.
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of tertiary education. To the best of my knowledge, the only paper which considers the
wage premium to attending private university in a developing country is Calo´nico and N˜opo
(2007), who use the National Living Standards Measurement Household Survey for Peru
in 1997 and 2000 to measure the wage differential between private and public education at
primary, secondary and tertiary levels. They find evidence of higher returns to education for
those who attended private university, but also of higher variation in wages for this group,
suggesting a large dispersion of quality among private universities, which is consistent with
general accounts in the development literature.
Research on lower levels of education provides a similar narrative. Bedi and Garg (2000)
find that graduates of private secondary schools in Indonesia perform better in the labour
market. This, interestingly, is despite a general consensus that Indonesian public schools are
of a higher quality than private ones. Finally, Alderman et al. (2001) identify factors that
affect demand by low-income households in Pakistan for private schooling. They find “that
even the poorest households use private schools extensively, and that utilization increases
with income”.
The dearth of research concerning the (individual and aggregate) effects of private universities
in developing countries is thus a notable gap in the literature, particularly in light of their
rapid proliferation across Africa, Asia and Latin America in recent decades. Prior to the
1990s, private universities accounted for a negligible fraction of tertiary enrolments in most
developing countries; instead, an effective state monopoly over the sector was characterised
by low tuition fees and, due to low funding, heavily restricted supply. The latter resulted in
high entry requirements, such that only the best students could attend university (Varghese
(2006)). The growth of private universities in these countries during the late post-colonial
period was a market-based response to the shortage of public university places, particularly
at a time of rapidly-growing demand for tertiary education and government funding cuts for
public education. A change in student tastes, particularly a growth in demand for courses
such as IT, accounting and finance, which public universities were ill-equipped to provide,
also underlies their popularity.
While it is beyond the scope of this research to provide a comprehensive account of the
features of private universities in developing countries, the following two stylised facts are
particularly significant in motivating this paper. Firstly, the majority of private universi-
ties in Africa, Asia and Latin America are profit-making institutions with nominal entry
requirements (Praphamontripong (2012)). This has the following important implication -
that, while entry into public universities continues to be determined by ability, entry into
these new universities is largely predicated on wealth. In contexts with ill-functioning credit
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markets, this constraint will be particularly binding.
Secondly, despite their large variation in quality, private universities are often favoured over
their public counterparts by private-sector employers as a source of new hires. A World
Bank survey across 10 developing countries in 2012-2014 revealed that, while 68 per cent
of employed private university graduates are placed in the private sector, only 38 per cent
of employed public university graduates are located here (World Bank (2012/2014)). This
is despite the fact that average graduate wages are higher in the private sector than in the
public, so the outcome is unlikely to be driven by an underlying preference for public-sector
jobs.2
A potential explanation is that private university graduates possess more and better non-
curricular skills of the form particularly sought by private-sector employers. World Bank em-
ployer surveys across several developing countries reveal problem-solving, learning, ICT, com-
munication and social skills to be skills valued by private-sector employers (Banerji (2010)).
Summary statistics from the STEP data further reveal that private university graduates have
higher average job-relevant skills than their public university counterparts. While this cannot
be taken to indicate a causal relation, these summary statistics are, nevertheless, broadly in
line with the stylised fact described above.
These two stylised facts collectively motivate the research questions underlying this paper:
how does the introduction of private universities influence the allocation of heterogeneous
workers in the labour-force; what are the implications of this allocation for aggregate pro-
ductivity; and, finally, what does this imply for income inequality over successive genera-
tions? The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline
model. Section 3 presents a model extension that allows for asymmetric information about
worker ability. Section 4 introduces the data and provides some summary statistics. Sec-
tion 5 analyses the results from a structural estimation of the model parameters. Section 6
concludes.
1.2 Baseline Model
This section builds a theoretical framework that explains the variation across developing
countries in private universities’ share of total tertiary enrolments, as well as in the com-
position of high- and low-ability workers in the private university cohort. I begin with a
discrete-choice model of tertiary education with full information and no credit markets. I
2Average graduate daily wages in the sample are US$16 for private-sector workers and US$12 for public-
sector workers
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consider an overlapping generations framework in which each generation of workers lives for
two periods. Each individual in a given generation is connected to a single individual in the
previous generation (a parent) from whom he receives a bequest, and to a single individual
in the subsequent generation (a child) to whom he leaves a bequest.
1.2.1 Workers
The model economy consists of a working-age population of unit size. All workers have
completed secondary schooling up to a high-school exit exam, and are risk-neutral.
Endowments:
Workers are heterogeneous in initial endowments of wealth and ability, which, for the first
generation, are both independent random variables. Innate ability of worker 𝑖, denoted ℎ𝑖,
is drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1] with cdf 𝐹 (ℎ). A worker 𝑖’s
wealth, 𝑦𝑖, may be high or low, denoted 𝑦𝐻 and 𝑦𝐿, respectively. In subsequent generations,
workers’ initial wealth is equal to the bequest received from parents, but ability remains an
independent random draw. The fraction of high-wealth types in the population is 𝜃𝑡. A high-
wealth worker is one whose initial wealth endowment is greater than or equal to the highest
tuition fee (𝑥*3) charged by a private university in any equilibrium. Conversely, a low-wealth
type has wealth less than the private university’s marginal cost (𝑐). As the private university
never sets a fee lower than 𝑐, agents with wealth 𝑦𝐿 can never attend private university.
𝑦𝐻 ≡ 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥*3} (1.1)
𝑦𝐿 ≡ 𝑦𝑖 < 𝑐 (1.2)
Choices:
At time 𝑡 = 1, workers must choose amongst three mutually exclusive and exhaustive al-
ternatives: work in the non-graduate sector (i.e. do not attend university), attend public
university, or attend private university. Let 𝑑𝑘 = 1 if alternative 𝑘 is chosen, and zero other-
wise, where 𝑘 = {1, 2, 3} corresponds to choices of non-graduate work, public university and
private university, respectively.
Let 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 be the individual’s information set at the time of decision-making, and 𝑠 =
{𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖, ℎ*, 𝑤3, 𝑤2, 𝑤1, 𝑥3}, where 𝑤𝑘 denotes wage payments for workers conditional on ed-
ucation choice, ℎ* denotes the public university’s entry requirement, and 𝑥3 denotes the
private university tuition fee. Finally, let 𝑅𝑘(𝑠) denote the expected pay-off to alternative
𝑘. Now, workers seek the optimal strategy 𝑑(𝑠) to maximise the discounted sum of future
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pay-offs:
𝑉 (𝑠) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
(︃ 2∑︁
𝑡=1
𝛽𝑡−1
3∑︁
𝑘=1
[𝑑𝑘(𝑠)𝑅𝑘 | 𝑠]
)︃
(1.3)
Thus,
𝑉 (𝑠) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑉1(𝑠), 𝑉2(𝑠), 𝑉3(𝑠)} (1.4)
where 𝑉𝑘(𝑠) is the present value if action 𝑘 is chosen. The optimal strategy is then:
𝑑𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 iff 𝑉𝑘(𝑠) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑉1(𝑠), 𝑉2(𝑠), 𝑉3(𝑠)}
0 otherwise
(1.5)
Nevertheless, not all workers face the same set of alternatives; the feasible choice set for
worker 𝑖, denoted 𝐷𝑖, is determined by her initial endowment values, ℎ𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖. Workers are
thus divided into four sub-groups, as follows:
𝐷𝑖 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{1} if 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 < ℎ*
{1, 2} if 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*
{1, 3} if 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 and ℎ𝑖 < ℎ*
{1, 2, 3} if 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 and ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*
(1.6)
At time t=2, workers must choose an optimal allocation of their income between second-
period consumption and a bequest for their child. There is no consumption in the first
period. The derivation of optimal bequests for non-graduates, public university graduates
and private university graduates may be found in Appendix A.1.
1.2.2 Universities
Rather than simply providing a signalling function as in Spence (1973), university education
in this model augments workers’ productivity by a factor 𝛾𝑘. Thus:
𝛾𝑘
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
= 1 if 𝑘 = 1
> 1 if 𝑘 = {2, 3}
(1.7)
such that remaining a non-graduate leaves productivity unchanged, while both private and
public university education strictly increase worker productivity.
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Assumption 1:
𝑄 = 𝛾𝑘ℎ𝑖 (1.8)
By Assumption 1, the production function for human capital displays complementarity in
tertiary education and innate ability such that, ceteris paribus, a worker with relatively
high ability benefits more from university education than does a worker with relatively low
ability.
Assumption 2:
𝛾3 > 𝛾2 (1.9)
Here I assume that private universities augment productivity by a larger factor than do
public universities. This captures the stylised fact that private university graduates have
more or better job-relevant skills than their public university counterparts. I later test this
assumption using the STEP data and find evidence in support of it for five out of the six
countries in my sample. The productivity differential thus represents the job-relevant skills
differential between private and public university graduates.
Finally, both private and public universities are homogeneous in their cost function, which is
given below, and where 𝑛𝑘 denotes the size of the student cohort in a given university type
and 𝑐 is the constant marginal cost.
𝐶(𝑛𝑘) = 𝑐𝑛𝑘 (1.10)
1.2.2.1 Public Universities
Public universities are assumed to be homogenoeus in quality, so I treat them as a single,
large institution. This institution is supported entirely by government funds, and is assumed
to charge no tuition fee. The cost of education is financed via a lump-sum tax, 𝜏 , on all
workers.
Assumption 3:
𝑥2 = 0 (1.11)
Nevertheless, this university has a fixed number of seats, denoted ?¯? . Thus, eligibility to enter
public university is determined by an entry requirement, ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*. In equilibrium, the value
of ℎ* is endogenously determined such that the public university exactly meets its enrolment
target, given its information set, which allows it perfectly to anticipate the education choices
of individuals at each level of wealth and ability.
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1.2.2.2 Private Universities
Like their public counterparts, private universities are homogeneous in quality, so I treat
them as a single, monopolistic firm. Price discrimination is not permitted here, so the firm
must charge a single price to all applicants. In equilibrium, therefore, the private university
sets a tuition fee above marginal cost and earns positive profits. Thus:
𝑥*3 > 𝑐 (1.12)
There is no entry requirement in terms of innate ability, but the value of the tuition fee
creates an effective cut-off rule in terms of wealth - only workers endowed with initial wealth
𝑦𝐻 are eligible to attend.
1.2.3 Employers
There is a perfectly competitive labour market, in which workers of all education types are
paid their marginal product. The market consists of two types of employer: a graduate
employer and a non-graduate employer.
1.2.3.1 Non-Graduate Employer
The non-graduate employer hires workers for an unskilled task, for which neither tertiary
education nor innate ability contributes to productivity. The production function is given
below, where 𝑛 denotes the fraction of the labour force currently working in the non-graduate
labour market.
Assumption 4:
𝑌𝑁𝐺 = 𝑛1 (1.13)
Non-graduate wages are thus given by:
𝑤1 = 1 (1.14)
1.2.3.2 Graduate Employer
I assume that the graduate sector employer uses public and private university graduates as
perfectly substitutable inputs in a constant elasticity of substitution production function with
no capital. There are thus no complementarities between the two types of graduate worker
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in the production process.3
Assumption 5:
𝑌𝐺 = 𝛾3ℎ𝑖𝑛3 + 𝛾2ℎ𝑖𝑛2 (1.15)
where 𝑛3 and 𝑛2 denote the private and public university graduating cohorts, respectively. As
tertiary education and innate ability are complements in the production function, the grad-
uate employer never hires non-graduates. Wages for private and public university graduates
are given as follows:
𝑤3 = 𝛾3ℎ𝑖 (1.16)
𝑤2 = 𝛾2ℎ𝑖 (1.17)
Finally, the private-public graduate wage premium is given by:
𝜔 = 𝛾3
𝛾2
(1.18)
1.2.4 Timing of the Model
The timing of the model for a given generation is as follows. At time 𝑡 = 0, the values of
workers’ initial endowments (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖) are realised. At time 𝑡 = 1, employers make wage offers
(𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3), the private university makes a tuition fee offer (𝑥*3) and the public university
posts an entry requirement (ℎ*). Workers observe these offers and choose a type of tertiary
education, or work in the non-graduate sector. At time 𝑡 = 2, all workers are in the labour-
force, with employment type and wages determined by their education choices at time 𝑡 = 1.
They allocate their income optimally between second-period consumption and a bequest for
their children. All workers of the generation die at the end of this period.
1.2.5 Characterising the Equilibrium
1.2.5.1 Workers’ Decision Rules
A worker with ability ℎ𝑖 and wealth 𝑦𝑖 chooses 𝑑*𝑘 to maximise discounted lifetime earnings
(see Appendix A.2 for decision rules). Thus, I can write the education choice rule for each
of the four sub-groups of worker defined by variation in feasible choice sets, as follows:
Workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿, ℎ𝑖 < ℎ* are always non-graduates as their only feasible choice is
3This assumption has been previously made in the literature and allows me to keep the framework simple
and tractable for my purposes, by avoiding the dependence of marginal products on relative labour supplies
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𝑑*𝑘 = 𝑑1.
Workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿, ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* may be non-graduates or public university graduates. Their
optimal strategy is
𝑑*𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑑2 if ℎ𝑖 > 𝑤1(1+𝛽)𝛽𝛾2
𝑑1 otherwise
(1.19)
where 𝛽 is the discount factor between periods.
Workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 , ℎ𝑖 < ℎ* may be non-graduates or private university graduates. Their
optimal strategy is:
𝑑*𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑑3 if ℎ𝑖 > 𝑤1(1+𝛽)+𝑥3𝛽𝛾3
𝑑1 otherwise
(1.20)
Finally, workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 , ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*s is the only group for whom all three choices are
feasible. Their optimal strategy is:
𝑑*𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑑3 if ℎ𝑖 > 𝑤1(1+𝛽)+𝑥3𝛽𝛾3 and ℎ𝑖 >
𝑥3
(𝛾3−𝛾2)𝛽
𝑑2 if ℎ𝑖 < 𝑥3(𝛾3−𝛾2)𝛽 and ℎ𝑖 >
𝑤1(1+𝛽)
𝛾2𝛽
𝑑1 if ℎ𝑖 < 𝑤1(1+𝛽)+𝑥3𝛾3𝛽 and ℎ𝑖 <
𝑤1(1+𝛽)
𝛾2𝛽
(1.21)
1.2.5.2 Equilibrium Worker Sorting
I now describe workers’ sorting behaviour in equilibrium. The feasible choice sets and decision
rules described above result in a set of three distinct cut-off values of ability:
i ℎ𝑖 = 𝑥3𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2)
ii ℎ𝑖 = (1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3𝛽𝛾3
iii ℎ𝑖 = (1+𝛽)𝑤1𝛽𝛾2
The relative ordering of these cut-offs with respect to each other, to the public university’s
entry requirement ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* and to the upper bound of the ability distribution, ℎ¯ = 1, fully
determines equilibrium sorting across the three education alternatives by the four worker
sub-groups. Imposing some structure on the public university capacity constraint allows me
to restrict the set of equilibria to three “reasonable” outcomes (see Appendix A.3). The
rationale for this is as follows: the public university’s physical space constraint ?¯? requires a
high value of ℎ*. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this capacity constraint is binding,
such that there exists a sub-group of workers with ability ℎ𝑖 < ℎ* who finds it optimal to
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attend public university but does not meet the entry requirement. Similarly, as the private
university imposes no entry requirement and ℎ* is high, there is likely to exist a sub-group of
workers with ℎ𝑖 < ℎ* who prefers to attend private university than to remain non-graduates.
Formally, this assumption amounts to a public university capacity constraint that satisfies
the following condition (see Appendix A.4 for derivation):
Assumption 6
?¯? ≤ (1− 𝜃)[𝛽𝛾3 + (1 + 𝛽)]
𝛽𝛾2
(1.22)
All but the sub-group of workers with ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 maintain the same optimal
behaviour across all three cases, namely that all workers with ℎ𝑖 < ℎ* and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 remain
non-graduates, all workers with ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 attend public university and, in the
sub-group of workers with ℎ𝑖 < ℎ* and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 , the sub-group 𝜃
(︁
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
)︁
remain non-
graduates, while the remaining sub-group 𝜃
(︁
ℎ* − (1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
)︁
attends private university. The
sorting behaviour of the remaining sub-group varies across the three different cases, and is
summarised as follows:
Case 1: In this case, all workers with ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 attend private university.
Case 2: In this case, the fraction 𝜃
(︁
𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2) − ℎ*
)︁
attends public university and the remain-
ing fraction 𝜃
(︁
1− 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2)
)︁
attends private university.
Case 3: In this case, the private university tuition fee is so high that no worker with ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*
and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 finds it optimal to attend private university. Thus, all workers in this sub-group
attend public university.
1.2.5.3 Public University’s Decision
Recall that public universities set ℎ* in order exactly to fill the available number of seats, ?¯? .
In Appendix A.5, I derive the value of ℎ* for each of the three possible equilibria. Note that
the value of ℎ* will be highest in Case 3, when demand for public university is highest, and
lowest in Case 1, when demand for public university is lowest.
Case 1:
ℎ* = 1− 𝜃 − ?¯?1− 𝜃 (1.23)
Case 2:
ℎ* = 1− 𝜃 − ?¯? + 𝜃𝑥
*
3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) (1.24)
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Case 3:
ℎ* = 1− ?¯? (1.25)
1.2.5.4 Private Universities’ Decision
Demand for private university comes from two sub-groups of worker: rich, high-ability work-
ers and rich, low-ability workers. Within each group, willingness to pay is increasing in
ability, due to the complementarity between tertiary education and ability in the wage func-
tion. Nevertheless, for a given level of ability, rich, low-ability workers have a more inelastic
demand for private university than do rich, high-ability workers.4 This is unsurprising, given
that they face a more favourable outside option than their low-ability counterparts.
Conditional on exogenous parameter values, the private university can then choose among
values of 𝑥3 that either capture both markets (i.e. pooling equilibria) or values that isolate
the demand of rich, low-ability workers (i.e. separating equilibria). Equilibria which isolate
the demand of rich, high-ability workers, however, do not exist. In Appendix A.6, I derive
the private university’s equilibrium tuition fee, 𝑥3, for each of the three possible cases.
Case 1: This is a pooling equilibrium in which all rich, high-ability workers and some rich,
low-ability workers attend private university. The equilibrium tuition fee is:
𝑥*3 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
[︃
𝛽𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑐
2 ,
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
(1− 𝜃) ,
𝛽𝛾3(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
(1− 𝜃) − (1 + 𝛽)
]︃
(1.26)
Case 2: This is a pooling equilibrium in which some rich, high-ability workers and some
rich, low-ability workers demand private university. Appendix A.6 derives the equilibrium
tuition fee under different parameter conditions.
Case 3: This is a separating equilibrium, in which only rich, low-ability workers demand
private university. The equilibrium tuition fee is:
𝑥*3 =
𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯?)− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑐
2 or 𝑥
*
3 = (1− ?¯?)𝛽𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽) or 𝑥*3 = 𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)
(1.27)
4To see this, compare the slopes of each group’s demand function. Rich, high-ability workers’ demand is
given by 𝑥3 ≤ 𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2)ℎ𝑖, while rich, low-ability workers’ demand is given by 𝑥3 ≤ 𝛽𝛾3ℎ𝑖− (1+𝛽). Clearly,
the former group has a less steeply-sloping demand curve.
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1.2.6 Summary
Thus, conditional on the particular realisation of parameter values, an economy may be
in any one of these three cases, where the unique equilibrium is the one that maximises
private university profit. Given exogenous parameter values, there is then always a unique
equilibrium for the model economy.
Two main predictions emerge from this model framework. The first is that the composition of
workers in private universities and, consequently, their average productivity, may vary widely
across countries in different cases. The second concerns the relative efficiency of these equilib-
ria. While all three cases involve all agents making optimal decisions given their constraints,
efficiency in terms of human capital allocation is decreasing in the distance from Case 1.
This is because Cases 2 and 3 describe outcomes in which non-zero fractions of high-ability
workers attend public university. Under the assumption that private universities supplement
worker productivity by a larger factor than do public universities, graduate-sector output
is thus lower than it would be if some of these workers attended private university instead.
Thus, there may be a role for governments to subsidise private tertiary education or to seek
to adopt private university technology into the public tertiary education sector. Discussing
the results from the structural estimation conducted in Section 4 affords an opportunity for
considering these predictions, and their implications, in more detail. First, however, I con-
sider an extension of the model framework by allowing for asymmetric information regarding
workers’ ability.
1.3 Model Extension: Asymmetric Information onWorker
Ability
I now relax the assumption of full information by introducing the following information asym-
metry into the model framework: employers can no longer observe individual’s innate ability,
although the distribution from which ability draws are made remains common knowledge.
Graduate wages are now set as follows:
𝑤𝑘 = 𝛾𝑘𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛𝑘, 𝑠′] ∀𝑘 = {1, 2} (1.28)
𝑤𝑘 = 1 ∀𝑘 = {1} (1.29)
where 𝑛𝑘 denotes the graduating cohort of education type 𝑘, and 𝑠′ is the information set
of the employer. As individual ability is now unobservable to employers, their perception of
the ability of worker 𝑖 is exactly equal to their perception of the average ability of cohort 𝑘
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(private university, public university, or non-graduate) from which she is drawn. This in turn
is determined by the choice behaviour of different groups of workers. (Common) knowledge
of such behaviour is contained in the state variable, 𝑠′. Thus, the new state variable for
employers is:
𝑠′ = {𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 𝑘𝑐, 𝑘𝑑;𝑤𝑘, ℎ*, 𝑥*3, 𝑦𝑖} (1.30)
where, as before, 𝑘 denotes the optimal education choice 𝑘 = {1, 2, 3} and the subscripts
refer to groups of workers undertaking these choices: a describes workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and
ℎ𝑖 < ℎ
*, b describes workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*, c describes workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 and
ℎ𝑖 < ℎ
*, and d describes workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 and ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*.
As before, ℎ𝑖 is a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution: ℎ𝑖 ∼ 𝑈 [0, 1].
The state variable for workers and universities is denoted 𝑠′′ and contains, in addition to the
information in 𝑠′, knowledge of individual workers’ ability endowment:
𝑠′′ = {𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 𝑘𝑐, 𝑘𝑑;𝑤𝑘, ℎ*, 𝑥*3, 𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖} (1.31)
As before, it is reasonable to assume that the discounted wage of a public university graduate
exceeds the discounted wage of a non-graduate, such that remaining a non-graduate is a
strictly dominated strategy for this group of workers. This allows me to solve for the set
of “reasonable” equilibria as in the baseline model, specifically excluding any in which high-
ability, rich workers prefer being non-graduates to attending free public university.. Formally,
this assumption amounts to a public university capacity constraint that satisfies the following
condition, which replaces Assumption 6 from the baseline model (see Appendix A.7 for
derivation):
Assumption 6′:
?¯? ≤ 2(1− 𝜃)[𝛽𝛾2 − (1 + 𝛽)]
𝛽𝛾2
(1.32)
1.3.1 Characterising the Equilibrium
As before, it is necessary to consider the optimal behaviour of four sub-groups of worker,
each of whom has a different feasible choice set, given her endowment of income and ability.
These are described in full in Appendix A.8, along with optimal worker sorting behaviour
in this model extension. This gives rise, as in the baseline model, to three distinct cases.
All low-wealth workers maintain the same optimal behaviour across all three cases, namely
that workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 < ℎ* always remain non-graduates, while the sub-group
with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* always attends public university. Thus, I now characterise the
15
three candidate equilibria in terms of the sorting behaviour of the two remaining sub-groups:
namely, rich workers, of both high and low ability:
Case 1′: In this case, all rich workers (regardless of ability) attend private university.
Case 2′: In this case, all rich, high-ability workers attend public university, while rich,
low-ability workers remain non-graduates. This defines the shut-down condition for private
universities, as its demand goes to zero.
Case 3′: In this case, all rich, high-ability workers attend public university, while rich,
low-ability workers attend private university.
Derivation of the public university’s optimal entry requirement and of the private university’s
optimal tuition fee may be found in Appendix A.9. The question of which choice of tuition fee
yields the highest profit and, consequently, which equilibrium results, depends on the relative
value of exogenous model parameters. Formally, the unique equilibrium of the economy
depends on 𝜃, the fraction of rich workers in the population. If 𝜃 is very low (but non-zero),
the equilibrium described by Case 3′ results. If 𝜃 is high, the equilibrium described by Case
1′ results. If 𝜃 = 0, we have the equilibrium described by Case 2′. Formally:
𝑥*3 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑥*23 if 𝜃 = 0
𝑥*33 if 0 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝑋
𝑥*13 if 1 > 𝜃 > 𝑋
(1.33)
where 𝑋 ≡ 1− 𝛽𝛾2?¯?
𝛽𝛾3?¯?2−2𝛽𝛾3?¯?−2(1+𝛽)(1−?¯?)+2?¯?𝑐+2𝛽𝛾2
1.3.2 Summary
As is the case with symmetric information, there are three candidate equilibria, each of
which is the unique equilibrium under different relative parameter values. Case 3′ describes
an equilibrium that, like Case 3 in the baseline model, is inefficient in its allocation of
human capital, as all high-ability workers attend public university, thereby gaining a relatively
smaller productivity boost than they would at private university. Thus, graduate-sector
output would increase if some high-ability workers moved to private university. In this model
extension, the possibility of the inefficient equilibrium arises from workers being forced to
trade-off the benefit of a higher productivity boost from private university against being
perceived by employers to be of high-ability by entering public university. In particular, the
inefficient equilibrium results when the fraction of rich workers in the population is small,
which is likely to be true in many developing countries. As before, this suggests a role for
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government to deal with the implicit market failure, either by subsidising private tertiary
education or by adopting its technology, which would require increased investment into the
public tertiary education system.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Data Description
The data I use is from the World Bank’s “Skills Towards Employment and Productivity”
(STEP) Skills Measurement household survey, administered between 2012 and 2014 in ten
developing countries: Armenia, Bolivia, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Laos, Sri Lanka,
Vietnam and Yunnan Province, China. I drop the last four countries due to their very small
sample size of private university graduates, and use only the first six in the analysis that
follows.
My sample consists of all individuals who possess an undergraduate degree or who may
be classified as a non-graduate. For the purposes of this study, the latter is defined as a
person who completed secondary schooling but has obtained no further education. I exclude
individuals with missing reports on education, wages, household wealth at age 15, or my
chosen measures of ability.
Wealth at the time of tertiary education choice-making is captured by a recall measure
of the respondent’s family’s socio-economic rank at age 15, which ranges from 0 to 10. I
refer to this hereafter as the household rank. I use two separate measures of ability. The
first is a composite quintile score based on the direct reading assessment conducted by the
World Bank in conjunction with this survey. I refer to this hereafter as the ETS score.
The reading assessment consists of a core literacy assessment unit intended to sort the least
literate from those with higher levels of reading skill; and a reading components section,
which consists of the following three sub-units: vocabulary, sentence processing and passage
comprehension. The score I construct here is the aggregation of the individual’s quintile score
for each of these four measurements. Thus, it ranges between 4 and 20 points. The second,
used as a robustness check only in Appendix A.10, is a recall measure which records how
respondents feel they compared academically to their peers in the highest primary/secondary
grade attended. Response options are “excellent/among the best in class”, “above average”,
“average” and “below average”. I use this data to construct a scale of ability which ranges
from 1 to 4 points. I refer to this hereafter as the ability score. Finally, wages are taken from
individuals’ reported period wage earnings, and are recalculated in terms of daily, US dollar
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units.5
1.4.2 Summary Statistics
In this section, I present some preliminary summary statistics. This initial presentation is not
intended to establish causal relationships; rather, it aims to test whether the data supports
the underlying assumptions of the model.
Firstly, the model assumes that private university provides a larger boost to worker pro-
ductivity than does public university. One explanation for this difference is that private
university graduates possess more or better soft skills than their public counterparts - skills
that are highly sought-after by private-sector employers in developing countries. Table 1.1
shows that 68 per cent of private university graduates in the STEP dataset work in the
private sector, where average graduate wages are highest for this sample of countries, com-
pared to only 37 per cent of public university graduates. Further, Table 1.2 summarises the
skills used by graduates in their current jobs. The cognitive skills score measures reading,
writing and numeracy on the job. The computing skills score is an aggregation of fifteen
binary measures of skills ranging from the use of email, word processing and spreadsheets
to programming, graphic design and network management. Finally, the general skills score
measures inter-personal relations, autonomy, computer use, tasks that involve learning, and
tasks that involve at least 30 minutes of thinking. We see that private university gradu-
ates have, on average, higher cognitive, computing and general skills scores than do public
university graduates.
Lastly, Table 1.3 shows that private university graduates’ hourly average wages (in USD) are
nearly twice that of their public university counterparts. In fact, private university graduates
in this sample have both a lower unemployment rate and a shorter school-to-work transition
than public university graduates, so these differences exist along extensive margins as well
as intensive ones. Collectively, therefore, the summary statistics presented here are broadly
in line with the model assumption that private university boosts worker productivity more
than public university does.
Table 1.4 presents some additional summary statistics for each country, disaggregated by level
of education. Here, ability is measured by ETS score and wealth by household rank.
5In the case of Armenia alone, I use hourly wage data, due to the unreliability of the daily wage data in this
instance. As the analysis that follows makes use only of relative wages, this does not affect the comparability
of results across countries.
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Table 1.1: Employment Sector by University Type
frequency percentage avg. daily wage (US$)
public graduates
private sector 466 37.40 14.50
public sector 780 62.60 11.53
Total 1246 100
private graduates
private sector 124 67.76 22.84
public sector 59 32.24 19.55
Total 183 100
Table 1.2: Soft Skills by University Type
mean sd min max difference
Cognitive Skills -0.622***
public 5.65 2.14 0 9
private 6.28 1.76 0 9
Computing Skills -1.801***
public 2.56 3.65 0 15
private 4.39 4.14 0 15
General Skills -1.044***
public 10.03 2.62 0 15
private 11.09 2.51 0 15
Table 1.3: Daily Wages by Education Type
mean sd min max
public university graduate 12.48 10.40 .14 95.45
private university graduate 21.18 16.43 .26 90
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics by Country and Level of Education
private graduate public graduate non-graduate
Armenia
proportion (full population) 0.01 0.37 0.62
proportion (grad. population) 0.03 0.97 -
hourly wage (USD) 1.36 1.64 1.28
ability 7.46 7.62 7.49
wealth 5.86 6.72 5.75
N 24 777 1306
Bolivia
proportion (full population) 0.05 0.09 0.85
proportion (grad. population) 0.36 0.64 -
daily wage (USD) 12.93 7.90 2.87
ability 7.88 7.81 6.25
wealth 5.33 4.97 4.22
N 76 134 1230
Colombia
proportion (full population) 0.06 0.03 0.91
proportion (grad. population) 0.62 0.38 -
daily wage (USD) 14.48 14.07 3.32
ability 7.98 8.08 6.79
wealth 5.42 4.75 4.18
N 121 73 1968
Georgia
proportion (full population) 0.02 0.20 0.78
proportion (grad. population) 0.11 0.89 -
daily wage (USD) 3.35 3.46 1.06
ability 6.88 7.01 6.59
wealth 6 6.01 5.55
N 34 274 1092
Ghana
proportion (full population) 0.01 0.07 0.92
proportion (grad. population) 0.14 0.86 -
daily wage (USD) 4.83 5.61 0.73
ability 11.32 11.39 7.52
wealth 6.28 5.41 4.87
N 25 156 2095
Kenya
proportion (full population) 0.01 0.08 0.92
proportion (grad. population) 0.08 0.92 -
daily wage (USD) 13 12.45 1.85
ability 7.9 7.93 6.44
wealth 6.3 5.21 4.46
N 20 230 2722
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1.4.3 Education Choice Regression and Case Predictions
The summary statistics allow us to make some (limited) predictions about the outcome
of each country. We expect countries with a positive private-public wealth differential, a
negligible private-public ability differential and a positive private-public wage differential to
be closer to Case 1. This is because average wages for private graduates rise when rich,
high-ability workers attend private university, and wealth rather than ability drives sorting
across university types. Equally, we expect countries with a negligible private-public wealth
differential, a negative private-public ability differential and a negative private-public wage
differential to be closer to Case 3. This is because average wages for private graduates fall
when rich, high-ability workers attend public university, and ability rather than wealth drives
sorting across university types. We cannot, however, easily distinguish a Case 2 county from
these other cases.
Table 1.5: Wage Ratios and Predicted Cases
Predicted Case Private Grad/Public Grad Wage Ratio
Bolivia 1 1.64
Colombia 1 1.03
Kenya 1 1.04
Armenia 3 0.82
Georgia 3 0.97
Ghana 3 0.86
Bolivia, Colombia and Kenya have a positive private-public graduate wage differential, while
Armenia, Georgia and Ghana have a negative one, as Table 1.5 shows. Thus, we expect
the former group to be closer to Case 1 and the latter to be closer to Case 3. I use a
multinomial logit specification to estimate tertiary education choice for the two groups, and
to test whether the coefficients on ability and wealth are in line with the predictions above.
The results, using public university as the base outcome, are provided in Table 1.6. The key
independent variables in terms of model assumptions are ability and income, and I include a
set of control variables, including a full set of country dummies.
First, note that the coefficients on ability and wealth for non-graduates are negative and
significant, as expected. Second, for the choice between private and public university, the
coefficient on ability is positive and significant for both Case 1 and Case 3 countries, but
the latter coefficient is larger, in line with the predictions above. The coefficient on wealth
is positive and significant for Case 1 countries, but zero for Case 3 countries, as predicted.
Thus, the reduced-form results support the model’s prediction of different equilibria across
countries.
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Table 1.6: Education Choice Regression
Dependent Variable: highest education level
(1) (2)
case 1 countries case 3 countries
non-graduate
ability -0.936*** -1.087***
(-15.15) (-22.20)
wealth -0.247*** -0.114***
(-8.09) (-5.95)
private university graduate
ability -0.283** -0.400**
(-2.89) (-2.80)
wealth 0.144** -0.004
(2.96) (-0.06)
country dummies Yes Yes
Observations 6333 5481
t statistics in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
controls: household size at age 12, gender, age
1.5 Estimation and Results
1.5.1 Static Model Estimation
The model framework consists of workers who are heterogeneous in terms of ability and initial
wealth. Thus, I begin by defining corresponding cut-offs for wealth and ability in the data
(see Appendix A.11 for details).
Estimation of the unknown parameters occurs in three steps. Firstly, I set some parameters
equal to standard values in the literature or to those taken directly from the data. Table 1.7
summarises the values used. Real interest rates for each country are obtained from World
Bank Development Indicators data.6 The capacity of public universities is set to equal the
proportion of public university graduates in each country sample. The fraction of rich workers
is set to equal the fraction of the country sample whose value of the household socio-economic
rank variable is greater than or equal to 7, as explained in Appendix A.11.
Secondly, I estimate the main parameters of the model independently for each country using
simulated method of moments (SMM). The chosen estimator thus minimises the distance
6Real interest rate data for Ghana is missing, so I replace it with the average of the other five countries’
values.
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Table 1.7: Fixed Parameters
Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya
discount factor, 𝛽 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
real interest rate, 𝑟 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
public university capacity, ?¯? 0.37 0.09 0.03 0.20 0.07 0.08
fraction of initial rich, 𝜃 0.40 0.11 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.11
between a set of selected moments from the data and the moments generated by simulation
of the model (McFadden (1989)). The SMM estimator takes the form:
𝜃𝑆,𝑇 (𝑊 ) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃[?^?𝑑𝑇 − ?^?𝑠𝑆,𝑇 (𝜃)]′𝑊𝑇 [?^?𝑑𝑇 − ?^?𝑠𝑆,𝑇 (𝜃)] (1.34)
where ?^?𝑑𝑇 is a vector of moments from the data with 𝑇 observations, ?^?𝑠𝑆,𝑇 is the corresponding
vector of moments from 𝑆 simulations of 𝑇 observations, and𝑊𝑇 is a weighting matrix. Here,
I set 𝑆 = 1 and 𝑊𝑇 is the identity matrix.
The parameters to be estimated structurally are the university’s marginal cost (𝑐), the pro-
ductivity contribution of private university (𝛾3) and the productivity contribution of public
university (𝛾2). To identify these three parameters, I use the following five moments: the
proportion of non-graduates in the sample, the proportion of high-ability workers in private
university, the proportion of rich workers in public university, the ratio of private univer-
sity graduate wages to public university graduate wages, and the ratio of private university
graduate wages to non-graduate wages.
Table 1.8 shows the values of these moments for each country, alongside the corresponding
simulated values from the estimation. The “distance” row shows the value of the minimisation
criterion in each case.
Table 1.9 displays the resulting parameter estimates. Importantly, these results are in line
with my initial hypothesis that private universities provide a larger productivity boost than
do their public counterparts (i.e. 𝛾3 > 𝛾2). The only exception is Ghana, where the estimated
value of 𝛾2 is slightly higher than the corresponding estimate of 𝛾3.
Finally, I compute the remaining parameters as follows. The initial wealth of rich workers
is set at a value just above the highest optimal tuition fee charged by private universities
in any equilibrium; this is to ensure that the choice of wealth level does not determine the
equilibrium. The initial wealth of poor workers is set to be equal to the value of the private
university’s marginal cost, estimated structurally. Finally, the lump-sum tax is equal to
the equilibrium fraction of public university graduates, multiplied by the marginal cost of
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Table 1.8: Matched Moments
Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya
prop. non-grads (data) 0.62 0.85 0.91 0.78 0.92 0.92
prop. non-grads (sim.) 0.62 0.86 0.91 0.78 0.92 0.86
prop. rich public grads (data) 0.52 0.08 0.12 0.43 0.22 0.2
prop. rich public grads (sim.) 0.41 0.08 0 0.35 0.15 0
prop. high-ability private grads (data) 0.17 0.28 0.44 0.01 0.16 0.25
prop. high-ability private grads (sim.) 0 0.28 0.06 0 0 0.15
private/public grad wage ratio (data) 0.82 1.64 1.03 0.97 0.86 1.04
private/public grad wage ratio (sim.) 0.80 1.64 1.08 0.97 0.86 1.07
private grad/non-grad wage ratio (data) 1.06 4.51 4.34 3.17 6.62 7.03
private grad/non-grad wage ratio (sim.) 1.07 4.51 4.33 3.17 6.62 7.03
distance 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.05
Table 1.9: Estimated Structural Parameters
Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya
university marginal cost, 𝑐 0.10 2.4 0 2.1 6.3 0.07
private university productivity, 𝛾3 5.94 19.53 21.00 14.66 26.25 34.86
public university productivity, 𝛾2 5.69 10.20 14.37 12.69 27.89 24.00
educating each graduate and divided by the size of the country sample. The results are shown
in Table 1.10.
Table 1.10: Fixed Parameters
Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya
initial wealth of rich, 𝑦𝐻 10 10 10 10 10 10
initial wealth of poor, 𝑦𝐿 0.10 2.4 0 2.1 6.3 0.07
lump-sum tax, 𝜏 0.04 0.22 0 0.39 0.43 0.01
1.5.2 Multiple Cases and Efficiency
The model predicts that any one of three possible cases may manifest in a particular country,
conditional on its exogenous parameter values. In the basic model with observable ability,
these are as follows: in case 1, all high-ability, rich workers and some low-ability, rich workers
above a threshold level of ability attend private university, while poor, high-ability workers
attend public university and poor, low-ability workers remain non-graduates. In case 2,
behaviour is unchanged except that a fraction of the high-ability, rich workers now attend
public rather than private university. In case 3, behaviour is again unchanged from case 1
except that all high-ability, rich workers attend public rather than private university. Recall
that these different cases result directly from the optimal tuition fee set by the private
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university, which in turn depends on the relative value of the productivity boosts offered by
private and public university (i.e. the values of 𝛾3 and 𝛾2) and on the value of its marginal
cost parameter.
The results from the structural estimation highlight this wide variability of outcomes across
countries as a consequence of variation in exogenous parameter values: Colombia and Kenya
are in case 1, Bolivia is in case 2, and Armenia, Georgia and Ghana are all in case 3, as Table
1.11 shows.
Table 1.11: Cases
Case
Armenia 3
Bolivia 2
Colombia 1
Georgia 3
Ghana 3
Kenya 1
The existence of multiple equilibria across countries is important primarily because, as dis-
cussed earlier, the resulting tertiary education outcomes deviate to varying degrees from the
social planner’s optimum. Specifically, in all countries for which 𝛾3 > 𝛾2, case 1 is the most,
and case 3 the least, desirable from the social planner’s perspective.
To see this more clearly, consider the output in Table 1.12. Here, I consider the outcomes in
each country under case 1 and case 3, respectively. To do so, I set the tuition fee for case 1
equal to its highest possible level, and the tuition fee for case 3 equal to its lowest possible
level, thus obtaining a lower bound on the size of the efficiency loss manifest by moving from
case 1 to 3. I calculate aggregate output under each of these equilibria, and then compute
the percentage deviation from aggregate output under the social planner’s optimal allocation
of education (see Appendix A.12). It is clear that the movement from case 1 to 3 within
each country (excluding Ghana) involves an increase in the deviation from output under the
social planner’s optimum. This occurs through two channels: a fall in the total number of
graduates and (potentially) a fall in the productivity of existing graduates.
Thus, differences in parameter values across countries affect the efficiency of resulting equi-
libria, with the size of the efficiency loss increasing as the economy moves further away from
case 1 if 𝛾3 > 𝛾2.
The grouping of countries into separate equilibria is interesting for a second reason, namely
that it shows very clearly the different roles private universities may adopt in different
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Table 1.12: Measuring Efficiency Loss
country equilibrium tuition fee % Δ from benchmark output total grads. output per grad.
Armenia 1 -0.48 -5.68 1022 4.37
Armenia 3 0.10 -10.32 786 4.66
Bolivia 1 3.18 -65.10 199 11.65
Bolivia 3 3.55 -68.01 173 10.79
Colombia 1 2.54 -70.22 199 14.68
Colombia 3 2.64 -70.76 190 14.63
Georgia 1 0.64 -27.69 568 10.48
Georgia 3 0.90 -37.10 455 10.41
Ghana* 1 - - - -
Ghana 3 0 -57.55 545 17.44
Kenya 1 3.97 -71.64 407 23.63
Kenya 3 4.34 -73.16 377 23.25
*equilibrium 1 impossible in Ghana, which has 𝛾3 < 𝛾2
economies. In case 1 countries, for instance, private universities are clearly the preferred
option for tertiary education across all levels of ability, and only wealth constraints prevent
public university applicants from switching to private university. At the other end of the
spectrum, private universities in case 3 countries are populated solely by wealthy workers of
relatively low ability, while all the most able workers in the economy attend public university.
Finally, in case 2 countries private universities manage to attract both high- and low-ability
workers, yet there remains a sub-group of the wealthy that finds it optimal to attend public
university instead, such that public universities receive a mix of students from across the
income distribution. The ability to predict such a diverse range of outcomes is one of the
most important features of the model framework, and is central to the analysis presented in
the remainder of this section.
1.5.3 Interpreting Results
The differences in parameter values across countries is also important for another reason:
namely, that they underpin wide variation in the wages of workers with different types of
education, as well as in the cost of private tertiary education. Table 1.13 shows that the
estimated private university tuition fee as a percentage of rich workers’ initial wealth ranges
from a mere 1 per cent in Armenia to 73 per cent in Ghana. Equally, the average private
graduate wage premium over non-graduate pay ranges from 7 per cent in Armenia to 603 per
cent in Kenya. There is also a large amount of variation in the difference between average
private and public graduate wage rates in different countries: in Armenia, the average private
graduate earns approximately 20 per cent less than her public university counterpart while,
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in Bolivia, she earns 63 per cent more than the average public university graduate.
Table 1.13: Comparing Private University Costs and Wage Premia
Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya
tuition fee as % of 𝑦𝐻 1.00 32.23 25.51 27.06 73.41 39.67
private grad./non-grad. wage premium (%) 7.14 346.69 332.64 216.79 561.64 602.63
private grad./public grad. wage premium (%) -19.63 62.59 8.63 -3.22 -13.90 7.31
1.5.4 Model Dynamics
In order better to understand the impact of the expansion over time of private universities in
developing countries, it is necessary to consider the evolution of these model economies in a
dynamic setting. Unfortunately, the STEP survey provides only a single cross-section of data,
so it is not possible to obtain structural parameter estimates based on actually observing
the evolution of the moments in the data. Nevertheless, it is still instructive to compare
outcomes over time across the STEP countries using the parameter estimates obtained from
the cross-section, while recognising the limitations of such an approach. This is because
such an exercise allows me to highlight the fact that the expansion of private universities
in developing countries does not have a clear dynamic effect on aggregate productivity and
income inequality. Rather, such effects depend crucially on relative parameter values, as
will be demonstrated in this section. Thus, the results in this section should not be read as
predictive of the future outcomes of these particular countries but, rather, as a demonstration
of the dynamic outcomes one might expect in economies characterised by the state variables
we observe in the cross-sectional data.
I proceed by using the structural parameter estimates from Table 1.9 to run the OLG model
over six generations, independently for each country as in the static case.
1.5.4.1 Generational Equilibria and Social Efficiency
An interesting and important result that emerges from this exercise is that countries move
away from case 1 over time. Specifically, of the three countries that begin in case 3, two remain
there in every generation and, in the third (Armenia), private universities cease entirely to
operate. By contrast, the two countries that begin in case 1 move to case 2 very quickly, while
Bolivia, the only country to begin in case 2, moves briefly to case 3 but then returns to case
2 in the next generation, as shown in Table 1.14. Thus, case 3 is persistent in a manner that
case 1 is not. This is important because, as just discussed, case 1 is the closest to, and case
3 the furthest from, the social planner’s optimal allocation when 𝛾3 > 𝛾2. Ghana, as earlier
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noted, is an exception to this rule, as it is the only one of the six countries for which public
universities provide a greater contribution to productivity than do their private counterparts;
thus, case 3 is both persistent and desirable here. The first main result, therefore, is that
for countries in which private universities are more productivity-enhancing than public ones,
efficiency weakly declines over time.
Table 1.14: Generational Equilibria
Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. 4 Gen. 5 Gen. 6
Armenia 3 - - - - -
Bolivia 2 3 2 2 2 2
Colombia 1 2 2 2 2 2
Georgia 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ghana 3 3 3 3 3 3
Kenya 1 2 3 2 2 2
A second important result is that there is wide variation in the success of the private university
sector across countries: the sector may remain small, expand significantly or collapse entirely.
This is, in fact, mirrored in the observed trajectory of private universities across developed
countries. Consider, for instance, Figure 1-1, which shows enrolments in private universities
as a percentage of total tertiary education enrolments across the OECD at two points in time:
2003 and 2011. First, there is large variation in the 2003 cross-section, and second, between
2003 and 2011, there is movement in different directions - the sector shrinks in Portugal and
Switzerland, for instance, but grows in New Zealand and the Slovak Republic.
Similarly, in this simulation using data from the STEP countries, private university enrolment
grows strongly in Kenya and Colombia, remains at a low, constant level in Ghana, Bolivia
and Georgia, and collapses to zero in Armenia, with the private university shutting down in
the second generation in the latter country, as Figure 1-2 shows.
1.5.4.2 Output Per Worker
Now, having established that dynamic outcomes for private universities vary widely across
the STEP countries, I turn my attention to the question of what this means for productivity
and income inequality.
First, Figure 1-3 shows the path of output per worker for each of the six countries. The
two countries which experienced strong growth in the private university sector - Kenya and
Colombia - also display much higher output per worker than other countries. Bolivia, despite
being in the same case (i.e. 2) as Kenya and Colombia fails to take off in either dimension.
This is because, despite having similar values of private and public university productivity to
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Figure 1-1: Percentage of Students in Independent or Government-Assisted Private Tertiary
Education
Figure 1-2: Proportion of Private University Graduates
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Figure 1-3: Output per Capita
Colombia, it has a higher marginal cost (see Table 1.9) and so, must set a higher equilibrium
tuition fee. This constrains the growth of private university enrolment and, consequently,
output per worker. The three case 3 countries remain at a constant, low level of output per
worker (and private university enrolment) over time.
Correspondingly, Figure 1-4 shows the percentage deviation of output per worker in each
country from a counterfactual scenario in which private universities do not exist. Output per
worker is higher than in the counterfactual case for all countries except Armenia where, since
private universities shut down after the first generation, the counterfactual is equal to the ob-
served result. This is unsurprising, given that the emergence of private universities increases
the total number, and (except in Ghana and Armenia) the productivity, of graduates. Thus,
the benefits of private universities derive from two separate (and complementary) channels.
More interesting, however, is to observe that the gap between observed and counterfactual
output per worker is, as before, largest in Colombia and Kenya.
A third result emerging from the dynamic simulation, therefore, is that the effect of private
universities on output per worker varies widely, and a large positive effect depends crucially
on whether 𝛾3 and 𝛾2 (and, indeed, their difference) is sufficiently large, and the marginal
cost parameter sufficiently small.
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Figure 1-4: Output per Capita: Counterfactual Comparison
1.5.4.3 Workers’ Income Inequality
Private education is often associated with perpetuating income inequality. While it is true
that, in all STEP countries in which private universities survive, income inequality is higher
compared to the counterfactual of no private universities, the reality is more nuanced, as
Figure 1-5 shows. This figure plots the percentage deviation of the Gini coefficient from its
counterfactual value in the case of no private universities for each of the STEP countries. In
Ghana, for instance, inequality is high and rising over time in both cases, and there is very
little difference between the case with and without private universities. As with output per
capita, the gap between the counterfactual and observed Gini coefficient is highest in Kenya
and Colombia, where private universities hold greater sway over the economy.
A caveat regarding these results is that this simple framework cannot model the manner in
which the graduate wage premium may respond to the graduate labour supply expansion
caused by the arrival of private universities. Studies that consider such effects for the U.S.
and for OECD countries have shown, however, that graduate wages, rather than falling in
response to such an increase in graduate labour supply, have remained remarkably constant.
For instance, Barth and Lucifora (2006) find a negligible change in the graduate premium
over the period 1985-2000, when the tertiary education supply grew on average by 20 per
cent each year. Similarly, Machin and McNally (2007) show that the graduate wage premia
for the UK and the US actually increase slightly over 1980-2004, despite similar increases
in tertiary education supply. Both sets of authors argue that this is due to a large and
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Figure 1-5: Gini Coefficient for Workers: Counterfactual Comparison
offsetting increase in graduate labour demand, driven by skill-biased technological change.
It may similarly be argued that structural transformation and technological advancement
in developing countries over the period in which private universities have appeared there
implies a similar labour demand shift to keep returns high. Indeed, Machin (2002) argues
that “the shifts in skill demand in the developing world appear to be correlated with the
shifts seen in the developed world”, while Ra et al. (2015) provides further evidence of this
for Asia in particular. Otherwise, we would expect the effects shown in this section to be
somewhat muted by a fall in graduate wages: evidence from the OECD suggests an extensive-
margin elasticity of about 2 in the absence of any demand-side effects (Barth and Lucifora
(2006)).
Looking now across the STEP countries, we would expect that workers’ income inequality is
higher in those with a larger private graduate wage premium and a higher marginal cost for
private universities (the latter because this drives up the optimal tuition fee, thus reducing
the number of graduates relative to non-graduates). The capacity of the public university is
also likely to play a role in this respect. Figure 1-6 broadly supports this interpretation. The
Gini coefficient is highest in Kenya, the country with the highest private graduate to non-
graduate wage ratio in the data. Armenia begins with the second-highest value (somewhat
mechanically, as it has the highest fraction of wealthy workers in the static model), but
quickly becomes the country with the lowest level of inequality, in keeping with its very
low graduate wage premium. Conditional on having similar graduate wage premia, the
university’s marginal cost parameter becomes relatively more important, broadly determining
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Figure 1-6: Gini Coefficient for Workers
the ordering of the remaining countries here.
Workers’ inequality decreases over time in all countries but Ghana, where it is increasing
at a decreasing rate. Importantly, this difference is not driven by the fact that 𝛾2 > 𝛾3
in Ghana (the effect persists if I switch the values of the two parameters). Rather, this
is simply a feature of a case 3 country with a sufficiently high value of public university
productivity. The reason for this is that, in case 3 countries, many wealthy graduates now
attend public university, at zero cost. If the public university wage premium is sufficiently
high, the first generation rich will leave a bequest larger than its own initial wealth, causing
income inequality to increase over time. Thus, in cases where the private university tuition fee
is high, the profit-maximising behaviour of private universities hinders the growth of income
inequality, by capturing a large portion of rents which would otherwise accrue to graduates
and their descendants.
Thus, while having private universities weakly raises workers’ income inequality relative to
the counterfactual with no such institutions, the relationship between private university en-
rolment and income inequality is not unambiguous. Specifically, with low enrolment, as is
the case in case 3 countries, the gap between observed and counterfactual income inequality
will be smaller but, if the graduate wage premium is sufficiently high, the limited power of
private universities to capture excess rents may lead to an increase in income inequality over
time.
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A final result emerging from this section, therefore, is that, as with output per capita, the
effect of private universities on workers’ income inequality is always positive compared to
the counterfactual with no private universities, but the magnitude of the effect varies widely
across countries, and is driven primarily by the size of the private graduate wage premium,
but also by the size of the university’s marginal cost parameter. Finally and importantly, it
is not simply the case that countries with higher private university enrolments (i.e. case 1
countries) are more unequal than countries in case 3, as the latter may experience growth in
inequality over time.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has explored the effect of private universities operating in developing countries on
human capital allocation, aggregate productivity and workers’ income equality. I have shown,
firstly, that the growth experience of private universities may vary dramatically across coun-
tries: even in this small sample, we observe these institutions growing strongly, remaining at a
low, relatively constant level, or shutting down entirely over time in different countries.
Secondly, I have demonstrated that the worker composition of these universities also varies
across countries. There are three possible cases: in case 1, private universities attract wealthy
workers of all abilities, in case 2, some wealthy workers of relatively high ability attend
public university but others remain at the private one and, in case 3, the private university
consists solely of low-ability, wealthy workers, while all high-ability workers attend public
university.
Thirdly, private universities always increase output per worker, by raising the number and (if
the difference between private and public university productivity parameters is sufficiently
positive) the productivity of graduates. Nevertheless, the size of the effect is heteroge-
neous across countries, and is largest when the productivity parameter of private and public
universities (and their difference) is large, while the marginal cost of tertiary education is
small.
Fourthly, workers’ income inequality is weakly higher than the counterfactual with no such
institutions, but the relationship between private university enrolment and inequality is nu-
anced - at low levels of enrolment, the gap with the counterfactual is smaller, but the limited
ability of private universities to capture excess rents may lead to income inequality increasing
over time if the graduate wage premium is sufficiently large.
While the specific results of the model are considered here only in relation to a small group
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of developing countries, the central premise that small differences in underlying parameter
values underpin large differences across countries in the growth of private universities, their
cohort composition, and their effects on output and inequality may be applied more generally
to explain observed patterns in other developing countries across the world.
Further research may use longitudinal data to consider how deep structural parameters may
vary over time, and extend the model to deal with more complex interactions, such as how
a non-competitive labour market - in which workers’ wages no longer are constrained by
marginal product - or cohort effects, may affect workers’ sorting behaviour.
35
36
Chapter 2
A Job Worth Waiting for:
Parental Wealth and Youth
Unemployment in Ghana
Abstract
Youth unemployment in Ghana increases in parental wealth. This occurs because, in the
absence of unemployment insurance, only workers with a sufficiently high stock of parental
wealth can afford to remain unemployed, and do so in order to search for scarce, high-
productivity jobs. I build and estimate a structural model of endogenous education, employ-
ment and occupational choice to quantify this effect, and to demonstrate that it leads to a
number of undesirable labour market outcomes: namely, low educational attainment, high
income inequality and low match efficiency among workers of heterogeneous ability. I use
the estimation results to decompose the effect of wealth on average lifetime earnings into an
education channel and an unemployment channel, and show that the latter accounts for 37%
of the total effect. Further, I use the estimated model to compare the effectiveness of two
alternative policy interventions: an education subsidy and unemployment insurance. I find
that the education subsidy is most effective at increasing aggregate productivity, but comes
at the cost of increasing income inequality, while unemployment insurance has a smaller effect
on aggregate productivity but also decreases income inequality.
Keywords: Youth Unemployment, Occupational Choice, Human Capital Invest-
ment, Credit Constraints, Unemployment Insurance
JEL codes: J24, I24, J64
37
2.1 Introduction
The first-time transition from school to the labour force often involves a period of searching
for a “good” job offer, regardless of where in the world it takes place. In many developing
countries, however, institutional failures such as search and information frictions, and a
shortage of desirable employment options can severely protract the required waiting time,
while a lack of credit or unemployment insurance renders long periods of unemployment
more costly. The outcome of these tensions is high dispersion and low average productivity
among accepted jobs. In Sub-Saharan Africa, such a state of affairs bears a particularly high
economic cost, as the region has the youngest population of any in the world: approximately
70% of its citizens are under 30 years of age, and the ILO estimates that 11 million young
people will enter the labour market each year over the next decade. Consequently, the
question of how best to channel youth into stable and productive employment is an important
consideration for researchers and policy-makers alike.
The primary focus of existing research and policy dialogue concerning youth in this region
has been unemployment (see, for instance, Baah-Boateng (2013) and Baah-Boateng (2016)).
This is epitomised by the president of Ghana who, in his 2018 State of the Nation address,
declared that “the number of young people who cannot find work is staggering and a threat
to our national security”.1 Nevertheless, there is an informal consensus among academics
and policy-makers that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, unemployment is often a luxury that few
can afford (Hart (1973), Udall and Sinclair (1982) and Fox et al. (2016)).2 In this paper, I
use data from Ghana to present a set of stylised facts that formalise this view. I show that
youth unemployment in this region is relatively low; consequently, the low productivity of
youth employment represents a much graver and more salient concern than unemployment.3
Further, I demonstrate that the probability of youth unemployment is increasing in parental
wealth: a 1% rise in parental assets is associated with a 0.08 percentage point increase in
the probability of unemployment among 15-29 year-old Ghanaian males. This relationship
arises precisely because the scarcity of high-productivity employment requires workers to
wait (often several years) for a “good” job. Youth whose families do not have a large stock
of assets to draw down will then accept worse jobs in order to avoid a prolonged period
of unemployment. In the absence of unemployment insurance these effects are likely to be
1https://www.dw.com/en/ghana-president-vows-to-step-up-fight-against-youth-unemployment/a-
42519951, last accessed 26 August 2018
2See also Serneels (2007) for a treatment of this subject in the context of workers queueing for public-
sector employment in urban Ethiopia. He argues, however, that unemployment is concentrated among the
middle-classes, rather than the wealthiest strata of society.
3This is in line with Falco and Teal (2012), who argue that, for young job-seekers in urban Ghana, the
binding constraint is not a shortage of jobs, but the low wages offered by many of them.
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particularly pronounced. Finally, I show that educational attainment is low, a fact that may
also be explained by an inability to reap the returns of education when they must be preceded
by a costly stint in unemployment.
I build and structurally estimate a model that quantifies these effects and demonstrates that
the positive link between parental assets and unemployment has negative implications for
education choices, income inequality and aggregate productivity. Individuals in the model are
heterogeneous in initial family assets and ability. They make decisions over whether or not to
invest in education, which sector of employment to accept work in, and how long to remain
unemployed after the end of education. A tension between the desire for higher consumption
while unemployed and the desire to save in order to fund a continued search for a better job
underlies, and motivates, these decisions. The consequence of this is a positive relationship
between parental wealth and unemployment, which results in youth from wealthier families
obtaining higher-productivity jobs, on average, than their poorer counterparts. For the
latter, this often implies a career in low-productivity agriculture or small-scale, low-capital
entrepreneurship. In particular, when the expected return to education is low and earnings
in high-education jobs are relatively dispersed, there is a high degree of income inequality,
low educational participation and an inefficient allocation of workers to jobs, as low-wealth,
high-ability workers end up in low-productivity employment.
I use the estimated model to decompose the effect of parental wealth on a worker’s average
lifetime earnings into two channels: higher education and greater willingness to wait in
unemployment for a good job. I show that, for Ghana, the former accounts for 63% of
the total effect, while the latter contributes the remaining 37%. The model also provides
a framework within which to consider counter-factual policy experiments. Accordingly, I
use it to compare the effectiveness of two alternative policy interventions: an education
subsidy and unemployment insurance. I find that the education subsidy is most effective
at improving aggregate productivity – a subsidy of 20% increases productivity by 25%, but
also increases income inequality by 6%. Unemployment insurance of the same total value
increases aggregate productivity by only 1%, but also reduces income inequality by 1%.
The relatively small effects generated by unemployment insurance are due to the fact that
the take-up rate of this policy is higher than that of the education subsidy. With a fixed
budget, this results in a relatively small per-person payment compared to that of the latter
policy. Differences in the size of the productivity effect across the two policies are also due
to gains from raising the aggregate level of education outweighing the gains from extending
unemployment (while holding education constant) in order to access higher-productivity
employment. The opposing effects on equity are due to workers in the bottom 20% of the
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initial wealth distribution being unresponsive to the education subsidy, such that the former
policy disproportionately benefits wealthier individuals, while the latter disproportionately
benefits the bottom of the wealth distribution. Thus, the optimal policy prescription depends
on a government’s relative preferences over efficiency and equity.
This paper draws on, and brings together, three related strands of existing literature: research
on the role of assets in determining labour market outcomes, research on education choice
and its implications for labour market search, and research on unemployment in developing-
country contexts.
In the first of these strands, Danforth (1979) is one of the earliest papers to analyse job
search with risk-averse workers, and shows that reservation wages are increasing in wealth.4
Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2015) come closest to the spirit of this paper: they set up a
search-and-matching framework with wage-posting, in which workers choose whether to di-
rect their search towards low- or high-productivity jobs. There is a trade-off between job
productivity and the probability of receiving an offer in each sub-market, such that initial
assets determine workers’ sorting behaviour across job types. They demonstrate the condi-
tions under which workers with low levels of initial assets sort into low-risk, low-productivity
jobs, while high-asset workers prefer jobs with high levels of both risk and productivity, and
unemployment duration increases in initial asset-holdings. Relatedly, Herkenhoff et al. (2017)
use an empirical approach and US data to show that, when credit access tightens during an
economic downturn, employment levels recover relatively quickly, while output and produc-
tivity remain low; this is due to low-asset workers exiting unemployment relatively quickly,
and taking jobs at low-productivity firms. A separate strand of the literature, based on Baily
(1978), shows that the receipt of unemployment insurance extends job search duration: for
instance, Chetty (2008) shows that UI disproportionately extends the search of low-asset
households, while Crossley and Low (2011) demonstrate the effects of UI on inter-temporal
consumption smoothing and job search duration in the presence of credit constraints.
The other two papers in this grouping focus on aggregate-level structural change: Banerjee
and Newman (1993) use a dynamic model of occupational choice to explain how the initial
distribution of wealth among individuals determines the long-run development path of the
economy, which, under certain conditions, leads to prosperity, and, under others, results
in stagnation. The mechanism driving these outcomes is the occupational choices made
by individuals in the presence of imperfect credit markets. Similarly, Ghatak and Jiang
4See Mortensen (1986) for a review of related research, and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001), Algan et al.
(2002) and Rendon (2006) for similar findings. Lentz and Tranaes (2005) show that search effort decreases
in wealth for risk-averse workers when utility is additively separable. Wolpin (1987) estimates an asset-
dependent model of the transition from high-school to employment for US workers.
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(2002) set up an inter-generational model of poverty traps based on Banerjee and Newman
(1993), in which credit-constrained workers must choose among three sectors of employment:
agricultural subsistence, entrepreneurship and wage work. The entrepreneurial sector utilises
a more efficient, but also more costly, technology than the subsistence sector. Consequently,
the question of whether or not the economy converges to a prosperous equilibrium depends
on the initial wealth distribution: a threshold amount of investment in entrepreneurship
is required in order to push the economy onto the high-growth path. Finally, Galor and
Zeira (1993) demonstrate the way in which the initial wealth distribution drives long-run
aggregate output in the presence of imperfect credit markets and indivisibility in human
capital investment.
The second strand of literature I build on deals with endogenous education choice. Keane and
Wolpin (1997) set up and estimate a dynamic, discrete-choice model of schooling, employment
and occupational choice.5 They use this to explain observed patterns in the labour-market
outcomes of young men in the US, and to forecast patterns of employment and wages. The
primary focus of the paper is its augmentation of the standard human capital investment
model, however, rather than a consideration of inequality. As such, there is no treatment of
wealth. Flinn and Mullins (2015) augment a standard search-and-matching framework with
an endogenous education choice that enables access to different labour sub-markets. As in the
model of this paper, workers are heterogeneous in ability, and earnings are complementary
in ability and match productivity with the firm. Workers sort across sub-markets, taking
into account the relative costs, wages, and unemployment rates. The authors then estimate
the model using US data to consider the impact of minimum wage policies and education
subsidies on welfare. Again, however, differences in wealth are not considered. A closely
related paper is Lee (2005), who estimates a dynamic model of schooling, employment and
occupational choice for US data, in order to consider the effect of changes in cohort size
on these decisions.6. Lastly, a number of papers such as Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and
Yang (2017) also analyse the effect of parental wealth on post-secondary schooling choice and,
consequently, lifetime earnings, but without consideration of unemployment behaviour.
The third, and final, body of research focuses on unemployment in developing countries.
Feng et al. (2018) use cross-country household survey data to investigate the relationship
between unemployment and GDP per capita. They find a positive relationship, and show
further that this is driven primarily by unemployment among low-educated workers. They
5Keane and Wolpin (2001), Lee and Wolpin (2006) and Sullivan (2010) represent related models of school,
employment and occupational choice.
6Other relevant papers include Charlot and Decreuse (2010), who build a model with heterogeneous
agents that demonstrates how the presence of search frictions in the labour market leads to over-investment
in education by the rich, and under-investment by the poor
41
build a two-sector model (traditional and modern), in which workers differ in terms of abil-
ity (proxying education), while countries vary in terms of their modern-sector productivity.
As productivity rises, production shifts to the modern sector and, under the assumption of
stronger labour market frictions here than in the traditional sector, unemployment rates rise,
both overall, and disproportionately for low-ability workers. Girsberger and Meango (2017)
seek to explain the “puzzle of educated unemployment in West Africa”.7 Accordingly, they
present a search-and-matching framework with three labour market sectors and heterogene-
ity in workers’ education levels. The model is estimated using data on two West African
countries: Senegal and Burkina Faso. They conclude that the relatively high unemployment
rates among highly-educated workers are driven by a combination of low job arrival rates,
poor search efficiency in self-employment, and differential job destruction. Lastly, Falco and
Teal (2012) investigate the nature of youth unemployment in urban Ghana, showing that,
while measured unemployment for this group is low, so are earnings and the quality of em-
ployment.8
The contribution of this paper is, firstly, to provide a framework within which to consider
the issue of youth unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa. This is achieved by presenting a
set of stylised facts that motivate an understanding of youth unemployment as a luxury
that increases in parental wealth, and by formalising these facts into a model that allows for
endogenous education, savings and occupational decisions based on parental wealth. This
framework draws together the three disparate strands of the labour-market literature I have
just described in order to facilitate a richer understanding of the school-to-work transition
in a developing-country setting. Secondly, the paper provides estimates of the model for
Ghana, which allows quantification of both the “waiting effect” on earnings and the aggregate
efficiency and equity consequences of the link between parental wealth and unemployment.
Finally, it offers a comparison of two policy interventions, and quantifies their relative effects.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 presents a trio of stylised
facts about labour markets in Ghana (and sub-Saharan Africa more generally) that motivates
this research, Section 2.3 outlines the theoretical framework, Section 2.4 introduces the data
and presents the results from a structural estimation of the model, Section 2.5 evaluates a
number of labour market policy alternatives, and Section 2.6 concludes.
7Fan and Stark (2012) offer a discussion of this phenomenon for developing countries more generally.
8Falco and Teal (2012) also argue that waiting in unemployment increases neither one’s chance of getting
a job, nor one’s earnings later in life, which appears to contradict the findings of this paper. Yet Falco and
Teal (2012) include workers out of the labour force in their definition of unemployment, while this paper is
concerned solely with active job-seekers.
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2.2 Data and Facts
The paper is motivated by a trio of stylised facts concerning young labour-force participants
in Ghana.9 The data I use comes from the 2012 round of the Ghana Living Standards
Survey (hereafter, GLSS 2012). This nationally representative, cross-sectional dataset covers
approximately 17,000 Ghanaian households, and includes a rich labour market module. The
selected sample is working-age males (aged 15-60). I drop those with missing information on
education, current employment and the variables used to compute parental wealth. I also
drop those currently in education, as well as casual workers, apprentices and individuals not
in the labour force. This yields a sample size of approximately 10,500 individuals.
Workers’ education is measured as the last completed level of schooling. For the structural
model, this is converted into a binary variable that defines individuals as “highly-educated”
if they have completed (as a minimum) senior high school, and as “low-educated” otherwise.
Employment status is defined as follows: an individual is classified as “unemployed” if he
has not worked during the last week, does not have a job on hold, and is available to work.10
Parental wealth for all individuals is obtained as follows: first, I regress a measure of household
assets on education, occupation and geographic region for males aged 35 to 60. I then
predict parental wealth using the same explanatory variables for sampled individuals’ fathers,
collected in the household module of the GLSS 2012. Details are given in Appendix B.1.
2.2.1 Fact 1: Low Youth Unemployment
The first fact of interest is that youth unemployment, in Sub-Saharan Africa on average,
and in Ghana in particular, is moderately low. In 2012, unemployment among men aged
15-24 years was 12.1% in the SSA region and only 9% in Ghana (Ku¨hn et al. (2016)). By
comparison, the relevant figures for the European Union and the United States were 25.2%
and 17.5%, respectively. Nevertheless, relatively low levels of unemployment in the context
of low-income, developing countries are not surprising but, rather, to be expected: in the
absence of unemployment insurance, remaining unemployed is simply an unaffordable luxury
for the majority of the labour-force. Instead, the more important and relevant statistic is the
productivity of employment, and it is here that the region truly lags behind others: it has the
9While Ghana constitutes the principal focus of this research, however, these findings are not unique to
it but rather, are also applicable more broadly to other countries in the Sub-Saharan African region. To
illustrate this, I replicate the stylised facts detailed in this section for Uganda in Appendix B.2.
10This is a slightly more relaxed version of the standard ILO definition of unemployment, which additionally
requires individuals to have actively searched for work in the last 7 days. I adopt this version because it
includes discouraged workers and those who may not have searched in the last 7 days due to slow job arrival
rates, but who are still “unemployed” in the sense that they want a job but do not have one. This is, further,
the definition used by the Ghana Statistical Service in their 2014 Labour Force Report based on this data.
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highest working poverty rate among youth of any region in the world, with approximately 70
per cent of youth living on a daily income of less than US$ 3.10 (Ku¨hn et al. (2016)).
2.2.2 Fact 2: Low Educational Attainment
The second fact is that educational attainment in Ghana is very low, despite numerous
policy attempts to raise it, including making education up to the age of 15 compulsory, and
providing education up to the end of senior high school available free of charge. As Figure
2-1 shows, approximately 76% of Ghanaian men between the ages of 20 and 60 have not
completed senior high school, and 36% have no formal education at all. Regionally, it is
estimated that, in 2014, 58% of secondary school-aged children were not in school; this is the
highest proportion of any region in the world (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2016)).
Figure 2-1: Male Educational Attainment in Ghana: Age 20-60
Data Source: GLSS 2012
2.2.3 Fact 3: Youth Unemployment Increases with Wealth
The third stylised fact is that Ghanaian youth from wealthy families are more likely to be
unemployed early in life than are their counterparts from poorer backgrounds. Table 2.1
shows the results from a linear probability regression of parental wealth on the probability of
men across different age groups being unemployed.11 In both cases, the dependant variable
is equal to 1 if the individual is currently unemployed and reports being available to work,
11The construction of the parental wealth measure is described in detail in Appendix B.1
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and zero if currently employed. I control for potentially confounding variables, including age,
region, and whether the individual lives in an urban or rural environment. Columns 3 and 4
add controls for education. While education decisions are endogenous, adding these controls
is still useful in terms of showing that differences in unemployment are not accounted for by
education alone; rather, as the model presented in the next section will show, it is one of the
channels through which parental wealth affects unemployment.
In Column 1, there is a positive and highly significant correlation between parental wealth
and unemployment among men aged 15-29: a 1% increase in parental wealth raises the
probability of unemployment by 0.08 percentage points. Comparing this to the results in
Column 2, however, reveals that this relationship completely disappears after the age of 30.
Columns (3) and (4) show that the same pattern persists even after controlling for education.
The results are also robust to using a probit specification, as shown in Appendix B.2, Table
B.3.
Table 2.1: Parental Wealth and Male Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 15-29
Unemployment = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployment = 1
Age 15-29
Unemployment = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployment = 1
log parental wealth 0.077*** 0.009 0.059** 0.009
(0.019) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006)
age -0.007*** 0.000 -0.008*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
urban 0.070*** 0.004 0.062*** 0.003
(0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003)
region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
education dummies No No Yes Yes
mean unemployment 0.072 0.020 0.072 0.020
𝑁 3328 7172 3328 7172
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
Data Source: GLSS 2012
In the next sections, therefore, I build and estimate a model that formalises the mechanisms
underlying this trio of stylised facts. As previously stated, the primary focus of this model
is the way in which parental wealth affects youth unemployment in a developing-country
setting, and the consequences of such a relationship for the equity and efficiency of labour
market outcomes.
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2.3 Model
In this section, I present a discrete-choice, life-cycle model that considers the effect of parental
wealth on youth unemployment. In this model, workers rely on family wealth in order to fund
consumption while transitioning from education into employment. The primary mechanism
underlying the unemployment motive is a desire to trade-off higher present consumption (by
accepting a job) against a better wage offer (by waiting in unemployment). Consequently,
wealthy workers remain unemployed longer, on average, in order to access high-paying jobs,
while workers from poor families are willing to accept less desirable jobs in order to transition
out of unemployment, which has consequences for education choices. As previously discussed,
the combination of credit market failure and an absence of unemployment benefits amplifies
the role of family wealth in this developing-country setting.
2.3.1 Model Set-Up
The model economy consists of a finitely-lived, working-age population. There are no credit
markets.
Endowments:
Workers are heterogeneous in their initial endowments of family wealth and ability, each of
which is an independent, random draw. Ability, denoted ℎ𝑖, may be low or high, such that
ℎ𝑖 ∈ {𝐻𝐿, 𝐻𝐻}, and is observable. The proportion of low-ability types in the population is
𝑞𝐿. The initial family wealth of worker 𝑖, denoted 𝑎𝑖,0, is drawn from a log-normal distribution
with cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝑎0, mean 𝜇𝑎0 and variance 𝜎2𝑎0.
Preferences:
Workers are risk-averse, and have logarithmic preferences over consumption in every period.
The period discount factor is denoted 𝛽.
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=1
𝛽𝑡−1 ln 𝑐𝑡 (2.1)
Education:
Workers make a binary education decision at time 𝑡 = 0. Let 𝑘 = {0, 1} indicate a choice
of low and high education, respectively. For the purposes of this paper, I define a worker of
“high education” to be one who invests in schooling beyond the compulsory level in Ghana
of junior high school. A worker of “low education” is equivalently defined as one who has the
compulsory level of schooling or lower. Workers incur a fixed cost of education, denoted 𝐸𝐸𝑘 ,
where 𝐸𝐸0 = 0 and 𝐸𝐸1 > 0. Those who choose to invest in high education spend 𝑇𝐸 periods
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at the start of life in school, with one period in this model set equal to a single year of working
life; simultaneous employment is not permitted. A worker’s choice of education determines
the set of occupations in which she later searches for employment (this is described in more
detail in the following subsection on jobs). Finally, I assume no depreciation of skills during
the transition from school into employment.
Jobs:
The labour market in this model consists of three sectors: wage employment, agricultural
production and entrepreneurship, where the latter is defined as self-employment in a non-
agricultural business.12 Entrepreneurship incurs a fixed start-up cost, denoted 𝐸𝑆. Let 𝑚 =
{𝑢,𝑤, 𝑎, 𝑒} denote the set of possible employment statuses, corresponding to unemployment,
wage employment, agriculture and entrepreneurship, respectively. Note that, while workers
may remain unemployed indefinitely, employment is considered an absorbing state, such
that there is no mobility across occupational alternatives once the worker has moved from
unemployment to some form of employment. This is a reasonable assumption because job-
to-job mobility in this context is low: for instance, among individuals sampled in the 2004
round of the Ghana Urban Household Panel Survey, which includes a detailed job history
module, 30-40 year-olds had had an average of 1.9 jobs in their lifetime (see Table B.7 in
Appendix B.3). This figure would be even lower in rural regions (which is where 66% of the
estimation sample lives), given the relative scarcity of job opportunities there.
Workers in this model economy may be employed in one of six distinct occupations. An
occupation is defined as a sector-education level pairing, each with its own distribution of
firm productivities. The productivity distribution for each alternative – from which each
unemployed worker receives a random draw each period – is stationary, and is assumed to
follow a log-normal distribution with mean 𝜇𝑚,𝑘, variance 𝜎2𝑚,𝑘 and cdf 𝐹𝑚,𝑘 where, as before,
𝑚 denotes an employment sector and 𝑘 denotes workers’ education level. Thus, as previously
described, while workers may choose to be employed in any sector, their education choice
restricts access to one or other subset of three (of the possible six) occupations.
The return to workers in each of the wage and entrepreneurial occupations is complementary
in firm productivity and worker ability, while the equivalent return for the agricultural oc-
cupations depends solely on the firm productivity draw.13 Furthermore, I allow for growth
12Gindling and Newhouse (2014) and Nguimkeu (2014) highlight the important role played by the het-
erogeneous informal sector in a broad range of developing countries, and in West Africa, respectively. For
an analysis of the role of self-employment in the Ghanaian labour market, with particular treatment of the
question of whether it represents a sector of “opportunity” or of “last resort”, see Falco and Haywood (2016).
Finally, Kerr (2012) argues the importance of distinguishing between self-employment and wage-employment
in small firms, which are traditionally treated collectively as the “informal sector”.
13Such an assumption is common in the literature for developing countries. For instance, Feng et al. (2018)
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in earnings over time (and within a given job) by including an occupation-specific growth
term, 𝐺𝑚,𝑘. Thus, an employed worker 𝑖’s total period earnings in a given job, 𝑊𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑡, may
be written as:
𝑊𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑡 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝐺𝑡−𝑑𝑚,𝑘𝑤𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑑ℎ𝑖 if 𝑚 ∈ {𝑤, 𝑒}
𝐺𝑡−𝑑𝑚,𝑘𝑤𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑑 if 𝑚 ∈ {𝑎}
(2.2)
where 𝑡 indicates the current period, and 𝑑 the period in which worker 𝑖 transitioned into
employment.
Choices and Timing:
During their lifetime, workers face three decisions. The first is a choice of education level.
The second is a two-part decision while in unemployment: whether or not to accept a given
job offer, and which sector to accept an offer from. Search is random, and every unemployed
worker receives an offer simultaneously from each of the three sectors in each period prior
to accepting one. They receive no unemployment benefits, and so, must rely solely on their
initial wealth draw to finance consumption until entering employment. The third, and final,
decision is a trade-off between consumption and savings in each period. When unemployed,
consumption will be an increasing function of 𝑎𝑖,0, ℎ𝑖, and expected future earnings in em-
ployment. Once employed, the optimal consumption path is deterministic, and is increasing
in 𝑎𝑖,0, ℎ𝑖 and accepted earnings.
The timing of the model is as follows: at 𝑡 = 0, workers receive their endowments of wealth
and ability (𝑎𝑖,0 and ℎ𝑖). They must choose whether or not to invest in high education at a
cost of 𝐸𝐸1 . At 𝑡 = 1, workers enter the labour market. They receive an independent, random
firm productivity draw from each sector: wage employment, agriculture and entrepreneurship.
Workers then decide whether to accept one of these offers, or to remain unemployed for the
period. In all subsequent periods up to and including 𝑡 = 𝑇 , employed workers remain in
their chosen job. Unemployed workers continue to receive employment offers each period
until they accept one. At the end of 𝑡 = 𝑇 , all workers die.
equally assume that agricultural returns do not depend on ability while returns to other sectors do, and
Banerjee and Newman (1993) make an equivalent assumption, albeit using effort rather than ability.
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2.3.2 Solving the Model: Optimal Education Choice
Workers seek the optimal strategy 𝑘 to maximise the discounted sum of future pay-offs. I
define the value of strategy 𝑘 at time 𝑡 = 0 as:
𝑉 𝑆𝑖,𝑘 = 𝐸
[︃
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=1
𝛽𝑡−1 ln(𝑐𝑖,𝑘,𝑡]
]︃
− 𝐸𝐸𝑘 (2.3)
The optimal strategy is then:
𝑉 𝑆*𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑉 𝑆𝑖,0, 𝑉 𝑆𝑖,1} (2.4)
2.3.3 Solving the Model: Optimal Savings Choice
Unemployed Workers
Let 𝑐𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑡 denote consumption at time 𝑡 of an individual 𝑖 with education 𝑘 and employment
status 𝑚. While unemployed, workers then solve the following maximisation problem, based
on their expectations of future earnings:
max
𝑐𝑖,0,𝑘,𝑡
𝐸
[︃
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=1
𝛽𝑡−1 ln(𝑐𝑖,0,𝑘,𝑡)
]︃
subject to 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝑊𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,0,𝑘,𝑡
𝑎𝑇 = 0 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑁
𝑎𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑁
(2.5)
This gives rise to an Euler equation:
𝐸𝑡[𝑐𝑡+1] = 𝛽𝑅𝑐𝑡 (2.6)
This problem has no explicit solution for 𝑐*𝑖,0,𝑘,𝑡, and is solved computationally, by backward
induction.
Employed Workers
Once employed, the savings choice is deterministic, and may be solved explicitly. Workers
solve the following maximisation problem, in which 𝑧 denotes the current period of employed
life and 𝑍 ≤ 𝑇 denotes the total number of periods spent in employment:
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max
𝑐𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧
𝑍∑︁
𝑧=1
𝛽𝑧−1 ln(𝑐𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧)
subject to 𝑎𝑖,𝑧 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝑖,𝑧−1 +𝑊𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧
𝑎𝑖,𝑍 = 0 ∀ 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑁
𝑎𝑖,𝑧 ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑧 = 1, ..., 𝑍 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑁
(2.7)
This yields the following interior and corner solutions for the optimal consumption path,
where 𝑅 = (1 + 𝑟) and 𝑟 is the real interest rate on savings:
𝑐𝐼𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧 =
𝛽𝑧−1𝑅𝑧−1
𝑅𝑍−1
∑︀𝑍−1
𝑧=0 𝛽
[𝑅𝑍𝑎𝑖,0 +
𝑍∑︁
𝑧=1
𝑅𝑍−𝑧𝑊𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧] (2.8)
𝑐𝐶𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑅𝑎𝑖,0 +𝑊𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧 if 𝑧 = 1
𝑊𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧 if 𝑧 = 2, ..., 𝑍
(2.9)
Thus, the employed worker’s optimal consumption in any period 𝑧 is given by:
𝑐*𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑐𝐼𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧, 𝑐𝐶𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧} (2.10)
2.3.4 Solving the Model: Optimal Employment and Sectoral Choice
Finally, I consider jointly the decision by workers between employment and unemployment,
as well as between sectors. Workers seek the optimal strategy 𝑚 to maximise the discounted
sum of future pay-offs. I define the value of strategy 𝑚 at time 𝑧 as:
𝑉𝑀𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧 = 𝐸
[︃
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=𝑧
𝛽𝑡−1 ln(𝑐𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑧)
]︃
(2.11)
The optimal strategy is then:
𝑉𝑀*𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑉𝑀𝑖,𝑢,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑉 𝑀𝑖,𝑤,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑉 𝑀𝑖,𝑎,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑉 𝑀𝑖,3,𝑒,𝑡} (2.12)
The model is solved computationally, by backward induction, and the results are discussed
in the next section.
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2.3.5 Model Predictions
In this section, I consider the ways in which the two dimensions of worker heterogeneity
(wealth and ability) affect choices over education and unemployment duration. This is im-
portant for understanding the mechanisms that underlie observed individual choices, for
determining the sign and magnitude of the effects on equity and efficiency, and, later, for
making sense of the differential effects of alternative policy interventions.
2.3.5.1 Wealth and Education Choice
The sign of the relationship between wealth and education choice is ambiguous; it depends on
the cost of education and the relative parameters of the offered earnings distributions in high-
and low-education occupations. There are thus two channels of effect; I term these the “fixed
cost” channel and the “cost of waiting” channel, respectively. The first of these depends on
𝐸𝐸1 and 𝑇𝐸, the monetary and time costs of education. The existence of these fixed costs
implies a threshold value of wealth above which workers can afford to enter high education,
and below which they cannot. The “cost of waiting” channel is, however, governed by the
relative means and variances of offered earnings in high- and low-education occupations. In
particular, when returns to education are highly uncertain (i.e. they have a low mean and a
high variance), less-wealthy workers will prefer not to obtain high education, due to the high
waiting cost of a good draw.
To show the effect on education choice of each of these channels in turn, I begin by con-
sidering a case in which the fixed cost of education is zero and the distribution of offered
earnings in high education has the same mean but a high variance compared to the equivalent
distribution in low education. This shuts down the “fixed cost” channel, isolating the “cost
of waiting” effect. As Figure 2-2 illustrates, this generates the standard result of a threshold
value of wealth, 𝑎*0, above which individuals always choose high education, and below which,
equivalently, they always choose low education. Increasing the fixed cost of education then
shifts the education-wealth threshold to the right: the minimum level of wealth which induces
workers to invest in high education is now higher.
It should be noted, however, that, while Figure 2-2 shows a case in which the “cost of
waiting” channel induces a positive relationship between wealth and education choice, it
is also possible for this effect to be negative. In particular, if low-education occupations
have a sufficiently higher “cost of waiting” than high-education occupations (that is, the
low-education earnings distribution is relatively more dispersed than the equivalent high-
education one) and the “fixed cost” effect is small or zero, there is a negative relationship
between education and wealth, in which poorer workers choose high education, while the
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Figure 2-2: Wealth and Education Choice
wealthiest workers, who can afford to wait a longer time in unemployment for a high-paying
job, find it optimal to remain at a low level of education, where there is now a chance of
getting a very high draw.
2.3.5.2 Wealth and Unemployment Choice
In considering the effect of wealth on workers’ choice of employment status, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between the effects within and across education categories. Conditional
on education status, average unemployment duration is always increasing in initial wealth.
Across education groups, however, the sign of the relationship depends on relative parameter
values of the earnings distributions, as these determine how long an individual must wait in
unemployment at each education level for a job he is willing to accept.
In particular, when offered earnings in high- and low-education have the same mean, but the
former has a higher variance, the cross-education wealth effect is positive: wealthy workers
are now more likely to get educated, given the fixed costs of high-education, and also remain
unemployed longer than their poorer counterparts, incentivised by the relatively high earnings
variance in their sub-market. This case is illustrated in Panel (i) of Figure 2-3.
Conversely, consider a case in which high-education offered earnings have a high mean and
a low variance relative to low-education earnings.14 Wealthy workers remain more likely
14A more natural comparison to the former case would be to assume constant means across the two
education levels, but a higher variance for low-education earnings. In such a case, however, the fraction of
educated workers is zero, so it is not possible to consider cross-group variation.
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Figure 2-3: Wealth and Unemployment Duration
to get educated, but now receive good job offers relatively quickly, so do not remain long
in unemployment. Poorer workers, by contrast, do not invest in high education, and then
find it optimal to wait relatively longer in order to secure a job. Here, the cross-education
wealth effect is negative. Panel (ii) of Figure 2-3 illustrates this case; with the negative cross-
education wealth effect dominating the positive within-education wealth effect, except at the
top of the wealth distribution (where everyone is highly-educated, such that the cross-group
effect is zero and the positive within-group effect dominates).
2.3.5.3 Ability and Education Choice
In terms of ability, the model predicts two opposing effects on education choice, rendering the
net effect ambiguous. I term these the “fixed cost” channel and the “asset de-accumulation”
channel, respectively. The “fixed cost” channel summarises the way in which, conditional on
wealth, the existence of an education fixed cost, 𝐸𝐸1 makes high-ability workers more likely
than their low-ability counterparts to undertake high education. This is shown in Figure
2-4: increasing the monetary or time cost of high education reduces the proportion of highly-
educated workers, but high-ability workers are less sensitive to these higher costs than are
their low-ability counterparts.
The “asset de-accumulation” channel, on the other hand, captures the fact that, all else equal,
a high-ability worker draws down his assets faster in unemployment than does a low-ability
worker, in anticipation of relatively higher future wages. This means that a high-ability
53
Figure 2-4: Cost of Education and Education Choice by Ability
worker behaves, for the purposes of education choice, as though he were effectively poorer
than a low-ability worker with the same level of assets. Therefore, as in the relationship
between wealth and education choice described above, when offered high-education earnings
are sufficiently uncertain (low 𝜇𝑚,1 and high 𝜎2𝑚,1) relative to low-education earnings, a high-
ability worker prefers to remain uneducated, as it allows him to transition more quickly
into employment, while a low-ability worker with the same wealth chooses high education.
Figure 2-5 presents this channel; beginning with a case in which high-education returns have
a lower mean but a higher variance than low-education returns, an increase in the variance
of high-education returns induces workers of both high- and low-ability to get educated, but
the latter group is more sensitive to this change than is the former.15
Thus, the question of which effect dominates depends on the relative parameters of education
costs and the earnings distributions; consequently, the probability of obtaining high education
may be increasing or decreasing in workers’ ability.
2.3.5.4 Ability and Unemployment Choice
As with wealth, it is important to distinguish between the effects of ability on unemployment
within and across education categories. First, the relationship with unemployment condi-
tional on education is ambiguous. There are two channels that drive this relationship, which
I term the “asset de-accumulation” channel and the “sectoral shift” channel, respectively.
15For simplicity, I set offered returns equal to zero in all sectors except wage-employment.
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Figure 2-5: Uncertainty in Returns to Education and Education Choice by Ability
The first of these has already been explained: a high-ability worker consumes more in un-
employment than does a low-ability worker with the same wealth, due to having a higher
expected future income stream. Thus, he draws down his assets more quickly, which lowers
his reservation wage and pushes him into employment. This means that a high-ability worker
behaves, for the purposes of employment choice, as though he were effectively poorer than a
low-ability worker with the same level of assets.
The “sectoral shift” channel arises due to the assumption that ability does not affect earnings
in the agricultural production sector. Consequently, a low-ability worker facing an employ-
ment offer from this sector is now more likely to accept it than an equivalent high-ability
worker, because he receives exactly the same value of employment, but the former has a lower
outside value of unemployment, due to lower expected earnings in the other two sectors. This
shifts low-ability workers towards employment in the agricultural sector, particularly when
offered returns in this sector have a relatively high mean.
Figure 2-6 shows the relationship between ability and unemployment duration, conditional
on workers’ education choice. In the first panel, I retain the assumption that ability does
not affect earnings in agricultural production, such that the results in this panel derive from
a combination of the “asset de-accumulation” and “sectoral shift” channels. In the second
panel, however, I relax this assumption (thereby removing the “sectoral shift” effect). The
removal of this channel leads to higher unemployment durations among low-ability workers in
the second panel compared to the first, but there is no change in the outcomes of high-ability
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workers.
Figure 2-6: Ability and Unemployment Duration
Second, if we now consider the relationship across education groups, an additional, com-
positional effect arises. The average unemployment duration across education sub-markets
is driven by the average asset-holdings of individuals in each sub-market, as well as by the
offered earnings parameters of its occupations. Thus, if high-ability workers are dispropor-
tionately likely to invest in high education (as detailed in the previous section), and offered
earnings in this sub-market have relatively low means and high variances compared to offered
earnings in the low-education sub-market, the cross-education effect of ability on unemploy-
ment duration is positive.
2.4 Data Description and Estimation
As previously described, the data comes from the sub-sample of working-age males (aged 15-
60) in the GLSS 2012. For employed workers, information about annual earnings and sector of
employment comes from survey questions relating to work during the last week and the total
number of hours worked in the last year. Workers who report having multiple occupations
(representing about 10% of the sample) are classified as belonging to their main sector of
employment, but total earnings across both sectors are used. For workers in agriculture,
earnings information is supplemented by data from a survey module on household agricultural
income. Lastly, for individuals recorded as “unpaid workers” in household agriculture or
non-agricultural businesses, earnings are computed as the total household earnings for that
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activity, divided by the number of household members engaged in it.
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
In this section, I present some summary statistics for the GLSS 2012 data. First, Ghana has -
as does the Sub-Saharan African region more broadly - a particularly youthful population. As
Figure 2-7 shows, 68% of individuals in the full sample are 30 years old or younger, a feature
that lends additional significance to the consideration of youth labour-market outcomes.
The remainder of these summary statistics focuses on the sub-sample of male labour-force
participants aged 16-30, which is the estimation sub-sample (equivalent statistics for the full
sample are presented in Appendix B.4). As previously discussed, average education is low,
with 70.73% of sampled workers having attained a maximum of middle-school education (see
Table 2.2). 34.33% are urban-dwellers, while the rest live in rural areas.
Figure 2-7: GLSS 2012 by Age Group
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Male Labour-Force Participants Aged 16-30
observations 3728
urban (%) 34.33
highly-educated (%) 29.27
mean s.d.
age (years) 24.26 4.07
education (years) 8.47 5.90
median parental assets (US$) 620.59 553.76
Figure 2-8 presents the sectoral composition of this labour market; the most striking feature
is that 45% of all individuals work in agricultural production (which accords with the high
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proportion of rural-dwellers). The proportion of agricultural workers falls significantly with
education, however: 64% of low-educated workers are in this sector compared to 28% of
their highly-educated counterparts. Education shifts the sectoral composition away from
agricultural production and towards wage-employment, with 47% of highly-educated workers
employed in the wage sector, compared to only 18% of the low educated. The share of
entrepreneurs, by contrast, is approximately constant across education groups.16
Figure 2-8: Employment Status by Education
2.4.2 Model Predictions and Empirical Patterns of Parental Wealth
The model predicts that parental wealth drives workers’ choices over unemployment, ed-
ucation and sector of employment and, consequently, leads to higher lifetime earnings for
the wealthy. In this section, I show that the empirical patterns of workers’ outcomes are
consistent with these predictions.
First, parental wealth drives higher unemployment rates through two channels: first, by
making wealthy workers more likely to invest in education, when earnings in high-education
occupations have relatively high variances, and second, conditional on educational status,
by making wealthy workers wait longer in unemployment for a better job. I have already
demonstrated the positive correlation between parental wealth and unemployment in Section
2.2. In fact, unemployment rates in the data also differ significantly across education groups,
16Poschke (2013), for instance, argues, using US data, that entrepreneurship rates are U-shaped with
respect to education, due to the co-existence of necessity-based and talent-based entrepreneurs.
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with 12% of highly-educated workers unemployed compared to only 5% of low-educated
workers, as Figure 2-8 has shown.
Second, Table 2.3 presents a linear probability regression of education choice on the log of
parental wealth and geographic controls. There is, as expected, a positive and significant cor-
relation between parental wealth and the probability of choosing to be highly-educated.
Third, the model predicts that differences in wealth drive sorting behaviour across sectors
of employment, with wealthier workers more likely to enter sectors in which returns are rel-
atively dispersed and, therefore, require a longer wait in unemployment in order to secure
a high-productivity draw. Table 2.4 presents the results from a multinomial logit regression
of employment sector on the log of parental wealth and geographic controls. Among low-
educated workers (the first column), higher parental wealth is associated with a shift out
of agriculture and into wage employment and (to a lesser extent) entrepreneurship. Among
highly-educated workers, higher parental wealth remains correlated with a shift out of agri-
culture and into wage employment, but there is no significant change in the probability of
being an entrepreneur. This is consistent with the model prediction, as the estimation results
in the next section show that offered earnings are, in fact, more dispersed in the wage and
entrepreneurial sectors than in agriculture.
Finally, I consider the relationship between parental wealth and lifetime earnings. Table 2.5
displays the results from a regression of the log of annual earnings on the log of parental
wealth and geographic controls. As parental wealth has a positive relationship with both
education choice and unemployment, the model predicts that workers from wealthier families
earn more than their counterparts from poorer backgrounds on average, and this wage gap
is increasing over the life-cycle. The latter result is due primarily to higher unemployment
among the wealthy (such that they are more likely to record zero earnings early in life), but
may also be affected by wealthy workers being relatively more willing to accept employment
in sectors with low initial earnings but high earnings growth. Table 2.5 presents just such
a pattern: in the first column (workers aged 16-30), parental wealth is negatively correlated
with earnings; in the second column (workers aged 31-50), however, wealthy workers not only
catch up with, but significantly outstrip, their poorer counterparts.
2.4.3 Identification and Structural Estimation Procedure
The model is estimated by the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM). It has a total of 28
parameters; 14 of these are identified structurally, by targeting a set of 25 data moments,
while the remaining 14 are external parameters fixed ex-ante in accordance with the data or
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Table 2.3: Education Choice and Parental Wealth
(1)
Age 16-30
Educated=1
log parental wealth 0.331***
(0.019)
urban 0.179***
(0.018)
region dummies Yes
mean(educated) 0.293
𝑁 3728
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
Figure 2-9: Education Choice and Parental Wealth
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Table 2.4: Employment Sector Choice and Parental Wealth
(1) (2)
education=0
Employment Sector
education=1
Employment Sector
log parental wealth
1.wage employment 0.093*** 0.170***
(0.023) (0.036)
2. agriculture -0.136*** -0.140***
(0.028) (0.038)
3. entrepreneurship 0.044* -0.030
(0.022) (0.021)
urban
1.wage employment 0.130*** 0.169***
(0.013) (0.030)
2. agriculture -0.299*** -0.269***
(0.014) (0.024)
3. entrepreneurship 0.169*** 0.101***
(0.013) (0.024)
region dummies Yes Yes
𝑁 2516 962
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
data: employed males aged 16-30 (GLSS 2012)
Figure 2-10: Sectoral Choice and Parental Wealth
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Table 2.5: Log Earnings and Parental Wealth
(1) (2)
Age 16-30
Log Annual Earnings
Age 31-50
Log Annual Earnings
log parental wealth -0.479* 0.260**
(0.196) (0.088)
age 0.324*** -0.002
(0.022) (0.006)
urban -0.194 0.671***
(0.187) (0.076)
region dummies Yes Yes
mean(log earnings) 6.050 7.388
𝑁 2237 4329
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
data: all males aged 16-50 (GLSS2012)
Figure 2-11: Log Annual Earnings and Parental Wealth
62
the literature.
Table 2.6 summarises the external parameters of the model. The real interest rate is obtained
from national statistics. The wealth distribution is described by my measure of parental
wealth. The cost of education is the median amount spent on tuition, textbooks, transport,
boarding and other schooling costs for male family members currently in public schooling
at the level of senior high school or above (the variable captures expenditure within the
last 12 months, and this figure is multiplied by the time cost of education to obtain the
parameter estimate for 𝐸𝐸1 ). The GLSS 2012 does not collect information about the fixed
cost of entrepreneurship. Thus, the estimate of 𝐸𝑆 is the average start-up cost reported
by entrepreneurs in the Ghana Urban Household Panel Survey (2004-2006). The model is
simulated over 35 periods, covering the age range 16-50. The time cost of education is the
average number of additional years spent in education by high-educated individuals (those
with a minimum of a senior high school certificate).
Finally, the growth rate of earnings in each occupation is computed by regressing the log
of earnings on age for men between the ages of 31 and 50 (see Appendix B.5 for further
details). The challenge here is to separately identify the wage growth due to selection -
that is, remaining unemployed longer to get a good earnings draw - and that governed by
the underlying growth parameter. As transition into the labour market has been completed
by age 30, I use the age range 31-50 to compute the growth parameters. Estimation of the
structural earnings parameters thus relies on the assumption that the growth rate of earnings
is constant over the life-cycle.
Table 2.6: External Parameters 1
Parameter Description Value
𝛽 discount factor 0.95
r real interest rate 5%
𝐹𝑎0 initial wealth endowment from GLSS 2012
𝐸𝐸1 cost of high education 1200 GHc (≈ 250 USD)
𝐸𝑆 cost of entrepreneurship 210 GHc (≈ 44 USD)
𝑇 number of periods 35
𝑇𝐸 time (period) cost of high education 4
𝐻𝐻 level of high ability 1
educated=0 educated=1
𝐺𝑤,𝑘 earnings growth 1% 3%
𝐺𝑎,𝑘 earnings growth 0% 5%
𝐺𝑒,𝑘 earnings growth 1% 2%
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Estimation of the model’s structural parameters is conducted as follows: first, I select the sub-
sample of all male labour-force participants aged 16-30. As the model focuses on the initial
transition from education to the labour-force, this is the age category whose characteristics
I aim to match in the estimation. This yields a sample size of 𝑁 = 3728. I proceed to
solve the model by backward induction for an initial parameter set. This yields a full set of
simulated outcomes for each sampled individual over his life-cycle. As the GLSS 2012 is a
cross-sectional dataset, however, I then convert the simulated data into a comparable cross-
sectional form based on the age at which each individual is observed in the empirical data.
The next step is to construct the moments required for estimating the structural parameters,
for both the simulated and empirical data. Simulated moments are computed for labour-
force participants aged 16-30, excluding those currently in education, in order to match the
data. Table 2.7 lists these parameters, while Tables 2.8 and 2.9 display the moments used to
estimate their values.
The estimated parameters minimise a quadratic loss function that measures the weighted
distance between the set of moments from the simulated dataset and their empirical coun-
terparts. I use the Nelder-Mead algorithm to simulate the model (and obtain the set of
simulated moments) repeatedly, varying the set of structural parameters until the loss func-
tion is minimised, such that the simulated moments are as close as possible to the empirical
ones. Formally, the simulated moments estimator 𝜃𝑆,𝑁(𝑊 ) solves:
𝜃𝑆,𝑁(𝑊 ) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃[𝜓𝑑𝑁 − 𝜓𝑠𝑁(𝜃)]′𝑊𝑁 [𝜓𝑑𝑁 − 𝜓𝑠𝑁(𝜃)] (2.13)
in which 𝑆 is the number of simulations for a given parameter set (I choose 𝑆 = 10), 𝑁 is the
sample size, 𝜓𝑑𝑁 is the set of empirical moments, 𝜓𝑠𝑁(𝜃) is the set of simulated moments, and
𝑊 is the weighting matrix. For the last of these, I use the inverse of the variance-covariance
matrix of the empirical moments. This puts more weight on moments that are precisely
estimated, while also adjusting the weighting for correlation between moments.
The moments employed in estimation are as follows: the means and standard deviations of
log earnings in each of the six occupations, the proportion of workers in each occupation, the
proportion of highly-educated workers in the sample, the proportion of unemployed workers
aged 16-24 by education level, the proportion of low-education workers in the top wealth
decile, and the mean log earnings ratio of workers in the top wealth decile by sector. The
last two sets of moments are particularly useful in estimating the parameters of the ability
distribution; identification of these parameters thus relies on the assumption that ability
is uncorrelated with the initial distribution of parental wealth. While the model simulates
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the schooling process of those who choose high education, simulated moments are computed
using only the sub-sample of out-of-school workers, in order to ensure comparability with the
data moments, which are computed for exactly this group of workers.
2.4.4 Estimation Results and Model Fit
The estimation results are presented below. Table 2.7 shows the estimated parameter values,
and Tables 2.8 and 2.9 list the values of the matched model moments alongside their empirical
counterparts and a 95% confidence interval around them. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are bootstrapped using 200 replications.
Table 2.7: Structural Parameters 1
Parameter Description Estimate
𝑞𝐿 proportion of low types 0.42
(0.01)
𝐻𝐿 low ability level 0.54
(0.03)
educated=0 educated=1
𝜇𝑤,𝑘 mean log earnings (wage-emp.) 0.86 4.87
(0.06) (0.08)
𝜇𝑎,𝑘 mean log earnings (agric.) 4.56 3.03
(0.03) (0.27)
𝜇𝑒,𝑘 mean log earnings (entrep.) 0.11 0.73
(0.01) (0.05)
𝜎𝑤,𝑘 sd log earnings (wage-emp.) 3.79 2.97
(0.11) (0.12)
𝜎𝑎,𝑘 sd log earnings (agric.) 2.02 2.55
(0.03) (0.14)
𝜎𝑒,𝑘 sd log earnings (entrep.) 4.10 3.69
(0.06) (0.11)
One of the most striking features of this set of results is the degree of labour-market selection
that underlies it. The wage offer distributions for all occupations have high estimated stan-
dard deviations; in fact, with the exception of high-education wage-employment and the two
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Table 2.8: Matched Moments 1
educated=0 educated=1
Moment Fitted Data {LB,UB} Fitted Data {LB,UB}
prop. (wage-emp.) 0.13 0.13 {0.12, 0.14} 0.17 0.14 {0.13, 0.15}
prop. (agric.) 0.46 0.45 {0.44, 0.47} 0.06 0.08 {0.07, 0.09}
prop. (entrep.) 0.11 0.09 {0.08, 0.10} 0.03 0.04 {0.03, 0.04}
mean log earn. (wage-emp.) 7.26 7.76 {7.66, 7.86} 8.07 8.03 {7.92, 8.13}
mean log earn. (agric.) 6.67 6.54 {6.45, 6.63} 7.25 6.64 {6.63, 6.90}
mean log earn. (entrep.) 7.41 7.85 {7.66, 8.03} 7.76 7.99 {7.75, 8.23}
sd log earn. (wage-emp.) 1.68 1.04 {0.97, 1.14} 1.69 1.12 {1.02, 1.24}
sd log earn. (agric.) 1.14 1.17 {1.13, 1.22} 1.27 1.25 {1.14, 1.38}
sd log earn. (entrep.) 1.77 1.52 {1.36, 1.79} 1.46 1.29 {1.12, 1.30}
note: UB and LB are the upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval around the data moment
Table 2.9: Matched Moments 2
Moment Fitted Data {LB, UB}
proportion of high-educ. workers 0.28 0.29 {0.28, 0.31}
proportion of low-educ. workers in top wealth decile 0.29 0.33 {0.28, 0.38}
high/low-educ. wage earnings ratio in top wealth decile 1.15 1.08 {1.02, 1.15}
high/low-educ. agric. earnings ratio in top wealth decile 1.08 0.99 {0.83, 1.19}
high/low-educ. entrep. earnings ratio in top wealth decile 1.04 0.99 {0.86, 1.07}
proportion of low-educ. unemployed workers aged 16-24 0.15 0.16 {0.13, 0.19}
proportion of high-educ. unemployed workers aged 16-24 0.06 0.06 {0.05, 0.09}
note: UB and LB are the upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval around the data moment
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agricultural occupations, the standard deviation of each occupation exceeds its corresponding
mean. By contrast, the accepted wage distributions (see Table 2.8) have low standard devi-
ations and high means relative to their offered counterparts. This demonstrates the degree
to which individuals, conditional on wealth, are willing to wait in unemployment in order to
secure a higher-paying job.
The model fits the data quite well; almost all the moment estimates lie within a 95% confi-
dence interval around their empirical counterparts, as Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show. Exceptions
are the mean of log earnings in high-education agriculture, and the standard deviation of
log earnings in the wage sector, which the model struggles to fit. The fit of the remaining
earnings moments is quite good, and the unemployment moments, in particular, are very
closely matched.
Figure 2-12: Log Wealth and Labout Market Outcomes
The manner in which the level of parental wealth influences youth labour market outcomes
is the central concern of this paper. Figure 2-12 thus shows the positive correlation between
parental wealth and each of the following: education choice, life-cycle earnings and probability
of unemployment. As before, results from the simulated model provide a good match to their
empirical counterparts.
The probability of education and of unemployment are both increasing in wealth. Average
lifetime earnings are also increasing in wealth, and this effect is strengthened by conditioning
on employment - this is as expected, given that wealthy workers are more likely to experience
unemployment in their youth.
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2.4.5 Wealth Effects on Education and Employment Choice: Con-
sequences for Equity and Efficiency
These empirical results draw attention to the fact that differences in initial parental wealth
underlie a strong selection effect in terms of education choice, sectoral choice and lifetime
earnings, driven by a combination of labour market search frictions and credit constraints
on workers. As discussed in the model set-up, wealth affects these outcomes through two
main channels: education choice and unemployment duration, which jointly offer access to
higher-productivity jobs.
Figure 2-13 illustrates the importance of the latter channel in this context, by comparing the
distributions of offered and accepted earnings in each occupation. In each case, the distribu-
tion of accepted earnings lies significantly to the right of the offer distribution, indicating a
preference among workers for rejecting low-productivity offers and waiting in unemployment
for better ones.
Figure 2-13: Job Selection Effects by Occupation
Table 2.10 decomposes the wealth effect into its two channels: education choice and un-
employment duration. This is achieved by regressing the log of annual earnings (averaged
over the life-cycle, from age 16 to age 50) in the simulated model on the log of parental
wealth, shutting down each of the education and unemployment channels in turn. Thus, the
first column of Table 2.10 shows the total effect of wealth on earnings; the second shows
the effect of wealth on earnings when all workers accept employment offers immediately,
with no time spent in unemployment, and leaving education choices unchanged from (1);
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finally, the third column shows the effect of wealth on earnings when all workers are low-
educated. This decomposition reveals that 63% of the effect of wealth on earnings comes
through an increased probability of being highly-educated, while the remaining 37% is at-
tributed to higher unemployment among the wealthy. Thus, the ability to wait for a good
job is an important component of the earnings premium gained by workers from wealthier
family backgrounds.
Table 2.10: Wealth Effect Decomposition
(1) (2) (3)
total wealth effect
log annual earnings
education effect
log annual earnings
unemployment effect
log annual earnings
log parental wealth 0.38*** 0.24*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
% of total wealth effect 100 63 37
𝑁 3728 3728 3728
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
Differences in initial (parental) assets therefore drive a significant inequality in earnings.
Furthermore, the combination of wealthy individuals delaying entry into the labour-market
and accessing jobs not only with higher earnings levels but also higher earnings growth than
their low-asset counterparts means that this inequality is increasing over the life-cycle, as
Figure 2-14 shows. Individuals in the lowest wealth decile actually begin with higher earnings
than those in the top wealth decile (due to high early-life unemployment among the latter
group), but are overtaken by their mid-20s. Thus, the earnings gap between the richest and
poorest 10% of the wealth distribution increases over the life-cycle, thereby exacerbating the
problem in the next generation, whose starting wealth is precisely a function of these, more
unequal, earnings.
Recall that the theoretical framework predicts an ambiguous relationship between ability
and unemployment, whose overall sign is governed by the relative magnitudes of an “asset
de-accumulation” effect and a “sectoral shift” effect. When high-ability workers are rela-
tively more impatient than low-ability workers to become employed, the issue of earnings
inequality is somewhat ameliorated: the earnings gap between low- and high-ability workers
is then lower compared to the case with positive assortative matching between workers and
jobs and, consequently, the aggregate earnings distribution is relatively compressed. This
is due to the complementarity between worker and firm productivities in the returns to
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Figure 2-14: Earnings Inequality Over the Life-Cycle
wage-employment and entrepreneurship. By contrast, when low-ability workers exit unem-
ployment more quickly than their high-ability counterparts, the earnings gap widens. As
Figure 2-15 shows, under the estimated parameters for Ghana, the “asset de-accumulation”
channel is dominant over the “sectoral shift channel”, such that low-ability workers have a
longer school-to-work transition than their high-ability counterparts, except at the very top
of the wealth distribution.17 Thus, the earnings gap is smaller than it would have been in
the opposite case.
The effect of wealth on individual decision-making has undesirable consequences, not just for
equity, however, but also for efficiency. The first, and most obvious, manifestation of this is
the fact that the search frictions reduce total productivity compared to a case in which they
did not exist, partly because workers must now spend in unemployment time that could have
been spent on productive labour, and partly because workers now accept lower-productivity
jobs because they cannot afford to wait for better ones. Under these parameter estimates,
workers spend an average of 0.98 years in unemployment.
The complementarities in the production functions for wage and entrepreneurial employment
mean that this issue of lower total productivity is exacerbated whenever high-ability workers
are relatively more reluctant to remain unemployed (which, as previously discussed, is true
in this case). This is because, even though high-ability workers earn more on average (they
have a higher total match productivity as earnings in the wage and entrepreneurial sectors
17See Appendix B.6 for a discussion of why the relationship between ability and unemployment varies along
the distribution of initial wealth
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Figure 2-15: Log Wealth and Unemployment Duration by Ability
are complementary in firm productivity and worker ability), low-ability workers match with
weakly higher-productivity firms. This is illustrated in Figure 2-16; only at higher levels
of wealth do high-ability workers catch up with their low-ability counterparts in terms of
the productivity of matched firms. Thus, the size of the welfare loss is exacerbated by the
fact that it is low-wealth, high-ability workers who are unable to access high-productivity
jobs.
Finally, wealth affects efficiency through determination of education choice: to the extent
that high-productivity jobs are located among the high-education occupations, low-wealth
workers are inefficiently matched to low-productivity jobs in low-educated occupations.18 The
fact that 45% of sampled workers are employed in low-education agricultural production, the
occupation with the lowest average earnings, clearly exemplifies this problem.
18The model’s prediction that low-wealth workers fail to invest in education when returns are highly dis-
persed is in line with Banerjee et al. (2016), who use a cross-country approach to make a similar argument:
namely, that relatively high unemployment risk in high-education jobs located in poor countries is an impor-
tant determinant of low educational take-up in the presence of high returns to education. Relatedly, Meghir
et al. (2015) show, using a search-and-matching framework estimated on Brazilian data, that the existence
of an informal sector contributes significantly to the number of workers in low-productivity employment,
thereby reducing output and welfare.
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Figure 2-16: Log Wealth and Log Productivity by Ability
2.5 Counterfactual Policy Simulations
In this section, I examine the effects of a pair of policy interventions – namely, an educa-
tion subsidy and unemployment insurance – that target earnings inequality and aggregate
productivity. In particular, I consider which of these policies has the greatest impact when
implemented by a government with a resource constraint. I denote the government’s total
policy budget by 𝐺.
With a fixed resource constraint, the government may face a trade-off between equity and
efficiency in selecting the optimal policy target group. If solely concerned with improving the
equity of labour market outcomes, it may target resources towards the poorest individuals.
By contrast, a government motivated by improving aggregate productivity could focus its
resources on improving the job prospects of high-ability workers, given the complementarity
between worker and firm productivity in the wage and entrepreneurial sectors. Thus, in the
discussion that follows, I consider three targeting options for each policy: first, a baseline
policy in which the policy is offered to everyone, second, an alternative in which the policy
is offered only to individuals of high-ability, and finally, an alternative in which the policy is
offered to low-wealth individuals.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show the effect of the policy interventions considered in this section on
a number of key outcomes: educational attainment, youth unemployment, income inequality
and aggregate productivity. The first column of results in each table shows the baseline
outcome, and the following rows show the outcome for the relevant policy counterfactual
72
under each of the three targeting options.
My measure of inequality is the “20/20 ratio” (the ratio of average earnings in the top 20%
of the income distribution to average earnings in the bottom 20%). This measure is used
for the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Indicators. The
baseline value of inequality is 25.74: that is, the top 20% of earners earn 25.74 times more on
average than the bottom 20%. Aggregate productivity is measured by the sum of individuals’
average income across all years in the labour-force.
2.5.1 Counterfactual Simulation 1: Subsidise Education Cost
The first policy I examine is a subsidy on the cost of education. This mimics a policy actually
implemented by the Ghanaian government: in 2017, it introduced a 100% subsidy on senior
high-school education, in an attempt to raise educational attainment. The parsimonious
model framework of this paper does not, however, allow for a consideration of the labour
market effects that such a policy would generate as a result of increasing the supply of
educated workers. Thus, I consider instead a 20% education subsidy, in order to avoid this
additional complexity.
First, I set the government’s policy budget, 𝐺, at 396,960 Ghanaian cedis (approximately
US$ 82,324). This is the total cost of a 20% education subsidy when offered to the entire
sample of 3728 individuals, of whom 1654 take it up; I fix 𝐺 at this value for the remainder
of this section in order to simplify comparison across policies.19
As previously discussed, I consider three separate targeting options: first, the government
offers a 20% subsidy to all individuals, regardless of their characteristics. Second, it aims
to improve worker-firm matching efficiency by targeting the subsidy at high-ability workers.
This change in targeting raises the value of the subsidy to 21%, when 𝐺 is held constant.
Finally, the government attempts to address equity concerns by targeting the subsidy at indi-
viduals drawn from the bottom of the initial wealth distribution. There are now two options
for determining the eligibility cut-off: first, retain the subsidy value used when targeting
the group of high-ability workers and allow differential compliance to the policy, or second,
adjust the subsidy value such that the same number of targeted individuals (who chose low
education in the baseline) take up education as under efficiency targeting. I employ the
former option, in order to compare the targeting alternatives in terms of the number, as well
as the composition, of individuals who respond to the subsidy by altering their education
choices.
19As shown in Table 2.11, a total of 1654 individuals choose high education when the subsidy is offered to
everyone - the total cost outlay is thus 0.2 * 1200 * 1654 = 396, 960 GHc.
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Table 2.11: Counterfactual 1 (Education Subsidy): Policy Outcomes
baseline target all target efficiency target equity
Proportion of Educated Workers 0.2751 0.4013 0.3967 0.4053
(% change) (46%) (44%) (47%)
Proportion of Unemployed Workers (Age 16-25) 0.0845 0.0909 0.0903 0.0911
(% change) (8%) (7%) (8%)
20/20 ratio (Income Inequality) 25.74 27.38 27.51 27.75
(% change) (6%) (7%) (8%)
Aggregate Productivity 65946.78 82198.89 82465.08 82813.97
(% change) (25%) (25%) (26%)
The first, and perhaps most obvious, outcome of this policy intervention is that the proportion
of highly-educated workers increases by 12 percentage points, from 28% to 40%. The newly-
educated are almost all high-ability individuals; less than 2% of low-ability workers respond to
the subsidy when offered it (see Figure 2-17). Further, youth unemployment increases slightly,
from 8% to 9%. Two mechanisms underlie this: firstly, more workers now enter a labour sub-
market in which there are greater benefits to waiting in unemployment, and secondly, a
substitution effect – some recipients of the subsidy chose to be educated even in the baseline
case; thus, they now channel the savings made on education costs into funding a lengthier
school-to-work transition. While higher youth unemployment may seem undesirable from a
policy-maker’s perspective, it is important to observe that any demand-side interventions in
this labour-market framework must raise unemployment in order to achieve either (or both)
higher output and lower inequality.
The expected effect on income inequality of this policy is ambiguous: first, we might expect
the education subsidy to reduce inequality by allowing lower-wealth individuals to access
better-paying (high-education) jobs. Conversely, however, targeting the subsidy at everyone
results in the substitution effect just described, which allows wealthier individuals to wait
longer in unemployment for even better jobs. As Table 2.11 shows, the aggregate result is
an increase in inequality. This is unsurprising given that individuals in the bottom 20% of
the wealth distribution do not respond to the subsidy (see Figure 2-17); thus, the inequality
measure reflects only the income gains at the top of the distribution.
Finally, I consider the effects of the policy on aggregate productivity. Unsurprisingly, there
is an increase (of 25% above the baseline) in productivity, as workers responding to the
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policy change access better jobs, through a combination of accessing occupations with higher
returns and waiting longer for them.
Strikingly, for this policy, changing the targeting group does not appear to have much effect
on these key outcomes. This is because the composition of workers induced to alter their
education choice in response to the subsidy is virtually the same under all three targeting
options, as take-up is almost exclusively among high-ability workers.
Figure 2-17: Education Choice by Wealth and Ability
In summary, therefore, we see that, while some high-ability workers respond to the education
subsidy, take-up among low-ability workers is very low, such that the aggregate effect on
productivity is muted and, further, that income inequality rises. These results are very much
in keeping with the predictions of the model, which are that an education subsidy alone is un-
likely to be a sufficient policy tool in this context. This is because, when returns to educated
employment require a lengthy wait in unemployment, take-up of education may remain rel-
atively low even when subsidised. Further, even if the subsidy induces additional take-up of
education, the fact that initial wealth continues to drive job quality conditional on education
means that it has limited effects on aggregate productivity and income inequality.
2.5.2 Counterfactual Simulation 2: Introduce Unemployment In-
surance
The second policy I consider is the introduction of unemployment insurance.20 Table 2.12
shows the results of this intervention. As before, I allow for three different types of targeting.
20see Shimer and Werning (2007) and Shimer and Werning (2008) for a discussion of optimal unemployment
insurance when workers are risk-averse.
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In the first case, with everyone eligible for UI, the per period payment is 105 GHc. In the
remaining two cases, where the target group is either high-ability or low-wealth individuals,
the relevant amount is 188 GHc.
Table 2.12: Counterfactual 2 (Unemployment Insurance): Policy Outcomes
baseline target all target efficiency target equity
Proportion of Educated Workers 0.2751 0.2790 0.2790 0.2790
(% change) (1%) (1%) (1%)
Proportion of Unemployed Workers (Age 16-25) 0.0845 0.0889 0.0893 0.0888
(% change) (5%) (6%) (5%)
20/20 ratio (Income Inequality) 25.74 25.51 25.66 25.33
(% change) (1%) (0%) (2%)
Aggregate Productivity 65946.78 66679.07 67038.09 66790.92
(% change) (1%) (2%) (1%)
Firstly, the effect of this policy on educational attainment is negligible: the model predicts
that raising consumption in unemployment (here, via unemployment insurance) can alter
education choices by making individuals more likely to enter a labour sub-market in which
returns are highly dispersed, but this result does not materialise. This is due to the small size
of the policy change; increasing the per-period payment to 1000 GHc, for instance, causes
the proportion of highly-educated workers to fall to zero, and the unemployment rate to rise
sharply, to 28%, as Table 2.13 shows.21
Second, the policy change has a comparable effect on youth unemployment to that of the
education subsidy – the proportion of unemployed 16-25 year-olds increases to approximately
9% - a 5% change. The direction of this effect is as expected – unemployment insurance allows
individuals to remain unemployed longer in order to access higher-productivity jobs.
It follows then that the policy should also reduce income inequality and increase aggregate
productivity; Table 2.12 shows that this is, in fact, what occurs. The increase in productivity
is much smaller than under the education subsidy (a 1% change compared to 25%) but, while
the larger increase in the latter case came at the expense of higher income inequality, there is
21The proportion of highly-educated workers drops to zero because workers face a trade-off in terms of
expending resources on education and on drawing out the time spent in unemployment. Given the fixed
cost of education and the relative means and variances of high-education and low-education earnings, the
introduction of relatively high-valued unemployment insurance makes it optimal for workers to remain at a
low level of education and allocate more resources towards staying unemployed, rather than to expend them
on higher education.
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no equity-efficiency trade-off under this policy option. This is because the resulting increase
in unemployment is proportionally larger at the bottom of the wealth distribution than at
the top, as Figure 2-18 shows.22
Figure 2-18: Unemployment Duration and Wealth
As expected, targeting the policy to high-ability individuals is most effective in raising ag-
gregate productivity, while targeting low-wealth individuals is better at reducing income
inequality. Finally, targeting everyone is a strictly dominated option.
Table 2.13: Key Outcomes with 𝑈𝐼 = 1000 GHc
high-educated unemployed (16-25) aggregate prod. 20/20 ratio
(%) (%) 1000s of GHc
0 27.81 101454.39 11.80
% change from baseline (100%) (229%) (54%) (54%)
In conclusion, therefore, with a fixed resource constraint of 396,960 GHc, an education sub-
sidy is the best option in terms of increasing aggregate productivity, while unemployment
insurance is the optimal choice for reducing income inequality. Thus, the optimal policy
prescription for a resource-constrained government will depend on its preferences over equity
and efficiency; in the absence of such constraints, a combination of the education subsidy
and unemployment insurance would be effective in tackling both issues.
22Relatedly, Browning and Crossley (2001) show that unemployment insurance improves consumption
smoothing among the poor but not the wealthy.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I set up and estimate a discrete-choice model of education and occupation
choice, in order to quantify the relationship between youth unemployment and parental
wealth in Ghana. I show that this relationship is positive, in line with descriptive evidence
from studies of developing-country labour markets. This is because, as in McCall models of
search, higher levels of liquid assets allow workers to remain unemployed for longer, in an
attempt to secure a high-productivity job. Using the results from a structural estimation of
the model’s parameters, I show that this waiting behaviour leads to a number of undesirable
labour market outcomes, compared to a case without credit or search frictions in the labour
market. These are, firstly, a high degree of income inequality that grows over the life-cycle;
secondly, low average educational attainment, as high dispersion in the returns to education
discourages investment in education by workers who cannot afford to wait in unemployment
for long; and finally, low aggregate productivity. This last outcome is due to a combination
of two factors: first, output loss from time spent waiting in unemployment, and second,
output loss from inefficient worker-firm matching, as high-ability workers are less willing to
wait in unemployment than their low-ability counterparts and, as such, match with lower-
productivity firms.
Further, I use the estimated model to decompose the effect of parental wealth on average
lifetime earnings into an education and a waiting channel, and show that the latter is an
important channel, accounting for 37% of the total effect. Finally, I evaluate the effects of
two alternative labour-market policies: an education subsidy and unemployment insurance.
I find that the first of these is most effective at raising aggregate productivity, but does so at
the expense of also raising income inequality. Unemployment insurance has a smaller impact
on productivity, but has the additional benefit of lowering income inequality. The optimal
policy tool thus depends on the government’s preferences over efficiency and equity.
The results of this paper suggest a number of important considerations for policy. First,
policy-makers seeking to improve educational attainment in such a setting would need to
take account of the additional, indirect costs of investment in education caused by the need
to wait for “good” jobs, which are disproportionately high for the poor. Second, in terms of
optimal labour market policy, it it clear that demand-side policies are a second-best solution
to the problems generated by wealthy workers waiting for better jobs, and each has its own
shortcomings: education subsidies increase inequality, while unemployment insurance may
improve worker-firm match efficiency and inequality, but results in an output loss due to more
time spent in unemployment. By contrast, policy efforts focused on improving the average
quality of high-education jobs are more likely – by targeting labour market frictions directly
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– to be effective.
Possible directions for further research on this subject are to consider the ways in which
parental wealth affects the likelihood of unemployment later in life, rather than simply dur-
ing the transition from school to work; to expand the model framework to allow for job-to-job
transitions, in order to understand how the possibility of on-the-job search affects the rela-
tionship between parental wealth and youth unemployment; and to expand the employment
decision space to include the possibility of labour market inactivity, in order to consider
how parental wealth may affect the decision to delay labour market entry (i.e. searching
for employment) among youth, rather than simply the choice between unemployment and
employment for those currently active in the labour market.
79
80
Chapter 3
Learning from Rejection:
Information Cascades in Organ
Transplantation
Abstract
This paper examines the consequences for efficiency of information cascades among UK hospi-
tals in organ transplant queues. We build a structural model in which organs are sequentially
assessed by centres of heterogeneous ability, and show that herding behaviour plays an im-
portant role in observed organ wastage: once an organ is rejected by one or more centres,
subsequent centres emulate their behaviour, ignoring their own assessment of the organ’s
quality. We employ administrative data from the NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT)
that covers the universe of abdominal organs donated in the UK during 2006-2016 to pro-
vide reduced-form evidence of herding behaviour among transplant centres. Further, we
undertake a set of counter-factual analyses to demonstrate that, while herding behaviour is
common among UK transplant centres, the resulting increase in discard rates is not substan-
tially higher than that of the full-information benchmark. Equally, it performs the important
function of preventing centres from accepting organs of poor quality such that, overall, the
benefits derived from observing predecessors’ decisions outweigh the costs of herding tradi-
tionally emphasised in the theoretical literature. In contrast with this literature, therefore,
we find that, in this context, herding is efficiency-enhancing overall.
Keywords: Social learning, Herd behavior, Information Cascades, Organ trans-
plant decisions
JEL codes: J12, J16, D31, I3
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3.1 Introduction
Allocating donated organs in an efficient and equitable manner to recipients on a waiting list
is the primary objective of any organ transplant program. In the United Kingdom, the organ
transplant program is organized around a nationwide network of centers (hospitals). When a
deceased-donor organ becomes available, all patients on the National Transplant Registry are
assigned a priority rank based on a predetermined allocation algorithm. Transplant centers
are offered the organ in order of their patients’ priority, until the organ either is accepted
or, having deteriorated with time, is no longer viable and, as such, is discarded. Currently,
demand outstrips the availability of both livers and kidneys, the two organs that dominate
transplantation activity in the United Kingdom and that constitute the focus of our analysis.
National Health Service Blood and Transplantation (NHSBT) statistics indicate that, five
years after being listed, approximately 20% of patients on the National Registry have either
died or been removed from the waiting list, as their condition has deteriorated below the
minimum eligibility criterion for transplantation. Simultaneously, however, approximately
50% of livers and 30% of kidneys are discarded. Organs may be discarded because they
are of poor quality and, thus, are unsuitable for transplantation. In this paper, we examine
an alternative possibility, namely that some viable organs fail to be utilized because, once
an organ has been rejected by one or more centers, subsequent centers ignore their own
assessment of organ quality and herd in line with their predecessors.
There is a growing economics literature on organ transplantation and two-sided matching,
including Roth et al. (2004), Roth et al. (2005) and Roth et al. (2007). This literature,
which is largely focused on organ transplants that involve live donors, studies the manner
in which donors and recipients are optimally matched in the absence of market mechanisms
(which, in the case of organs, do not exist for obvious ethical reasons). Our research shifts
the organ transplant literature in a new direction, by focusing on the information-based
inefficiencies that may arise when deceased-donor organs are offered sequentially to centers
on a waiting list. Such information-based inefficiencies may arise, more generally, whenever
an object is offered sequentially to decision-makers and past decisions are public knowledge.
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) motivate their seminal paper on herding with an example in
which a research paper, once rejected by one or more journals, is more likely to be rejected
by other journals as well. The labor market is another obvious setting for this phenomenon.
In this paper, we provide a strategy to detect information-based herding in settings in which
decisions are characterized by a sequence of rejections, followed either by an acceptance
or by termination of the process, as well as a methodology for quantifying the efficiency
consequences of such herding.
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In order to understand why transplant centers might rationally condition their decisions on
those of the centers that preceded them, and why such herding behavior could generate
inefficiencies, suppose that there are two types of organ: good (𝐺) and bad (𝐵). Each
transplant center makes an assessment of the quality of the organ that is made available to
it. This assessment – which, to be consistent with the existing literature on herding, may
equivalently be treated as an information signal – is not directly observed by other transplant
centers. As in Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Anderson and Holt (1997), we assume that
signals are binary: good (𝑔) and bad (𝑏). Centers are not systematically misinformed; they
are thus more likely to receive a 𝑔 (𝑏) signals when an organ is good (bad). For expositional
convenience, we assume that transplant centers have a common negative prior about the
quality of offered organs; thus, in the absence of any other information, each center’s decision
is to reject the organ. Additionally, we assume that a 𝑔 signal dominates a center’s negative
prior, such that it always accepts the offered organ upon receipt of such a signal.
It follows that the first center to be offered an organ rejects it on receipt of a 𝑏 signal (which
reinforces its prior), but accepts it on receipt of a 𝑔 signal. The second center in line is offered
the organ only if the first center rejects it, and knows that the first center only rejects after
a 𝑏 signal. Thus, if the second center also receives a 𝑏 signal, this reinforces the information
contained in both the first center’s 𝑏 signal and the negative prior, and it will certainly reject
the organ. If, however, the second center receives a 𝑔 signal, it knows that its signal is not
aligned with that of the first center. Under the assumption that all transplant centers receive
signals of equal precision (i.e. that they are all equally competent in assessing the quality of
an organ), the first and second centers’ signals cancel each other out, and the second center
also rejects (based on its negative prior). Next, consider the third center’s decision: it knows
that the second center rejects the organ regardless of its signal, such that the second center’s
decision gives the third center no additional information. Accordingly, the third center now
behaves as if it were second in line. Following the preceding argument, it also rejects the
organ, regardless of the signal it receives. This process is replicated along the entire waiting
list, regardless of the sequence of signals received by centers.
While it is individually rational for centers to ignore their signals in this manner, herding
can result in the under-utilization of viable organs. To see why this is the case, suppose
that the first center in line for an organ receives a 𝑏 signal, but all the centers that follow
receive 𝑔 signals. This organ is rejected by all centers, despite the fact that it is evidently a
𝐺 organ. The phenomenon just described is referred to in the literature as an “information
cascade”. The pioneering papers in this literature, Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al.
(1992) also provide similar illustrations of information cascades. These cascades are a special
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case of a general phenomenon known as “herding”, in which agents condition their decisions
on their predecessors’ decisions (C¸elen and Kariv (2004)). The distinguishing feature of an
information cascade is that agents completely ignore their own signals when they herd behind
their predecessors; consequently, agents that follow them in the decision-making process can
learn nothing from their decisions, resulting in an information inefficiency.
The identification of information-based herding is a challenging statistical problem because,
for many reasons, agents’ decisions may be correlated. For example, a strand of the finance
literature, which includes Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wermers
(1999), has interpreted clustering in asset investment decisions as being indicative of herd-
ing. Such clustering does not, however, imply that agents learn from each other; rather,
agents could make the same decisions simply because they have correlated characteristics or
receive correlated information signals. More recently, Cipriani and Guarino (2014) estimate a
structural model of asset investment decisions to examine herding in financial markets. Their
identification strategy relies on a particular (i.i.d.) specification of unobserved information
shocks within a day. If, given this specification, investors are found to trade against their
own information and systematically to follow their predecessors’ decisions, the authors infer
that herding is present. As the timing of decisions is endogenous (not random, as assumed
in the model), investors who choose to buy or sell at particular times of the day likely receive
correlated signals. Clustering in investment decisions within a day would then spuriously be
attributed to information-based herding.1
There is a long tradition in development economics of using theoretical models to derive ro-
bust tests of herding in the adoption of new agricultural technology, with particular attention
paid to potential omitted variable biases of the sort described above; examples include Foster
and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (2004), Conley and Udry (2010). Although this literature
provides credible evidence of herding, the information frictions incorporated into the models
of technology adoption are distinct from those in the canonical theoretical models of infor-
mation cascades. Specifically, farmers draw signals from a continuous distribution and make
decisions along a continuum. Thus, neighbors’ signals can perfectly be recovered from their
decisions. Informational inefficiencies arise because neighbors’ signals are less informative
than the farmer’s own signals. Identifying information cascades, which arise when signals
and decisions are binary, requires novel tests. An important contribution of our research is
to develop such tests, which are based explicitly on the fact that agents ignore their signals
entirely when information cascades occur (such that their decisions are useless to the agents
1In general, structural models (conditional on having been previously validated) are most useful for quan-
tification. In this paper, we independently validate our model with reduced-form tests before proceeding to
the structural estimation.
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who follow them).
The most direct implication of herding is that agents’ decisions should be correlated with their
predecessors’ decisions. Quite apart from the alternative non-learning interpretations of these
correlations, the structure of our data does not even allow this test to be implemented. This
is because there is so little variation in transplant decisions – an acceptance is observed once,
at most, for each organ (and only ever at the end of a sequence). To identify herding, which,
in our setting, is equivalent to information cascades, we thus incorporate heterogeneity in
center ability. In particular, suppose that centers are distinguished by their ability to identify
good and bad organs. In our model, this implies that the precision of the information signal
varies across centers. We would then expect a center in second position to be more likely to
reject the organ when it follows a higher-ability center in first position, compared to the case
in which it follows a lower-ability center in the same position. Letting 𝑝2 be the probability
that center 2 rejects (conditional on being offered the organ) and 𝑞1 be center 1’s ability, this
implies 𝛼1 > 0 in equation (3.1):
𝑝2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑞1. (3.1)
While an estimated 𝛼1 > 0 is consistent with herding, a special feature of our application
is that this result could also be obtained without learning – that is, even if centers simply
follow their own signals with no regard for the decisions of their peers. This is because a
higher-ability center is more likely to accept a good organ and less likely to accept a bad
organ. Thus, compared to a center of lower ability, it passes on a worse pool of organs when
in first position. Our first test of herding consequently is based on an augmented specification
of the preceding equation:
𝑝2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑞1 + 𝛼2𝑞2 + 𝛼3𝑞1 · 𝑞2, (3.2)
where 𝑞2 is center 2’s ability. Our focus is on the interaction term, 𝑞1 · 𝑞2. When centers
follow their own signals, center 2 is more responsive to the deterioration in the organ pool that
results from center 1 being of relatively high ability when center 2 is itself of higher ability.
That is, we expect 𝛼3 to be positive. When centers ignore their own signals and herd in line
with their predecessors, however, this effect may be reversed, resulting in a negative value
for 𝛼3. This is because lower-ability centers in second position are more likely to abandon
their signals and reject with certainty, especially when following higher-ability centers.
Our second test of herding is based on the behavior of centers in third position. To imple-
ment this test, we estimate the following equation, with the probability of rejection in third
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position, 𝑝3, as the dependent variable:
𝑝3 = ?˜?0 + ?˜?1𝑞1 + ?˜?2𝑞2. (3.3)
Consider a case in which centers follow their own signals. As previously noted, a higher-
ability center passes on a relatively worse pool of organs to subsequent centres. Thus, ?˜?1, ?˜?2
are both positive. Furthermore, as long as a center’s position does not vary systematically
with its ability (i.e. average 𝑞1 equals average 𝑞2), as verified below, the coefficients ?˜?1 and ?˜?2
are also equal to each other. Once we introduce the possibility of herding (this can happen
in second, but not first, position), ?˜?2 is strictly smaller than ?˜?1. This is because centers
that herd (and reject with certainty, regardless of their signal) do not alter the quality of the
organ pool or, consequently, the rejection probability of center 3.
We implement the tests of information cascades using administrative data obtained from
NHSBT. This data covers the universe of deceased-donor livers and kidneys offered between
2006 and 2015. The data includes the sequence of centers that was offered each organ,
as well as their decisions, which – with the possible exception of the final center in every
sequence – must necessarily be rejections. The first step in estimating equations (3.2) and
(3.3) is to construct a measure of center ability. Higher-ability centers are better than their
low-ability counterparts at detecting both 𝐺 and 𝐵 organs. Thus, when the pool of organs
is poor, higher-ability centers reject more often than do lower-ability centers. Conversely,
when the pool of organs has high average quality, higher-ability centers accept more often.
To determine which scenario is relevant for a given organ type – livers or kidneys – we take
advantage of equation (3.1), which indicates that centers in second position reject more often
when following a higher-ability center. We find that, for livers, a center’s ability increases
in its first-position probability of rejection, while, for kidneys, the reverse is true. Our
measure of ability is thus, for livers, precisely this probability and, for kidneys, one minus
the corresponding probability. Using this measure, we successfully test both predictions of
the model. Based on the estimates of equation (3.1), the model additionally predicts that
the interaction coefficient in equation (3.2), 𝛼3, should be negative for livers and positive for
kidneys. We also provide empirical support for this prediction.
Having established that information cascades exist, the next step is to estimate their preva-
lence and to quantify their efficiency consequences. Accordingly, we estimate the structural
parameters of the model and then conduct counter-factual simulations. Heterogeneity in
center quality is a distinguishing feature of our model; while this helps us to identify infor-
mation cascades, however, it also renders the structural estimation more challenging. Our
model has two ability parameters – the probability of receiving a 𝑔 signal with a 𝐺 organ and
86
the probability of receiving a 𝑏 signal with a 𝐵 organ – that must be estimated separately
for each center. Due to the large number of centers, we estimate these ability parameters
outside the model. Indices of organ quality based on optimally-determined donor and or-
gan characteristics have recently been proposed in the organ transplant literature for both
livers and kidneys. These indices are constructed from retrospective NHSBT data that cov-
ers organ transplant decisions and subsequent patient outcomes over many years. Although
individual centers base their decisions on many of the characteristics that are incorporated
in the risk indices, their decisions are nonetheless limited by their own experiences. In gen-
eral, we expect decisions taken by higher-ability centers to track more closely with the risk
index. We use this intuition to construct center-specific measures of ability, to characterize
the organ-center specific distribution of signals, and to compute the fraction of 𝐺 organs in
the population of organs.
The risk indices allow us to obtain internally-consistent estimates of all the model’s param-
eters, with one exception: the threshold belief that an organ is good, above which centers
accept it. An increase in this threshold has no bearing on the decisions of centers that follow
their own signal; they will accept if they receive a 𝑔 signal and reject if they receive a 𝑏 sig-
nal. It does, however, increase the fraction of centers that herd and ignore their own signal,
thus rejecting with certainty. An increase in the threshold belief is therefore accompanied by
an increase in the rejection rate and, hence, there exists a unique threshold value at which
the rejection rate predicted by the model matches the data. This is our best estimate of
the threshold belief, which is estimated using the simulated method of moments (based on
repeated draws of the information signals). We verify that the estimated threshold satisfies
a key assumption of the model, which is that all centers follow their signals in first position.
We also verify that the model matches the data well; indeed, our model’s goodness of fit is
substantially better than that of the alternative “no-learning” model, in which centers ignore
their predecessors’ decisions and always follow their signals.
To measure the prevalence of information cascades, we compute the fraction of decisions in
our data for which centers are predicted to have ignored their signals (given our estimate of
the threshold belief). Based on this estimate, it is common for centers to ignore their signals:
this occurs 66% of the time for livers, and 54% of the time for kidneys, with an increase
in these statistics at higher positions. Arguably, however, a more important question is
whether such herding has substantial efficiency consequences. To answer this question, it is
necessary to specify the full-information benchmark. In our model, centers know which of
their predecessors followed their own signals and, consequently, which must have received a
𝑏 signal when they rejected. The missing information is associated with centers who herd,
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as the centers that follow them learn nothing from their decisions. With full information, by
contrast, signals received by all preceding centers are utilized in the decision-making process.
We construct the full-information benchmark by drawing signals for those centers who are
predicted by the model to herd (this is possible because the risk index provides us with more
information than was historically available to individual centers). The signals we draw are
also used to predict decisions in the alternative no-learning model, in which centers always
follow their own signals.
With herding, there are too many rejections relative to the full-information benchmark. This
is because herding centres ignore their own 𝑔 signals, and this has spillover effects on the
centers that follow. Conversely, with no learning, there are too many acceptances, because
useful information contained in previous rejection decisions is ignored. Our estimates quantify
these opposing effects: we find that over-rejection with the herding model is modest, while
over-acceptance with the no-learning model is substantial. These findings motivate the final
step of the analysis, in which we compare discard rates under the herding and no-learning
models against the full-information benchmark. The decision to discard an organ is taken
by NHSBT and thus exists outside our model. Our interest is in whether an organ that
is discarded in the data (with herding) would have been accepted at an earlier position
with the alternative models. As decisions are similar under herding and the full-information
benchmark, we do not expect discard rates to diverge substantially. As expected, discard
rates with herding are roughly 10% higher than the full-information benchmark. By contrast,
discard rates under the assumption of no learning are 35% lower than the same benchmark,
on account of the many false acceptances that arise when centers ignore the information that
is contained in their predecessors’ decisions. These results collectively indicate that herding
contributes substantially to the high discard rate observed in the data, but that this increase
in the discard rate is not necessarily inefficient. Centers often ignore their own signals, but
their reliance on their predecessors actually protects them from accepting bad organs. The
concluding section of the paper discusses the generalizability of these findings.
3.2 Institutional Setting
The shortage of suitable donor organs has always been the primary challenge faced by or-
gan transplant programs. In response to this challenge, many countries, including the United
Kingdom, have established national allocation schemes for the distribution of organs supplied
by deceased donors. Organs obtained from deceased donors are classified, according to the
manner of death, as either DBD (donation after brain death) or DCD (donation after cardiac
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death).2 In the absence of circulation, cells switch from aerobic to anaerobic metabolism,
with a resulting accumulation of toxic metabolites and lactic acid. To reduce the accompa-
nying loss in cellular integrity, organs from deceased donors must be transplanted as quickly
as possible. Organs are removed from DBD donors with the heart still beating (with the
support of a ventilator) and are then immediately cooled to 4𝑜C. Although these organs do
deteriorate, through a process known as cold ischaemia, the metabolic rate at 4𝑜C is less
than 10% of what it is at normal temperature and, hence, deterioration is relatively slow.
DCD organs, by contrast, are subject to an initial period of warm ischaemia once the heart
stops beating – which, in practice, could exceed an hour – before the organ is retrieved and
cooled. Deterioration is relatively rapid during this period and, moreover, organs that suffer
warm ischaemia subsequently tolerate cold ischaemia very poorly. Thus, while DBD and
DCD organs may not vary systematically with respect to ex ante quality, and while the same
broad allocation protocols are utilized by the National Health Service Blood and Transplant
(NHSBT) for both types of organ, DCD organs are useable for a shorter period of time before
they must be discarded from the donor pool and set aside for research.
Our analysis focuses on livers and kidneys, for which donors have been matched to recipients
in the United Kingdom through a national allocation scheme since the late 1990s. These
two types of organ continue to dominate transplantation activity: NHSBT statistics indicate
that over 80% of livers and kidneys obtained from DBD donors in 2014-2015 were trans-
planted, while the corresponding statistics for pancreases, hearts, and lungs were less than
35%. For DBD livers and kidneys, a Transplant Benefit Score (TBS), which puts weight on
both the patient’s need for a transplant and the patient’s organ-specific quality of life after
the transplant, is used to rank all patients listed on the National Registry when a given organ
becomes available. The TBS is calculated using a fixed set of donor and recipient character-
istics. When an organ becomes available, it is offered to patients in order of their priority.
Each patient’s hospital (transplant center) has 45 minutes to accept or decline the offer,
based on the information that is made available; this process continues until the organ has
been accepted or until too much time has elapsed for it to remain useable. Transplantation
delays are substantially more costly for DCD organs and, hence, the proximity between donor
and recipient is also a factor in drawing up the priority list. For livers, DBD (DCD) organs
should be transplanted within 12 (6) hours, while the corresponding cutoffs for kidneys are
18 (12) hours. Due to greater urgency, DCD organs are offered regionally before being added
to national lists. Nevertheless, a common feature of the allocation procedure for all organ
types is that the order of recipients and, by extension, the order of centers, is exogenously
determined. This order varies from one organ to the next; we exploit this variation in our
2The description of DBD and DCD organs that follows is based on Watson and Dark (2012).
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empirical analysis.
Our analysis is based on the universe of deceased-donor organs that was offered to patients
on the National Registry between 2006 and 2015. A new National Kidney Allocation Scheme
was initiated in 2006 and a new National Liver Allocation Scheme was initiated after 2015.
The analysis thus covers a period during which both livers and kidneys are allocated in a
uniform manner.3 We see in Figure 3-1 that there was a substantial increase in the number
of organs offered per annum over this period – from 900 to 1800, and from 1200 to 2400, for
livers and kidneys, respectively.4 Nevertheless, the fraction of patients who either die while
on the wait list or are removed from the wait list remains high. Patients are generally listed
on the Registry, and can remain on the Registry, if they have more than a 50% chance of
surviving for five years post-transplant. NHS Blood and Transplant (2010) indicates that
23% of liver patients listed on the National Registry in 2007-2008 had either died or had been
removed from the list three years later. Among the kidney patients listed in 2004-2005, 12%
had the same outcome. Nearly a decade later, NHS Blood and Transplant (2018a) and NHS
Blood and Transplant (2018b) indicate that the shortage of available organs remains largely
unchanged. 17% of liver patients who were listed on the National Registry in 2015-2016 had
either died or were removed from the list three years later, while 12% of kidney patients
listed in 2014-2015 had the same outcome two years later.
Figure 3-2 provides an explanation for the continued organ shortage, which exists despite the
fact that the number of donations has increased over time. This figure reports the fraction
of organs that was discarded (i.e. set aside for research), and we see that there has been a
substantial increase in this fraction over the period of our analysis (2006-2015). While 22% of
donated livers were discarded in 2006, 48% were discarded by the end of our analysis period.
Discard rates are lower for kidneys than for livers.5 Simultaneously, however, there has been
a steep increase in the discard rate for kidneys, from 8% in 2006 to 29% by 2015. Some
of this increase in the discard rate may be attributed to the worsening pool of organs over
time, as DCD organs and organs that would previously have be considered unsuitable are
now being retrieved (Watson and Dark (2012)). We posit a different mechanism, however,
3Starting in 2012, organs that have been declined by a fixed number of centers or have been subject to cold
ischaemia for a sufficient amount of time are offered to all the centers that remain on the list, through a process
termed the “Fast Track” allocation scheme. As discussed below, this scheme, as currently implemented, can
nevertheless be modelled as a sequential process. Providing support for this argument, our model, based on
sequential decision-making, matches the data at least as well in the Fast Track period as it does before that
period (results available from the authors).
4There has been an increase in the number of live kidney donors in recent years. However, most kidneys
continue to be transplanted from deceased donors in the United Kingdom.
5Recipients of liver transplants are usually much sicker than recipients of kidney transplants, who can
remain on dialysis while they are waiting. Liver transplants are also more complex operations than kidney
transplants. Not surprisingly, transplant surgeons tend to be more conservative with livers than kidneys.
90
Figure 3-1: Total Number of Organs Offered Over Time
Figure 3-2: Proportion of Discarded Organs Over Time
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which is based on the notion of herding in transplant decisions. The sequential nature of
the decision-making process means that, once one or more centers have declined an organ,
following centers may (rationally) emulate their decision to decline. The analysis that follows
tests for the presence of such herding, and quantifies its contribution to the increase in the
discard rate over time, as well as its consequences for welfare.
3.3 A Model of Organ Transplantation
3.3.1 Organs, Centers and Signals
There is a pool of organs of unknown quality. Organs can be either of good (𝐺) or bad (𝐵)
quality.6 The outcome of an organ transplant is denoted by 𝐻 if the organ is good, and by
𝐿 if it is bad, with 𝐻 > 0 > 𝐿. Payoffs 𝐻 and 𝐿 are realized independently of the hospital
(center) undertaking the transplant and the identity of the patient who receives the organ.
We normalize the outcome of not transplanting an organ to 0. The prior on organ quality is
denoted by 𝜋, i.e. this is the probability that a random organ from the pool is a 𝐺 organ.
We define the cut-off belief ?˜? as the belief at which every hospital is indifferent between
accepting or rejecting an organ – that is, ?˜?𝐻 + (1− ?˜?)𝐿 = 0, or ?˜? = −𝐿
𝐻−𝐿 .
Centers individually assess organ quality before making a decision. Specifically, each center
independently receives a signal 𝑠 ∈ {𝑔, 𝑏}, for which a 𝑔 signal indicates that the organ
is good, while 𝑏 indicates that it is bad. Centers differ in their ability to distinguish 𝐺
organs from 𝐵 organs, and this heterogeneity is captured by an underlying ability (or type)
parameter 𝑞𝑗 ∈ [𝑞, 𝑞] ⊂ R for each center 𝑗. A center’s type 𝑞𝑗 determines the probability
𝛾𝑗 ∈ (0, 1), with which it correctly identifies a 𝐺 organ, and the probability 𝛽𝑗 ∈ (0, 1), with
which it correctly identifies a 𝐵 organ. Formally, for center 𝑗, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑔 | 𝐺) = 𝛾𝑗 = 𝛾(𝑞𝑗) and
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑏 | 𝐵) = 𝛽𝑗 = 𝛽(𝑞𝑗), with strictly increasing functions 𝛾, 𝛽 : [𝑞, 𝑞]→ (0, 1).
A center with type 𝑞𝑗 updates its beliefs about organ quality upwards upon receiving a 𝑔
signal and downwards upon receiving a 𝑏 signal, so that with
𝜋𝑗(𝐺|𝑔) = 𝜋𝛾𝑗
𝜋𝛾𝑗 + (1− 𝜋)(1− 𝛽𝑗) ,
𝜋𝑗(𝐺|𝑏) = 𝜋(1− 𝛾𝑗)
𝜋(1− 𝛾𝑗) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽𝑗 ,
6Given that decisions are binary (accept or reject) and that these are the only outcomes that we consider
in the analysis, there is no gain from enriching the organ type-space. For example, if we assumed that organ
quality was measured on a continuum, then all values above (below) a threshold would be observationally
equivalent to 𝐺 (𝐵) organs. Centers would accept (reject) if they knew that an organ was 𝐺 (𝐵).
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we have
𝜋𝑗(𝐺|𝑔) > 𝜋 > 𝜋𝑗(𝐺|𝑏). (3.4)
The inequalities in (3.4) are satisfied if
Assumption 1: For all 𝑗, 𝛽𝑗 ≥ 1− 𝛾𝑗.
We further assume that, in the absence of any other information, centers always follow their
own signals, such that each center accepts the organ if it receives a 𝑔 signal and declines the
organ upon receipt of a 𝑏 signal.7 This requires that:
Assumption 2: For all 𝑗, 𝜋𝑗(𝐺|𝑔) ≥ ?˜? > 𝜋𝑗(𝐺|𝑏)
3.3.2 Transplant Decisions
Organs are offered sequentially to centers on the basis of a predetermined (algorithmic) order.
The priority list, both for a given organ and across organs, is independent of center ability.
Center 1 receives a signal and, given Assumption 2, accepts after a 𝑔 signal and declines after
a 𝑏 signal. If the organ is accepted, it is transplanted by center 1 and results in payoff 𝐻 or
𝐿, depending on its quality. If it is declined, an administrator from NHSBT decides either
to offer the organ to the next center or to set it aside for research. The decision to discard
an organ is based on its condition or useability, which depends on the duration of ischaemia,
as discussed above. NHSBT administrators monitor the condition of the organ during the
offering process (this information is not available to centers), discarding it as soon as it is
considered to be unsuitable for transplantation. Because the decision to discard an organ is
orthogonal to its quality, this will not affect the next center’s prior on organ quality and, as
such, has no impact on the analysis.
Centers positioned further along in the sequence learn from the decisions of their predecessors;
the particular structure of our data means that these decisions can only be rejections. Each
center knows the identity of its predecessors and the order in which they made their decisions.8
As centers are ordered in a sequence, we identify a center by its position in this sequence,
7As decisions are binary and there are two organ types, there is no gain to enriching the signal space. For
example, suppose that signals are bounded and distributed on a continuum, with centers receiving a higher
signal on average when an organ is good. Then there exists a threshold signal value above (below) which the
organ is accepted (rejected) by a given center, absent any other information. All signal values above (below)
the threshold are then observationally equivalent to 𝑔 (𝑏) signals.
8Results (available from the authors) are the same, but the analysis is more involved, when this assumption
is relaxed.
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such that the center at position 𝑗 has ability 𝑞𝑗. We use an iterative process to describe
centers’ equilibrium beliefs and strategies. The equilibrium concept that characterizes the
learning process is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Center 2 knows that center 1 must have received a 𝑏 signal, given Assumption 2. Its prior
belief (before it receives its own signal) is therefore
𝜋2 = 𝜋1(𝑏) =
𝜋(1− 𝛾1)
𝜋(1− 𝛾1) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1 . (3.5)
Its posterior belief when it receives a 𝑔 signal is
𝜋2(𝑔) =
𝜋2𝛾2
𝜋2𝛾2 + (1− 𝜋2)(1− 𝛽2) ,
Finally, its posterior belief when it receives a 𝑏 signal is
𝜋2(𝑏) =
𝜋2(1− 𝛾2)
𝜋2(1− 𝛾2) + 𝜋2𝛽2 .
Center 2 always rejects the organ if it receives a 𝑏 signal, because its prior belief, 𝜋2 (which
is lower than ?˜?), is downgraded even further following a 𝑏 signal. Center 2 could reject the
organ even if it receives a 𝑔 signal – which implies that it is herding – if this updating does
not raise its posterior above ?˜?. In summary, therefore, center 2’s optimal decision is only to
accept the organ if it received a 𝑔 signal and 𝜋2(𝑔) ≥ ?˜?, and to decline otherwise.9
Furthermore, center 3 knows center 2’s decision-making process and its prior belief, 𝜋2,
but does not necessarily know center 2’s signal. If center 2 herds, its decision provides no
information about its signal to center 3, and the latter’s prior belief is therefore equal to 𝜋2.
If, on the other hand, center 2 uses its signal to make its decision (𝜋2(𝑔) ≥ ?˜?), center 3 infers
from center 2’s rejection that it must have received a 𝑏 signal, and therefore has a prior belief
equal to 𝜋2(𝑏):
𝜋3 =
⎧⎨⎩ 𝜋2, if 𝜋2(𝑔) < ?˜?𝜋2(𝑏) otherwise.
We can easily extrapolate from the discussion above to understand the manner in which
center 𝑛 > 3, given its prior belief (𝜋𝑛), forms its posterior belief (either 𝜋𝑛(𝑔) or 𝜋𝑛(𝑏)),
9With a binary signal structure, centers either follow their own signal or ignore their signal entirely, which
implies an information cascade. With a continuum of signals, centers could place weight on both their own
signals and those of their predecessors. Herding and cascades could co-exist in such a case but, in order to
identify both phenomena simultaneously, as in C¸elen and Kariv (2004), we would require information that is
only available in a laboratory setting.
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and then chooses optimally either to accept or to decline the organ. Center 𝑛 + 1’s prior
thus depends (as just discussed for center 3) on whether its predecessor, center 𝑛, herds or
not.
3.3.3 Center Heterogeneity
When agents herd, they place weight on the decisions of their predecessors in making their
own decisions. For the case in which the decision is binary (accept or reject), an agent
is more likely to accept (reject) when his predecessors also have accepted (rejected). Due
to the particular structure of our data, in which an organ can be accepted only once, this
correlation in decisions cannot be tested directly. Instead, in order to identify herding, we
exploit heterogeneity in center ability. In particular, we expect a center to put more weight
on a predecessor with higher ability because a rejection decision by such a center is more
informative about the state of the world (i.e. that the organ is bad).10 The first step,
therefore, is to establish that such heterogeneity among centers does indeed exist.
The first measure of a center’s ability that we construct is based on its probability of rejection
when in first position. Given Assumption 2, the probability that center 1 (with ability 𝑞1)
rejects is equal to the probability that it receives a 𝑏 signal, which is:
𝑝1(𝑞1) = 𝜋(1− 𝛾1) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1. (3.6)
In order to be able to use a center’s rejection probability in position 1 as a measure of its
ability we need to assume that this probability is monotonic – either increasing or decreasing
– for all centers. The probability of center 1 rejecting the organ is increasing in its own ability
if, for any 𝑞1 ∈ [𝑞, 𝑞],
𝑑𝑝1(𝑞1)
𝑑𝑞1
= −𝜋𝛾′(𝑞1) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽′(𝑞1) ≥ 0. (3.7)
If the preceding condition is reversed for all 𝑞1, a center’s probability of rejection in position
1 will be decreasing in its ability.
To determine whether center ability is increasing or decreasing in the probability of rejection
in first position, we examine the decisions of centers in second position. To begin with, assume
10The implicit assumption here is that center ability is common knowledge. Past research on herding; e.g.
Munshi (2004) has generated informational inefficiencies by assuming that neighbors’ types are imperfectly
observed. In such a situation, similar neighbors (in type-space) receive more weight, as do higher-ability
predecessors in our framework.
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that center 2 follows its own signal. This would be the case if it ignores its predecessors’
decisions or if it does not herd; that is, its posterior belief upon receiving a 𝑔 signal exceeds
?˜?. In this case, the probability that center 2 rejects the organ is the probability that it
receives a 𝑏 signal, conditional on center 1 also having received a 𝑏 signal. Applying Bayes’
Rule yields:
𝑝2(𝑞1, 𝑞2) =
𝜋(1− 𝛾1)(1− 𝛾2) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1𝛽2
𝜋(1− 𝛾1) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1 . (3.8)
We can now compute, using Assumption 2, the manner in which center 2’s rejection proba-
bility varies with center 1’s ability:
𝜕𝑝2(𝑞1, 𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1
= 𝜋(1− 𝜋)(𝛾
′
1𝛽1 + 𝛽′1(1− 𝛾1))(𝛽2 − (1− 𝛾2))
(𝜋(1− 𝛾1) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1)2 ≥ 0, (3.9)
Furthermore, an increase in center 1’s ability makes it more likely that center 2 herds and
rejects with certainty. This is because a higher-ability predecessor’s rejection has a bigger
impact on center 2’s prior belief, thereby increasing the likelihood that its posterior belief will
remain below ?˜? even when it receives a 𝑔 signal. In general, center 2 is more likely to reject
when center 1 has high ability, regardless of whether centers learn from their predecessors or
not.
If we observe that centers in second position are more (less) likely to reject when they follow
centers with a higher probability of rejection when in first position, condition (3.7) implies
that this probability is positively (negatively) associated with center ability. We will see later
that the sign of this relationship is positive for livers and negative for kidneys. We therefore
use the probability of rejection in first position to measure center ability for liver transplants
and one minus this probability to measure center ability for kidney transplants in our tests
of information cascades.
3.3.4 A Test of Cascades (based on decisions in second position)
The preceding discussion demonstrates that a center positioned at 2 is more likely to decline
an organ when it follows a higher-ability center, both with and without herding. To test for
information cascades, and for herding more generally, we must thus put more structure on
the relationship between center 2’s rejection decision and center 1’s quality, 𝑞1. In particular,
we examine the way in which this relationship varies with center 2’s quality, 𝑞2. In order to
implement this test, we estimate equation (3.2), which includes 𝑞1, 𝑞2, and 𝑞1 ·𝑞2 as covariates,
and focus on the interaction term.
First, assume that center 2 does not herd, such that its rejection probability is described by
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(3.8). The cross-partial with respect to 𝑞1 and 𝑞2, which is essentially the coefficient on the
interaction term, is then
𝜕2𝑝2(𝑞1, 𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝑞2
= 𝜋(1− 𝜋)(𝛾
′
1𝛽1 + 𝛽′1(1− 𝛾1))(𝛽′2 + 𝛾′2))
(𝜋(1− 𝛾1) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1)2 > 0, (3.10)
That is, the effect of an increase in center 1’s ability on center 2’s rejection probability is
larger when center 2 has higher ability. In order to obtain some intuition for this result, we
decompose the effect of an increase in center 1’s ability on center 2’s rejection probability as
follows: an increase in 𝑞1 decreases 𝜋2 (the quality of the organ pool passed on to centre 2),
which, in turn, raises centre 2’s rejection probability. Therefore, 𝜕𝑝2/𝜕𝑞1 is increasing in 𝑞2
if and only if − 𝜕𝑝2
𝜕𝜋2
also is, where
𝑝2 = 𝜋2(1− 𝛾2) + (1− 𝜋2)𝛽2,
and 𝜋2 (see (3.5)) depends on 𝑞1 but not on 𝑞2. Taking derivatives,
−𝜕𝑝2
𝜕𝜋2
= 𝛽2 − (1− 𝛾2),
which is increasing in 𝑞2 because both 𝛽2 and 𝛾2 are. Intuitively, the rejection decision of
a high-ability center is more sensitive to the quality of its organ pool than is the rejection
decision of a low-ability center.
Although (3.10) shows that the cross-partial is positive in the absence of herding, this result
does not necessarily hold when center 2 herds. In particular, there are now two effects:
the pure cross-partial effect and the herding effect. The former, which we described above,
implies that a low-ability center reacts less to an increase in its predecessor’s ability than
does a high-ability center, because the former is less sensitive to the quality of its organ pool.
The latter effect works in the opposite direction: as the rejection by a high-ability center 1
represents worse news about underlying organ quality than does the rejection of a low-ability
center, it is more likely that a weak center 2 herds and also rejects. The question of which
effect dominates depends on the underlying organ pool and on the ability of the relevant
centers.
This is best seen in the following two figures. In drawing these figures, we have assumed
that the lowest-ability center is completely uninformed and takes a random decision, and
that the highest-ability center is perfectly informed, although the results do not rely on those
97
assumptions.11 The figures show the rejection probabilities of two centers at position 2 as
a function of center 1’s ability 𝑞1. The centers at position 2 differ in their own ability, and
we assume that 𝑞′2 < 𝑞′′2 . The curves labelled 𝑝2(·, 𝑞′2) and 𝑝2(·, 𝑞′′2) are the centers’ respective
rejection probabilities without herding, given by the expression in (3.8). If center 2 follows
center 1 with 𝑞1 = 𝑞 it faces an organ pool with quality 𝜋 and, consequently, draws signals as
if it were in first position. This implies that 𝑝2(𝑞, 𝑞2) = 𝑝1(𝑞2), which pins down the intercept
of each curve. Note that Figure 3 assumes that 𝑝1(𝑞′2) < 𝑝1(𝑞′′2), which we later see applies to
livers, while Figure 4 assumes that the inequality is reversed, which is relevant for kidneys.
This represents the only difference between the two figures.
If center 2 follows center 1 with 𝑞1 = 𝑞, the organ is a 𝐵 organ for certain, so center 2
draws signals from a 𝐵 organ. This explains why the curves reach a height of 𝛽(𝑞2), where
𝛽(𝑞′2) < 𝛽(𝑞′′2). With herding the rejection probability of each center 2 jumps to 1 at a
threshold 𝑞1. This happens at 𝑞1(𝑞2), where 𝑞1(𝑞′2) < 𝑞1(𝑞′′2), because a lower-ability center
positioned at 2 starts herding sooner than does a high-ability one. Thus, for 𝑞1 < 𝑞1(𝑞2),
center 2 uses its signal and rejects according to the expression in (3.8) while, for 𝑞1 ≥ 𝑞1(𝑞2),
center 2 herds and always rejects.
Figure 3-3: 𝑑𝑝1(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
> 0
𝑞1
𝑝2(·, ·)
1
𝑝1(𝑞
′′
2)
𝑝1(𝑞
′
2)
𝑞1(𝑞
′
2) 𝑞1(𝑞
′′
2) 𝑞𝑞
𝛽(𝑞′2)
𝛽(𝑞′′2)
𝑝2(·, 𝑞′2)
𝑝2(·, 𝑞′′2)
We now use the figures to derive the effect of the interaction term 𝑞1 ·𝑞2, on center 2’s rejection
11Formally, 1− 𝛾(𝑞) = 𝛽(𝑞) and 𝛾(𝑞) = 𝛽(𝑞) = 1.
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Figure 3-4: 𝑑𝑝1(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
< 0
𝑞1
𝑝2(·, ·)
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𝑝1(𝑞
′′
2)
𝑝1(𝑞
′
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𝑞1(𝑞
′
2) 𝑞1(𝑞
′′
2) 𝑞𝑞
𝛽(𝑞′2)
𝛽(𝑞′′2)
𝑝2(·, 𝑞′2)
𝑝2(·, 𝑞′′2)
probability with herding. Expression (3.10) allows us to obtain a measure of this effect for
each pair (𝑞1, 𝑞2) in the absence of herding. With herding, we cannot use the same method,
because center 2’s rejection probability contains a jump when center 2 starts to herd and,
as such, the derivative is not well-defined at each point. Instead, we compute the“average
effect” of an increase in 𝑞1; this is the slope of the line starting at (𝑞, 𝑝1(𝑞2)) and going to
(𝑞, 𝑝2(𝑞, 𝑞2)). We then examine how this slope varies with 𝑞2 (𝑞′2 versus 𝑞′′2). Consistent with
the cross-partial expression in (3.10), the slope with respect to 𝑞1 is increasing in 𝑞2 in the
absence of herding in both figures:
𝑝2(𝑞, 𝑞′2)− 𝑝1(𝑞′2)
𝑞 − 𝑞 <
𝑝2(𝑞, 𝑞′′2)− 𝑝1(𝑞′′2)
𝑞 − 𝑞
When we incorporate the effect of herding, however, we see that the slope with respect to 𝑞1
in Figure 3-3 is decreasing in 𝑞2:
1− 𝑝1(𝑞′2)
𝑞 − 𝑞 >
1− 𝑝1(𝑞′′2)
𝑞 − 𝑞 .
Thus, when center ability is increasing in the rejection probability in first position,(𝑑𝑝1(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
> 0,
as observed for livers), we predict that the interaction effect is reversed with herding: lower-
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ability centers at position 2 react more to an increase in center 1’s ability because the herding
effect dominates. By contrast, when center ability is decreasing in the rejection probability
in first position, (𝑑𝑝1(𝑞)
𝑑𝑞
< 0, as observed for kidneys), we predict that the interaction effect
goes in the same direction as it does in the absence of herding; the pure cross-partial effect
then dominates, such that higher-ability centers at position 2 react more to an increase in
center 1’s ability. In summary, therefore:
Proposition 1 Without herding, the average cross-partial effect of an increase in both center
1’s and center 2’s ability on center 2’s rejection probability is strictly positive. With herding,
the average cross-partial effect is strictly positive if center ability is decreasing in rejection
probability at first position and negative if center ability is increasing in rejection probability
at first position.
3.3.5 A Test of Cascades (based on decisions in third position)
Our second test of cascades is based on decisions at position 3, in particular, on the rela-
tionship between these decisions and center abilities at position 1 (𝑞1) and position 2 (𝑞2),
as expressed in equation (3.3). In deriving this test we assume that center 3 does not herd.
Centers that herd at third position always reject, and their decision is thus unaffected by
marginal changes in 𝑞1 and 𝑞2.
To develop our second test of herding we investigate the effect of a marginal increase in 𝑞1 and
𝑞2 on center 3’s rejection probability. We first consider the case without herding, in which
center 3’s rejection probability, denoted by 𝑝3, is given by the probability that it receives
a 𝑏 signal, conditional on both center 1 and center 2 also having received 𝑏 signals. Again,
applying Bayes’ Rule:
𝑝3(𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3) =
𝜋(1− 𝛾1)(1− 𝛾2)(1− 𝛾3) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1𝛽2𝛽3
𝜋(1− 𝛾1)(1− 𝛾2) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1𝛽2 . (3.11)
It is easy to see that an increase in either center 1’s or center 2’s ability decreases the quality
of the organ pool passed on to center 3, which increases the latter’s rejection probability.
Formally,
𝜕𝑝3(𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3)
𝜕𝑞1
= Θ𝛽2(1− 𝛾2)(𝛾′1𝛽1 + 𝛽′1(1− 𝛾1)), (3.12)
𝜕𝑝3(𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3)
𝜕𝑞2
= Θ𝛽1(1− 𝛾1)(𝛾′2𝛽2 + 𝛽′2(1− 𝛾2)), (3.13)
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with Θ = 𝜋(1−𝜋)(𝛽3−(1−𝛾3))[𝜋(1−𝛾1)(1−𝛾2)+(1−𝜋)𝛽1𝛽2]2 . Both expressions clearly are strictly positive, but their
exact magnitudes depend on the abilities of both centers. For 𝑞1 ̸= 𝑞2, either effect could be
larger than the other; for 𝑞1 = 𝑞2, however, expressions (3.12) and (3.13) are identical, such
that the two effects are the same.
Now consider a situation in which center 2 herds. Our intuition suggests that, with herding
– contrary to the environment in the absence of herding – a marginal increase in center 1’s
ability should have a bigger impact on center 3’s rejection probability than would the same
increase in center 2’s ability. Intuitively, if center 2 herds, an increase in its ability has no
impact on the organ pool passed on to center 3. By contrast, center 1 always uses its signal,
such that an increase in its ability always worsens center 3’s organ pool. Formally, center
3’s rejection probability when center 2 herds, denoted by 𝑝ℎ3 , is equal to the probability that
center 3 receives a 𝑏 signal, conditional on only center 1 having received a 𝑏 signal:
𝑝ℎ3(𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3) =
𝜋(1− 𝛾1)(1− 𝛾3) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1𝛽3
𝜋(1− 𝛾1) + (1− 𝜋)𝛽1 . (3.14)
In this case, the effect of an increase in the ability of center 1, though different to the case
without herding (see (3.12)), is still positive, while the effect of an increase in the ability of
center 2 is zero:
𝜕𝑝ℎ3(𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3)
𝜕𝑞1
= Π(𝛾′1𝛽1 + 𝛽′1(1− 𝛾1)), (3.15)
𝜕𝑝ℎ3(𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3)
𝜕𝑞2
= 0, (3.16)
where Π = 𝜋(1−𝜋)(𝛽3−(1−𝛾3))[𝜋(1−𝛾1)+(1−𝜋)𝛽1]2 . Our prediction, therefore, is as follows:
Proposition 2 Assume that centers at position 1 and 2 have identical abilities. Then, without
herding, the effect of an increase in center 1’s ability on center 3’s rejection probability equals
the effect of an increase in center 2’s ability. With herding, the effect of an increase in center
1’s ability is larger than the effect of an increase in center 2’s ability.
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3.4 Testing the Model
3.4.1 The Data
The data that we use to test the model consists of the sequence of decisions taken by centers
for each deceased-donor organ (liver or kidney) that was offered for transplantation in the
2006-2015 period. Each center that is offered an organ can either accept or reject it. If an
organ is rejected, it is offered to the next center in line, unless NHSBT assesses that the
condition of the organ has deteriorated to the point that it is no longer useable, in which
case it is discarded (i.e. set aside for research). There are thus two possible end-points
for an organ: it is accepted or it is discarded. Prior to either end-point, all decisions must
necessarily be rejections.
The deterioration that results in an organ being discarded can be caused by delays in retriev-
ing the organ (warm ischaemia) or by subsequent delays in transplantation (cold ischaemia).
In either case, the amount of time available for transplantation is limited; hence, sequence
lengths tend to be short. With such short sequence lengths, most decisions must necessarily
be concentrated at early positions: this is, in fact, precisely what we observe in Figure 3-5.
For livers, 35% of observations are in first position, with a steep decline in the fraction of
decisions at higher positions. For kidneys, 40% of observed decisions are in first position,
followed by an even steeper decline in the fraction of decisions at higher positions. There are
relatively few decisions past the eighth position for either type of organ.
Figure 3-5: Proportion of Observations by Queue Position
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Another useful way to describe the data is to plot the fraction of rejections and the fraction
of discarded organs (conditional on rejection) at each position. We see in Figure 3-6 that
organs are discarded as early as the first position, presumably because such organs enter the
offering sequence in relatively poor condition. Discard rates remain fairly stable at higher
positions, except for a spike at positions 7 and 8 for livers. Rejection rates, by contrast,
which start at around 60% at first position for both livers and kidneys, increase steadily
by position. Notice that rejection rates are systematically lower for kidneys; this results in
shorter sequence lengths for this type of organ, which explains the relatively steep decline in
the fraction of organs by position that we document for kidneys in Figure 3-5.
Figure 3-6: Probability of Rejection and Discarding by Queue Position
3.4.2 Center Ability
Our measure of center ability is based on the center’s probability of rejection when in first
position. Figure 3-7 plots this statistic for all transplantation centers in the United Kingdom,
separately for livers and kidneys. There are eight liver transplant centers in total, and we see
that their probability of rejection in first position ranges from 0.3 to nearly 0.8. This range
is quite wide, even if we ignore one outlying center with a relatively low rejection probability.
There are many more kidney transplantation centers (twenty-four), and these also display
wide variation in the probability of rejection. Ignoring two centers with relatively low or high
probabilities, the rejection probabilities range from around 0.4 to 0.8. Thus, there appears
to be substantial variation in our measure of ability across transplantation centers.
As noted, the rejection probability in first position may be either positively or negatively
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Figure 3-7: Rejections by Centers in First Position
associated with center ability, depending on whether or not inequality (3.7) is satisfied. We
test this by estimating the relationship between the rejection decision in second position and
the preceding center’s overall probability of rejection in first position. The unconditional
relationship is reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.1. We see that the coefficient on the
first-position center’s probability of rejection is positive and significant for livers, and negative
and significant for kidneys. Columns 2 and 4 report estimates for an augmented specification
that includes center fixed effects (to account for the direct effect of center 2’s ability), as well as
a measure of organ quality that is based on an independently-constructed Risk Index, which
is described in greater detail below. The implicit assumption made in using the probability
of rejection in first position to measure a center’s ability is that centers receive organs of
equal quality on average. Suppose, instead, that centers are homogeneous with respect to
ability, but that some centers receive more bad organs than others when at first position.
These centers will reject more often and, because they pass on worse organs on average,
their successors will also be more likely to reject. The augmented specification accounts
for this possibility and, while the estimated coefficient on the first-position probability of
rejection does increase in absolute magnitude for both livers and kidneys, the unconditional
and conditional estimates are statistically indistinguishable.
Centers in second position are unambiguously more likely to reject when they follow a higher-
ability center. The results in Table 3.1 thus imply that center ability is increasing (decreasing)
in the first-position probability of rejection for livers (kidneys). We measure center ability
by this probability for livers and by one minus the probability for kidneys.
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Table 3.1: Measuring Center Ability
Dependent variable: probability of rejection in second position
Organ: liver kidney
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of rejection in first position 0.300*** 0.440*** -0.281*** -0.374**
(0.068) (0.089) (0.036) (0.038)
Constant 0.652*** 0.537*** 0.889*** 1.316***
(0.041) (0.093) (0.022) (0.052)
Center 2 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Organ risk index No Yes No Yes
N 6383 5684 9257 8764
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
3.4.3 Testing for Cascades
Our first test of information cascades is based on the manner in which the relationship
between center 2’s rejection decision and center 1’s ability varies with the ability of center
2. As described in Proposition 1, we expect the cross-partial effect (i.e. the effect of the
interaction term 𝑞1 ·𝑞2 in equation (3.2)) to be negative when each center’s ability is increasing
in its first-position rejection probability. Based on the preceding results, this will be the case
with livers. By contrast, we expect the cross-partial effect to be positive for kidneys, as center
ability is negatively associated with the first-position rejection probability.
Table 3.2 reports the estimated relationship between the rejection decision in second position
and center ability in first and second position, together with the interaction term. The
coefficient on 𝑞1 applies to the case in which 𝑞2 equals zero. In the absence of herding, a
center with 𝑞2 = 0 effectively chooses to accept or reject randomly, independently of 𝑞1.
With herding, however, the probability that these centers reject with certainty is increasing
in 𝑞1. We find that 𝛽1, the coefficient on 𝑞1, is small and imprecisely estimated for kidneys,
and is much larger and significant at the one percent level for livers. 𝛽2, the coefficient on
𝑞2, applies to the case in which 𝑞1 is at its lowest possible level. In this case, the first center’s
decision has no effect on the quality of the organ pool that is passed on and, moreover, it
does not increase the likelihood that the center that follows will herd. When 𝑞1 = 0, center
2 effectively behaves as if it were at first position and 𝛽2 corresponds to the intercept in
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Figures 3 and 4, which is increasing (decreasing) in 𝑞2 for livers (kidneys). As predicted,
the coefficient on 𝑞2 is positive and significant for livers, and negative and significant for
kidneys. Our test of cascades is, however, based on the interaction coefficient. As predicted
by the model, the interaction coefficient is negative and significant for livers, and positive
and significant for kidneys. By contrast, the interaction coefficient would be positive and
significant for both livers and kidneys in the absence of herding.
Table 3.2: First Test of Information Cascades (based on decisions in second position)
Dependent variable: probability of rejection in second-position
Organ: liver kidney
(1) (2)
Ability of center in first position (𝑞1) 2.135** -0.0245
(0.713) (0.097)
Ability of center in second position (𝑞2) 2.588*** -0.999***
(0.688) (0.102)
(𝑞1 × 𝑞2) -2.668** 1.003***
(1.103) (0.246)
Constant -1.081** 0.977***
(0.447) (0.040)
N 6383 9257
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.05
Our second test of information cascades is based on the decisions of centers in third position,
as specified in equation (3.3). As described in Proposition 2, we expect these decisions to
place more weight on first-position ability, 𝑞1, than on second-position ability, 𝑞2, when there
is some amount of herding at position 2. The implicit assumption here, which we verify
below, is that centers always follow their signals at position 1. By contrast, decisions in third
position would place equal weight on 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 in the absence of cascades.
Table 3.3 reports the estimated relationship between the rejection decision in third position
and each of 𝑞1 and 𝑞2. Center ability, for livers and kidneys, is measured as in Table 3.2.
As predicted by the model, when cascades are present, the coefficient on 𝑞1 is substantially
larger than the coefficient on 𝑞2; it is twice as large for livers and 50% larger for kidneys. The
coefficients on 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 (𝛽1 and 𝛽2 respectively) are imprecisely estimated for livers, and
we cannot reject the hypothesis that 𝛽1 ≤ 𝛽2. The corresponding coefficients for kidneys,
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however, are statistically significant: we can reject the hypothesis that 𝛽1 ≤ 𝛽2 at the 5 per
cent level.
Table 3.3: Second Test of Information Cascades (based on decisions in third position)
Dependent variable: probability of rejection in third position
Organ: liver kidney
(1) (2)
First position center ability (𝑞1) 0.104 0.352***
(0.066) (0.045)
Second position center ability (𝑞2) 0.0529 0.220***
(0.064) (0.046)
Constant 0.820*** 0.541***
(0.067) (0.024)
F-statistic (𝛽1 ≤ 𝛽2) 0.47 3.43
p-value [0.247] [0.032]
𝑞1 0.60 0.40
𝑞2 0.65 0.40
N 4819 6084
Note: 𝛽1, 𝛽2 are the coefficients on 𝑞1, 𝑞2, respectively
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
The data requirements for implementing the second test of information cascades are quite
stringent: (i) a large fraction of centers should herd in second position, (ii) a large fraction
of centers should not herd in third position (as, if they did, the variation in 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 would
have no consequence for their decisions), and (iii) substantial variation in decisions (accept
versus reject) in third position is required in order for the test to have statistical power.
Based on the estimated structural model, we will see that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied
for both livers and kidneys. An important difference between the two organ types is that,
by the third position, over 90 per cent of decisions for livers are rejections, while the same
is not true of kidneys. This lack of variation in liver decisions may explain the fact that the
coefficients on 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 in column 1 are imprecisely estimated. Due to this data limitation,
we focus on kidneys alone for this test of information cascades.
Proposition 2 is derived for the case in which centers at positions 1 and 2 have equal ability
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Figure 3-8: Distribution of Ability Differential (𝑞1 − 𝑞2)
Note: sample includes all kidneys that reached third position.
Table 3.4: Second Test (restricted samples)
Dependent variable: probability of rejection in third position
(𝑞1 − 𝑞2) range: [-0.30,0.30] [-0.25,0.25] [-0.20,0.20] [-0.15,0.15] [-0.10,0.10] [-0.05,0.05]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Center 1 ability (𝑞1) 0.396*** 0.418*** 0.427*** 0.575*** 0.638*** 1.020**
(0.053) (0.057) (0.064) (0.090) (0.136) (0.468)
Center 2 ability (𝑞2) 0.153** 0.139** 0.132** 0.0817 0.00181 -0.437
(0.055) (0.059) (0.065) (0.091) (0.140) (0.470)
Constant 0.554*** 0.550*** 0.550*** 0.506*** 0.513*** 0.515***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.045)
F-statistic (𝛽1 ≤ 𝛽2) 7.27 7.97 6.81 9.25 5.94 2.44
p-value [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.059]
N 5603 5399 5071 4063 3069 1665
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
Alternative samples restricted to kidneys within a pre-specified ability differential (𝑞1 − 𝑞2) range
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(that is, 𝑞1 = 𝑞2). Although average ability in first and second position (𝑞1 and 𝑞2, respec-
tively) are equal for kidneys in column 2,the more stringent requirement for testing the model
is that these abilities should be equal for each organ.
Figure 3-8 describes the distribution of the ability differential (𝑞1 − 𝑞2) for all kidneys that
reached at least third position in our data (and, thus, are used in the second test of informa-
tion cascades). Although the distribution is centered at zero, there is substantial variation
in the ability differential statistic
Table 3.4 takes account of the preceding variation by implementing the test of cascades with
an increasingly restricted sample of organs, by sequentially narrowing the ability differen-
tial range). Reassuringly, the key result in Table 3.3, which is that the coefficient on 𝑞1 is
significantly larger than that on 𝑞2 for kidneys, remains stable as we reduce the sample in
this manner. Indeed, this result is obtained even with the extremely narrow ability differ-
ential presented in column 6, for which the sample is just one-quarter of the full sample of
kidneys.
3.5 Structural Estimation and Quantification
3.5.1 Estimation
Our model features two types of organ: good (𝐺) and bad (𝐵). Centers are heterogeneous
in their ability to identify organ type; 𝛽𝑗 is the probability that center 𝑗 receives a 𝑏 signal
when the organ is bad and 𝛾𝑗 is the probability that it receives a 𝑔 signal when the organ
is good. The fraction of good organs in the population of organs is 𝜋 and the cutoff belief
(that the organ is good) above which centers accept an organ is ?˜?.
We begin by describing the construction of 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗. The reduced-form tests of the model are
based on a single ability measure, which is derived from each center’s probability of rejection
in first position. The structural estimation, by contrast, is based on a complete specification
of the model, which utilises two ability measures. In order to construct separate measures
of ability, 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗, we take advantage of two indices of organ quality that have previously
been constructed specifically for the United Kingdom: the UK KDRI (Kidney Donor Risk
Index) and the UK DLI (Donor Liver Index).
Indices of liver and kidney quality were first constructed in the United States, but have
recently been adapted to the U.K. population. The UK KDRI is based on U.K. National
Transplant Registry data covering over 7000 recipients who received deceased-donor kidneys
between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2007 (Watson et al. (2012)). Various recipient
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and transplant factors were included in a model of transplant success, measured by patient
survival, and the UK KDRI consists of those donor and organ characteristics that were found
to be significant determinants of success (with appropriate, estimated weights on each of those
characteristics). More recently, data from all liver transplants from deceased donors between
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2014 have been used to construct the UK DLI (Collett
et al. (2017)). As with the UK KDRI, donor, recipient, and transplant data were used to
identify factors associated with graft survival. Those donor and organ characteristics that
were found to be significant determinants of transplant success, appropriately weighted, are
included in the UK DLI.
We begin by using the probit model to estimate the relationship between the probability
that an organ is rejected and its risk index, by center, restricting the sample to decisions
that were made when centers were at first position (and therefore, by assumption, following
their signals, as verified below). The risk indices were originally developed to aid centers in
their decision-making, and a proposal to incorporate the UK KDRI into the National Kidney
Offering Scheme was presented at the 2018 Blood and Transplantation Congress. At the
time of writing, however, neither the UK KDRI nor the UK DLI – the latter of which was
developed in 2017 – are made available to transplant surgeons at the time of their decision-
making. While centers may thus not have had explicit knowledge of the risk indices during
the period of our analysis (2006-2015), we expect them to have put weight on many of the
factors incorporated into the UK KDRI and the UK DLI. Figure 3-9 reports probit estimates
of the Risk Index coefficient, with the corresponding 95% confidence interval, by center. As
expected, the coefficient is positive and significant, almost without exception, for both livers
and kidneys.
The risk indices are optimally constructed on the basis of outcomes generated by thousands
of transplants over many years. This information is not available to transplant centers, who
must base their decisions on past experiences with a limited set of outcomes. Higher-ability
centers will, nonetheless, make decisions that track more closely with the risk indices. We
see in Figure 3-9 that there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated slope coefficients;
we interpret larger coefficients as corresponding to higher center ability. Although we do not
explicitly map the risk index onto underlying organ types (𝐺 versus 𝐵), in the limit, extremely
high levels of the risk index would correspond to a 𝐵 organ, while extremely low levels would
correspond to a 𝐺 organ. For a given center 𝑗, the predicted probability of rejection at
the top of the risk index distribution thus provides an estimate of 𝛽𝑗; i.e. the probability of
receiving a 𝑏 signal with a 𝐵 organ. Similarly, at the bottom of the risk index distribution, the
predicted probability of rejection provides an estimate of 1− 𝛾𝑗; (the probability of receiving
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Figure 3-9: Center-Specific Probit Slope Coefficient Estimates
(a) liver (b) kidney
Note: estimates based on the relationship between the probability of rejection in first position and the risk
index.
a 𝑏 signal with a 𝐺 organ). Figure 3-10 reports the estimated 𝛽𝑗 and 1 − 𝛾𝑗 for all centers,
separately for livers and kidneys. These predictions are computed at the 95𝑡ℎ percentile and
the 5𝑡ℎ percentile of the risk index distribution, respectively. Assumption 1 in the model
states that 𝛽𝑗 > 1 − 𝛾𝑗 (that is, that centers are not systematically misinformed, such that
the probability of receiving a 𝑏 signal when an organ is bad must exceed the corresponding
probability when an organ is good). We see in Figure 3-10 that this assumption is satisfied
for each center, both for livers and for kidneys.12
Having constructed center-specific measures of ability, 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗, the next step is to charac-
terize the signal-generating process. If the type of organ (𝐺 versus 𝐵) were observed, then
the model would provide us with the probability that a given center 𝑗 would receive a 𝑔
signal or, conversely, a 𝑏 signal. In practice, however, the type of organ is not observed by
the econometrician. As with the construction of the center ability measures, therefore, we
turn to the risk indices to characterize the distribution of signals. Recall that we have already
estimated the relationship between the probability of rejection in first position and the risk
index for each center. Given this relationship, the predicted organ-center specific probability
of rejection for a given organ (with an associated risk index) will determine the probability
that the center receives a 𝑏 signal. This probability does not rely on the center’s position in
the decision-making sequence for that organ.
12Notice also that, while 𝛽𝑗 is increasing and (1− 𝛾𝑗) is decreasing in the estimated risk index coefficient,
the relationships are not monotone. This is because the 𝛽𝑗 , 𝛾𝑗 measures that we construct are based on both
the risk index coefficients – i.e. the slope and constant (intercept) terms of the estimated probit model. The
slope alone cannot be used to construct our measures of ability.
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Figure 3-10: Estimates of Center Ability
The risk indices can also be used to compute 𝜋 (the fraction of 𝐺 organs in the population
of organs). In constructing 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗 we assumed that an organ at the top of the risk index
distribution is a 𝐵 organ, while an organ at the bottom of the distribution is a 𝐺 organ. At
intermediate levels, the probability that an organ is a 𝐺 organ will be decreasing in the risk
index. Based on our model, this allows us to characterize decision-making in first position as
follows:
𝑝𝑗(𝑅𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖(1− 𝛾𝑗) + (1− 𝜋𝑖)𝛽𝑗, (3.17)
where 𝑝𝑗(𝑅𝑖) is the probability that center 𝑗 rejects organs with risk index 𝑅𝑖 when in first
position, while 𝜋𝑖 is the probability that the underlying organ is of type 𝐺. Although, in
principle, the 𝜋𝑖 corresponding to a given 𝑅𝑖 should be the same for all centers, noise in the
estimated 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗 could generate some variation in practice. Our best estimate of 𝜋𝑖 is
thus the average across all centers; the average of this statistic across all risk indices 𝑅𝑖 then
yields an estimate of 𝜋.
The characterization of decision-making in equation (3.17) is not inconsistent with our de-
scription of decision-making in the model. In the model, each organ is of a particular type
– 𝐺 or 𝐵 – and, while centers may not know this type, the signals that they receive (which
are all that matter for decision-making) correctly reflect the underlying organ type. The
econometrician does not observe the underlying organ type either, but the risk index allows
us to characterize the (organ-center-specific) distribution of signals and to estimate the prob-
ability that an organ is a 𝐺 organ (given 𝑅𝑖). This probability, averaged over all risk indices,
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provides an estimate of 𝜋, the fraction of 𝐺 organs in the population of organs.
Having constructed measures of center ability (𝛽𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗), characterized the signal-generating
process, and estimated 𝜋, all that now remains is to estimate ?˜?, the cutoff belief that an
organ is a 𝐺 organ above which centers accept the offer. All centers follow their signal in
first position in the model, which implies that their belief following a 𝑔 (𝑏) signal lies above
(below) ?˜?. While some centers continue to follow their signals in later positions, others will
begin to herd (i.e. to reject offers regardless of whether they receive a 𝑔 or a 𝑏 signal). This is
because their beliefs always lie below ?˜?. As ?˜? increases, the fraction of centers that herd thus
increases, with an accompanying increase in the rejection rate (the decisions of centers that
follow their signals remain unchanged). To estimate ?˜? we thus match the overall rejection
rate in the data to the rejection rate predicted by the model; there is a unique value of ?˜? at
which the actual and predicted rejection rates match and this will be our best estimate of
the ?˜? parameter.
We employ the simulated method of moments to estimate ?˜?. We draw signals that are organ-
center-specific, as described above, and then predict decisions at each position (given the
previously-estimated values of 𝛽𝑗, 𝛾𝑗, and 𝜋). The average over multiple draws of the signals
predicts the overall rejection rate for a given ?˜?; we then search over all ?˜? to find the value at
which the actual and predicted rejection rates match. The data are effectively generated by
a single draw from the signal distribution. Even if the model were correctly specified and the
correct value of ?˜? selected by the econometrician, actual and predicted decisions evidently
would not match at each organ-position. As long as a large number of centers follow their
signals, however, this sampling error will wash out, such that actual and predicted rejection
rates will match overall when the correct ?˜? is selected.13 Table 3.5 reports ?˜? estimates, with
bootstrapped standard errors, separately for livers and kidneys. As we estimate only a single
parameter, we require a single moment for matching; we may therefore employ the rejection
rate at any position for this purpose. The benchmark specification matches on the rejection
rate at second position, as the largest fraction of centers follow their signals at this position
(smoothing out the sampling error). We observe, however, that the parameter estimates
remain stable when we match on additional positions (moments) up to position 5.14
13A special feature of our data is that the order of centers who would have been approached after the
position at which an organ is accepted or discarded, is unavailable. Thus, if the model predicts a rejection
at the final position in a sequence for which an organ was accepted in the data, then we can go no further.
To preserve symmetry, therefore, whenever the model predicts an acceptance at a position at which an organ
was rejected in the data, we proceed no further (and subsequent positions are not utilized for estimation).
14When matching on multiple positions, we compute the error in the rejection rate at each position and
then take the unweighted average across all positions in order to compute the overall error. Our best estimate
of ?˜? is the value that minimizes the overall error.
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Table 3.5: Structural Parameter Estimates
Organ: liver kidney
Moment count: one two three four one two three four
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
?˜? 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.58 0.52 0.50 0.50
(0.0038) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.005) (0.0044) (0.0018) (0.0066) (0.0015)
N 5029 3780 3109 2548 7691 5031 3508 2747
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
Note: to match moments, we begin with the probability of rejection in second position, and sequentially add
the corresponding probabilities in third, fourth and fifth positions
3.5.2 Validation and Goodness of Fit
As multiple positions (moments) are available for estimation, we might think it possible
simultaneously to estimate both ?˜? and 𝜋. To see why this is infeasible, however, suppose
that we choose a value of 𝜋, but leave the estimated 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗 unchanged. The generated
signals would no longer be organ-specific; nevertheless, as 𝜋 increases, the rejection rate
among centers that follow their signals will decrease. To bring the overall rejection rate back
in line with the data, therefore, ?˜? must increase (and, with it, the fraction of centers that
herd). It follows that, for every value of 𝜋, there exists a ?˜? such that the actual and predicted
rejection rates match. Therefore, ?˜? and 𝜋 cannot be estimated simultaneously, highlighting
the important role played by the risk index in our analysis.15
As we need only estimate a single parameter, ?˜?, it is straightforward to establish that the
parameter is identified – that is, that a unique value exists at which the model best fits the
data. This value must, however, also satisfy additional restrictions implied by the model. In
particular, Assumption 2 requires that each center’s belief that the organ is good lie above
(below) ?˜? when it receives a 𝑔 (𝑏) signal in first position. Figure 3-11 verifies that this
important assumption is satisfied for each center, both for livers and for kidneys.
Having estimated the model and validated its key assumptions, the next step is to assess the
15Cipriani and Guarino (2014) estimate a structural model of herding in financial markets in which investors
draw signals from a continuous distribution. However, this additional flexibility in the signal structure does
not allow them to estimate additional parameters. Once we reduce their model to match the key elements of
our model, ignoring parameters associated with the presence of noise from traders who never receive signals
as well as from changes in the fundamental value of the financial asset (which corresponds to whether the
organ is good or bad) we see that they estimate only one parameter, which characterizes the distribution of
signals. The parameter that corresponds to ?˜? in our model is the price of the asset, which is observed. Thus,
Cipriani and Guarino measure ?˜? and estimate 𝜋, while we do the opposite.
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Figure 3-11: Updated Beliefs in First Position, by Center
model’s goodness of fit with the data. As we use the overall rejection rate to estimate ?˜?, we
begin by comparing the actual and predicted rejection rates, by position, separately for livers
and kidneys. The benchmark ?˜? estimate is obtained by matching rejection rates at second
position; all the results that follow are based on this estimate. Thus, we would expect to
find a close match at second position, though not necessarily at higher positions. As a basis
for comparison, we also report rejection rates from an alternative model with no learning.
In this model, center quality and the signal-generating process are captured just as in the
baseline specification, although decisions are now based exclusively on the signals received
by each center (without regard to the decisions of preceding centers). We see in Figure 3-12
that rejection rates predicted by the herding model exceed the corresponding rates in the
data, particularly at higher positions, while the alternative no-learning model systematically
under-predicts rejection. The error associated with our model is not, however, substantial:
overall, predicted rejection rates exceed actual rejection rates by just 3% for kidneys and 7%
for livers
An alternative metric for comparing the performance of these models is the fraction of
correctly-predicted decisions – that is, acceptances (rejections) in the data that are predicted
to be acceptances (rejections). Based on this metric, the herding model clearly out-performs
the no-learning model, both for livers and for kidneys, as shown in Figure 3-13. This result
complements the reduced-form tests of the model in providing independent evidence that
herding is an important component of centers’ decision-making.
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Figure 3-12: Goodness of Fit (Probability of Rejection): Alternative Models
Figure 3-13: Goodness of Fit (Proportion of Correct Predictions): Alternative Models
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3.5.3 Quantification and Counter-Factual Simulations
While both the reduced-form tests and the tests of the structural model against the no-
learning alternative indicate that centers are herding, we would also like to quantify the
prevalence of this behavior. Given the estimates of 𝛽𝑗, 𝛾𝑗, 𝜋, ?˜? and the sequence of centers
associated with each organ, we can determine whether a given center at a given position is
herding – that is, that its prior belief based on preceding decisions is so far below ?˜? that
it will reject regardless of the signal it receives. Figure 3-14 reports the prevalence of such
herding, by position, for livers and kidneys. Herding is very common. For livers, about 40%
of centers at second position herd. There is a steep increase in herding at higher positions
and, by the sixth position, almost all centers herd. Herding is less prevalent, on average,
for kidneys than for livers. Nevertheless, over 10% of kidney centers still herd at second
position, with a sharp increase to 50% at third position, and over 90% herding by the sixth
position.
Figure 3-14: Prevalence of Herding
Having measured the prevalence of herding in organ transplant decisions, we now turn to
the efficiency consequences of such behavior. We do so by comparing organ discard rates
under the status quo (with herding) with discard rates under full information (in which case
centers observe, and use, the signals of all their predecessors) and under no-learning (for
which centers rely exclusively on their own signals).
The standard practice for counter-factual analysis is to compare outcomes predicted by the
model with simulated outcomes under alternative scenarios. A complication arises in pre-
117
dicting discards with our model, however, namely that the order of centers beyond the point
at which an organ is accepted or discarded in the data, is unavailable. As predicted discards
are thus based on observed data, and as observed sequences consist exclusively of rejections
(with the possible exception of an acceptance at the end of a sequence), the model will
under-predict discards and sequence lengths, even when correctly specified (by predicting
acceptances in place of rejections simply by chance).16
Given the special structure of our data, we therefore use the actual discard rate as the
benchmark for the counter-factual analysis. With full information, the signals received by
centers that herd will be available to those that follow; as some of these will be 𝑔 signals,
subsequent rejections observed in the data may be reversed, threby lowering the discard
rate. With no learning, centers follow their own signals. Here, some centers who currently
herd, but draw a 𝑔 signal, will reverse their decision. In either case, we are interested in the
reduction in the discard rate that occurs under both full information and no-learning.
We begin by examining the decisions that underlie discard rates under alternative scenarios.
In predicting the decisions associated with the full-information model, we draw signals only
when required, in order to be consistent with our herding (limited-information) model. Thus,
when a center accepts an organ, we assume that it must have followed its (𝑔) signal. Similarly,
when our model predicts that a center was following its signal, and it was observed to reject
the organ, we assume that it received a 𝑏 signal. We draw signals only when our model
predicts that a center was herding; here, we use the organ’s risk index and the center’s
quality to determine the probability that it received a 𝑏 signal, in the manner described
above. Decisions generated by the full-information model for each draw of the signals are
compared with actual decisions at each organ-position, and the resulting discrepancy is then
averaged over multiple draws to compute the fraction of false rejections and false acceptances
with herding.17 The same procedure is used to compare the no-learning outcome with that
of full information, with the exception that, in the former case, centers always follow their
signals.
Figure 3-15 reports the fraction of false rejections among all rejections, by position, in the
16Some acceptances in the data will be predicted by the model to be rejections, but this will be less frequent
than reversals in the opposite direction, as rejections are more common. Moreover, we cannot infer that an
organ for which an acceptance in the data is reversed by the model will necessarily be subsequently discarded.
17Observed decisions are determined by a single draw from an underlying signal-generating process. Thus,
there will always be a discrepancy, due to sampling error, between the observed decision and the decision
predicted by the model, based on repeated draws at a given organ-position (even when the model is correctly
specified). This discrepancy washes out, however, when averaged over many organ-positions. By the same
argument, we obtain a consistent estimate of the discrepancy between the alternative models under consid-
eration as long as the number of organ-positions for which we draw signals is large. This will indeed be the
case, due to the high prevalence of herding documented at each position in Figure 3-14.
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herding and no-learning models, relative to the full-information benchmark. The herding
model will generate a false rejection whenever a preceding center ignored its signal and when
this signal would have changed the subsequent decision (from a rejection to an acceptance)
if it had been observed to be 𝑔. The wide prevalence of herding that we have documented
implies that such false rejections are likely to be common. With no learning, by contrast,
there will be a false rejection whenever a center that rejects an organ on the basis of the
𝑏 signal it received would have reversed that decision if the signals received by preceding
centers had been observed and utilized for decision-making. This is because, in the absence
of herding, all signals associated with prior decisions (which would necessarily be rejections)
would be 𝑏 signals, thus reinforcing the decision to reject. A false rejection could thus only
be obtained if a sufficiently large fraction of preceding centers were herding and received
positive signals, thereby off-setting the negative information received both from prior centers
that did not herd and from the center’s own 𝑏 signal. False rejections are therefore likely
to be relatively uncommon under the assumption of no learning. This is indeed what we
observe in Figure 3-15: the proportion of false rejections is much greater for the herding
model than for its no-learning counterpart. Although the fraction of false rejections in the
herding model is quite large at higher positions, especially for livers, most organ sequences
are short. Thus, the efficiency consequences of the false rejections may not be substantial
(as verified below).
Figure 3-15: False Rejections as a Proportion of All Rejections (relative to full-information
benchmark)
Figure 3-16 reports the fraction of false acceptances among all acceptances, comparing –
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as before – the herding and no-learning models to the full-information benchmark. As an
acceptance must, beginning at position 2, follow one or more rejections, accepting centers
must have received a 𝑔 signal in all the models we consider. The herding model would then
generate a false acceptance only if a sufficiently large fraction of centers were herding and
received 𝑏 signals, with this new information shifting the accepting center’s belief that the
organ was a 𝐺 organ from above ?˜? to below ?˜?. This would appear to be an unlikely event.
By contrast, we expect false acceptances for the no-learning model to be quite common. This
is because, under this model, centers ignore the information contained in preceding decisions,
which are always rejections. We see in Figure 3-16 that false acceptances are indeed rare
with the herding model but are quite common with the no-learning model, for which they
begin as early as position 2.
Figure 3-16: False Acceptances as a Proportion of All Acceptances (relative to full-
information benchmark)
While the position-specific analysis described above paints a comprehensive picture of decision-
making under different models relative to the full-information benchmark, the important con-
sideration from a social welfare perspective is that good organs should be accepted and bad
organs discarded. For instance, the case in which a center herds in line with its predecessors
and rejects a good organ is costly for its patient. There is no welfare loss associated with this
behavior, however, as long as patients are treated interchangeably and the organ is accepted
further down the line. We therefore complete the analysis by comparing discard rates under
full information and no-learning against the data.
In our data, an organ is either accepted for transplantation or discarded (set aside for re-
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search). The decision to discard an organ is taken by NHSBT and is based on its usability,
which depends, in turn, on its condition (which is distinct from its quality). Thus, the dis-
card decision is treated as exogenous in our analysis. If we observe that an organ has been
discarded in the data, but one of the alternative models (no-learning or full-information)
predicts that it would have been accepted at one or more earlier positions, we assume that
the alternative model would have generated an acceptance for that organ. If the alternative
model does not predict an acceptance at any position, the organ is assumed to have been
discarded. By the same logic, if an organ was accepted in the data and an alternative model
predicts that it would have been accepted at one or more positions, up to the point at which
it was accepted, the organ is assumed to have been accepted with the alternative model.
Finally, if an organ was accepted in the data, but an alternative model does not predict an
acceptance at any position up to that point, we assume that it would have been accepted
further down the line.18
Figure 3-17 reports the discard rate in the data (with herding), for both the full-information
and no-learning models, across the range of risk indices and separately for livers and kidneys.
The herding model and the full-information model differ only when there are false rejections
and false acceptances in the data. As observed in Figures 3-15 and 3-16, the former is much
more likely. Nevertheless, discard rates for the herding model are only slightly higher than
those for the full-information model: 11% for livers and 10% for kidneys. This contrasts
with discard rates for the no-learning model, which are substantially lower than those for
the full-information model: 31% for livers and 35% for kidneys. This is due to the false
acceptances in the no-learning model, as documented in Figure 3-16, which appear to be
concentrated at higher risk indices, precisely where they are most dangerous. With organ
transplantation, herding appears to protect centers from costly false acceptance decisions,
without substantially raising the discard rate through false rejections.
Figure 3-18 closes the analysis by quantifying the contribution of herding to the observed
increase in the discard rate over time. The model is now estimated separately for each
year, providing us with distinct 𝛽𝑗, 𝛾𝑗, 𝜋 and ?˜? at each point in time. Changes in the
discard rate over time under the no-learning model then reflect changes in center quality (𝛽𝑗,
𝛾𝑗), changes in the quality of the organ pool (reflected in changes in the signal-generating
process), and changes in decision-making (due to changes in ?˜?). We see that these changes,
which are outside our model, resulted in an increase in the discard rate over the 2006-
2012 period, followed by a mild decline in recent years, which tracks the overall discard
18We make this assumption in order to generate a conservative estimate of the discard rate for the full-
information model. Nevertheless, we will see that the discard rate predicted by this model is not too far
below what we observe in the data.
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Figure 3-17: Organ Discard Rate
Figure 3-18: Organ Discard Rate, by Year
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rate. The gap between the observed discard rate and the discard rate predicted by the no-
learning model quantifies the contribution of herding to the discard rate. This contribution is
substantial in each year and increases in relative importance in the most recent years. Notice,
however, as in Figure 3-17, that herding does not push the discard rate very far above the full
information benchmark in any year. Centers do herd behind their peers but, in this context,
the herding is beneficial (relative to no learning) and is not particularly costly (relative to
full information).
3.6 Conclusion
Organs obtained from deceased donors continue to be discarded at high rates in the United
Kingdom, despite the long waiting list for transplantation. We examine one explanation for
these high discard rates, which is information-based herding; once one or more transplant
centers have rejected an organ, those that follow rationally ignore their own assessment of the
organ’s quality and reject as well. We find evidence that such herding is relatively common.
It does not, however, push discard rates much above the efficient full-information benchmark;
instead, it is protective, preventing centers from accepting organs of poor quality.
The literature on information-based herding has been active for nearly three decades and now
has well-established theoretical and empirical components. Nevertheless, while the canonical
models (and much of the theoretical literature that followed them) have focussed on informa-
tion cascades, in which agents completely ignore their own signals and instead follow their
predecessors, resulting in inefficiencies, the empirical literature has tested a different class
of learning models. In particular, the empirical development literature, which has provided
the most compelling evidence in support of herding to date, has studied environments in
which agents always pay some attention to their own signals and in which neighbors’ signals
may be perfectly recovered from their decisions. The informational inefficiencies that arise
in these models are distinct from the informational inefficiencies associated with information
cascades (which arise because the signals received by those who herd fail to be passed on to
those that follow).
Our analysis explicitly incorporates information cascades in a setting in which organs are
assessed sequentially by centers with varying ability. As noted, we find that cascades are
common, but that the benefits derived from predecessors’ decisions outweigh the costs of
herding that are emphasized in the theoretical literature. A special feature of our environment
is that the order of centers is determined by the priority of their patients and, as such, is
independent of their ability. In other settings for which our model is relevant, such as the
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selection of job candidates in the labor market, higher-ability decision-makers (firms with
better reputations) are able to choose earlier on average. This increases the incidence of
herding, but does not necessarily reduce efficiency (because decision-makers that move first
are better informed). There is, therefore, no obvious reason why our broad empirical findings
should not be replicated elsewhere.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Deriving Optimal Bequests
The budget constraint for period 1 is given as follows, where 𝑑𝑘 represents a dummy variable
for action 𝑘 and we require 𝑠1 ≥ 0 due to the absence of credit markets.
𝑠1 = 𝑦𝑖 + 𝑑1𝑤1 − 𝑑3𝑥3 (A.1)
The budget constraint for period 2 is given by:
𝑐2 + 𝑦2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠1 + 𝑑1𝑤1 + 𝑑2𝑤2 + 𝑑3𝑤3 − 𝜏 (A.2)
where 𝑦2 denotes the bequest and 𝜏 is a lump-sum tax levied on all workers by the government
in order to cover the cost of public university education. It is calculated as follows:
𝜏 = 𝑐𝑛2
𝑁
(A.3)
where 𝑐 is the university’s marginal cost and 𝑛2 is the sum of public graduates in the current
generation.
The individual’s problem is thus to choose the size of consumption and bequest that maximise
lifetime utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
max
𝑦2,𝑐2
𝑢(𝑐2) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑦2)
subject to 𝑐2 + 𝑦2 = (1 + 𝑟)(𝑦1 + 𝑑1𝑤1 − 𝑑3𝑥3) + 𝑑1𝑤1 + 𝑑2𝑤2 + 𝑑3𝑤3 − 𝜏
(A.4)
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Note that the RHS of the lifetime budget constraint is simply lifetime income, which I denote
𝐼. Separability allows me to consider the agent’s choice of education first. Then, taking this
as given, I can solve for the optimal levels of consumption and bequest. Specifying logarithmic
utility, I write the Lagrangian as follows:
ℒ = 𝑙𝑛𝑐2 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑦2 − 𝜆[𝑐2 + 𝑦2 − (1 + 𝑟)(𝑦1 + 𝑑1𝑤1 − 𝑑3𝑥3) + 𝑑1𝑤1 + 𝑑2𝑤2 + 𝑑3𝑤3 − 𝜏 ] (A.5)
First-order conditions are given by:
𝜕 ℒ
𝜕𝑐2
= 1
𝑐2
− 𝜆 = 0 (A.6)
𝜕 ℒ
𝜕𝑦2
= 𝛽
𝑦2
− 𝜆 = 0 (A.7)
Solving the FOCs simultaneously yields the following expressions for optimal consumption
and bequest:
𝑦*2 =
𝛽
1 + 𝛽 𝐼 (A.8)
𝑐*2 =
1
1 + 𝛽 𝐼 (A.9)
Thus, I can write optimal bequests by choice of education as follows: For non-graduates:
𝑦*2 =
𝛽
1 + 𝛽 (1 + 𝑟)(𝑦1 + 𝑤1) + 𝑤1 − 𝜏 (A.10)
For public university graduates:
𝑦*2 =
𝛽
1 + 𝛽 (1 + 𝑟)𝑦1 + 𝑤2 − 𝜏 (A.11)
For private university graduates:
𝑦*2 =
𝛽
1 + 𝛽 (1 + 𝑟)(𝑦1 − 𝑥3) + 𝑤3 − 𝜏 (A.12)
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A.2 Deriving Workers’ Education Choice Rules
A worker with ability ℎ𝑖 and wealth 𝑦𝑖 chooses 𝑑*𝑘 to maximise discounted lifetime earnings.
Thus, the optimal choice is given by:
𝑑*𝑘
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
= 𝑑3 if 𝑤3 > 𝑤2 + 𝑥3/𝛽 and 𝑤3 > ((1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑥3)/𝛽 and 𝑑3 ∈ 𝐷𝑖
= 𝑑2 if 𝑤2 > 𝑤3 − 𝑥3/𝛽 and 𝑤2 > (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1/𝛽 and 𝑑2 ∈ 𝐷𝑖
= 𝑑1 if 𝑤1 > (𝛽/(1 + 𝛽))𝑤2 and 𝑤1 > (𝛽/(1 + 𝛽))𝑤3 − 𝑥3/(1 + 𝛽)
(A.13)
where 𝛽 is the discount factor between periods. Substituting in for 𝑤2 and 𝑤3, gives the
final decision rules for each of the four sub-groups of workers defined by variation in feasible
choice sets.
A.3 Identifying Reasonable Equilibria
As described in section 2.5.2 of the main paper, equilibria in this framework are determined
by the relative ordering of workers’ education choice cut-offs. There are 120 permutations;
however, I restrict the set of equilibria to a subset of “reasonable” permutations by imposing
the public university capacity constraint in the main text (derived in Appendix A.4). This
reduces the number of cut-off permutations to the following three cases:
∙ Case 1: ℎ* > 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{︁
𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2) ,
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
, (1+𝛽)𝑤1
𝛽𝛾2
}︁
∙ Case 2: 1 ≥ 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2) > ℎ
* > 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{︁
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
, (1+𝛽)𝑤1
𝛽𝛾2
}︁
∙ Case 3: 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2) > 1 > ℎ
* > 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{︁
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
, (1+𝛽)𝑤1
𝛽𝛾2
}︁
A.4 Deriving the Public University’s Capacity Con-
straint for Baseline Model
Cases 1 and 3 represent the lowest and highest equilibrium demand for public university, and
thus the lowest and highest equilibrium values of ℎ*, respectively. Thus, we can use these
two cases to determine appropriate bounds for ?¯? . In order to limit the set of equilibria to
the sub-set in which the public university’s entry requirement is “binding”, we require that
the following expression holds for every equilibrium value of ℎ* and 𝑥*3:
∙ ℎ* ≥ (1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
∙ ℎ* ≥ (1+𝛽)𝑤1
𝛽𝛾2
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In Case 1, this amounts to the following set of conditions:
(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
1− 𝜃 ≥
(1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾3
+ 𝛽𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽) + 𝑐2𝛽𝛾3 (A.14)
(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
1− 𝜃 ≥
(1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾3
+ 𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
𝛽𝛾3(1− 𝜃) (A.15)
(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
1− 𝜃 ≥
(1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾2
(A.16)
(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
1− 𝜃 ≥
(1 + 𝛽 + 𝑥3)
𝛽𝛾3
+ (1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)1− 𝜃 −
(1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾2
(A.17)
In Case 3, this amounts to the following set of conditions:
(1− ?¯?) ≥ (1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾3
+ 𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯?)− (1 + 𝛽) + 𝑐2𝛽𝛾3 (A.18)
(1− ?¯?) ≥ (1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾3
+ 𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)
𝛽𝛾3
(A.19)
(1− ?¯?) ≥ (1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾2
(A.20)
(1− ?¯?) ≥ (1 + 𝛽)
𝛽𝛾3
+ 𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯?)− (1 + 𝛽) (A.21)
It is now possible to eliminate some of these conditions. First, it is easy to see that the
constraint on ?¯? implied by condition A.16 is stricter than that implied by condition A.20, so
the latter may be ignored. Secondly, the value of 𝑥3 in condition A.14 is only an equilibrium
if it is smaller than the values of 𝑥3 in both condition A.15 and condition A.17. Thus, these
latter conditions imply stricter constraints on ?¯? , so condition A.14 may be ignored. Thirdly,
the value of 𝑥3 in condition A.18 is an equilibrium only if it is smaller than the value of 𝑥3
in condition A.21. Thus, condition A.21 is a stricter constraint on ?¯? , so condition A.18 may
also be ignored. Fourthly, the value of 𝑥3 in condition A.18 is an equilibrium only if it is
larger than the value of 𝑥3 in condition A.19, so condition A.18 is a stricter constraint than
condition A.19. Thus, condition A.19 may also be ignored. Fifthly, conditions A.15 and A.16
may be re-arranged to give exactly the same constraint on ?¯? , so condition A.16 may also be
dropped. Sixthly, condition A.17 may be rearranged to give 0 ≥ 0, which is always true, so
this condition may also be ignored. We are now left with conditions A.15 and A.21, which
imply the following capacity constraint:
?¯? ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛
[︃
[𝛽𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽)]
𝛽𝛾3
,
(1− 𝜃)[𝛽𝛾2 − (1 + 𝛽)]
𝛽𝛾2
]︃
(A.22)
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Now observe that, if 𝛽𝛾3 > (1 + 𝛽), condition A.15 implies a stricter capacity constraint
than does condition A.21. This simply states that a worker with the highest endowment of
ability (ℎ𝑖 = 1) must prefer being a private university graduate to being a non-graduates
when 𝑥3 = 0. This must be true, else no-one would ever attend private university. Thus,
condition A.21 may be ignored, and we obtain the final capacity constraint:
?¯? ≤ (1− 𝜃)[𝛽𝛾2 − (1 + 𝛽)]
𝛽𝛾2
(A.23)
It is intuitive that the strictest constraint on public university capacity is one implied by
Case 1 rather than Case 3 as, when ℎ* is lower, it is more difficult for the two preference
cut-offs to lie below ℎ*, as specified above.
A.5 Deriving Public University Admission Cut-Offs
Case 1: ℎ* > 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{︁
𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2) ,
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
, (1+𝛽)𝑤1
𝛽𝛾2
}︁
Now all rich, high-ability workers attend private university, so demand for public university
comes exclusively from workers with income 𝑦𝐿. Thus, ℎ* is set to satisfy:
?¯? = (1− 𝜃)(1− ℎ*) (A.24)
Rearranging gives the equilibrium value of ℎ*:
ℎ* = 1− 𝜃 − ?¯?1− 𝜃 (A.25)
Case 2: 1 ≥ 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2) > ℎ
* > 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{︁
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
, (1+𝛽)𝑤1
𝛽𝛾2
}︁
Now some fraction of rich workers both above and below ℎ* attend private university, so ℎ*
is set to satisfy:
?¯? = (1− 𝜃)(1− ℎ*) + 𝜃
(︃
𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) − ℎ
*
)︃
(A.26)
Applying the uniform and solving simultaneously with 𝑥*3 gives:
ℎ* = 1− 𝜃 − ?¯? + 𝜃𝑥
*
3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) (A.27)
where we can substitute the appropriate value of 𝑥*3 as derived for Case 2 in Appendix A.6,
below.
Case 3: 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2) > 1 > ℎ
* > 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{︁
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
, (1+𝛽)𝑤1
𝛽𝛾2
}︁
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If the private university chooses an equilibrium tuition fee that is sufficiently high to shut
rich workers with ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* out of the market, ℎ* is set to satisfy:
?¯? = (1− ℎ*) (A.28)
Rearranging gives the equilibrium value of ℎ*:
ℎ* = 1− ?¯? (A.29)
A.6 Deriving the Private University’s Optimal Tuition
Fee for Baseline Model
As the relative ordering of the cut-offs determines the demand function for private universi-
ties, I solve for the equilibrium in the following way. First, I postulate an equilibrium under
each of the three possible orderings. I then derive the optimal tuition fee and profit for
the profit-maximising private university in that case. Finally, I check whether it meets the
conditions for being an equilibrium (i.e. that no-one has an incentive to deviate, and that
the relative ordering of the cut-offs is satisfied).
∙ Case 1:
The total group of workers demanding private university education at a given price 𝑥3
is:
𝜂 = 𝜃
(︃
1− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
)︃
(A.30)
The firm’s profit-maximisation problem is given by:
max
𝑥3
𝜋 = 𝜃
(︃
1− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
)︃
(𝑥3 − 𝑐)
subject to (1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)(1− 𝜃) 𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) ≥ 𝑥3 and
𝛽𝛾3(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
(1− 𝜃) − (1 + 𝛽) ≥ 𝑥3
(A.31)
This yields an interior solution and two corner solutions, and the final expression for
𝑥*3 is given as:
𝑥*3 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
[︃
𝛽𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑐
2 ,
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
(1− 𝜃) ,
𝛽𝛾3(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
(1− 𝜃) − (1 + 𝛽)
]︃
(A.32)
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The equilibrium exists iff the following condition is satisfied:
1− 𝜃 − ?¯?
1− 𝜃 ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛
[︃
𝛽𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑐
2𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) ,
𝛽𝛾3(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)− (1− 𝜃)(1 + 𝛽)
(1− 𝜃)𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)
]︃
(A.33)
∙ Case 2: The demand function is now:
𝜂 = 𝜃
(︃
ℎ* + 1− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
− 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)
)︃
(A.34)
Substituting for ℎ* gives:
𝜂 = 𝜃
(︃
1 + 1− 𝜃 − ?¯? + 𝜃𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) −
(1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
− 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)
)︃
(A.35)
The profit-maximisation problem is then given by:
max
𝑥3
𝜋 = 𝜃
(︃
2− 𝜃 − ?¯? + 𝜃𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) −
(1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
− 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)
)︃
(𝑥3 − 𝑐)
subject to 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) ≤ 1 and 𝑥3 ≥
(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)
(1− 𝜃)
and 𝑥3 ≥ (𝛾3 − 𝛾2)[(1 + 𝛽)− 𝛽𝛾2(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)]
𝛾2𝜃
and constraint 4
(A.36)
where
constraint 4 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑥3 ≤ (𝛾3−𝛾2)[𝛽𝛾3(1−𝜃−?¯?)−(1+𝛽)][(1−𝜃)𝛾3−𝛾2] if [(1− 𝜃)𝛾3 − 𝛾2] > 0
𝑥3 ≥ (𝛾3−𝛾2)[𝛽𝛾3(1−𝜃−?¯?)−(1+𝛽)][(1−𝜃)𝛾3−𝛾2] [(1− 𝜃)𝛾3 − 𝛾2] < 0
(A.37)
This yields an interior solution and two corner solutions. If [(1 − 𝜃)𝛾3 − 𝛾2] > 0, we
have:
𝑥*3 =
(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)[(2− 𝜃 − ?¯?)𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽) + 𝑐] + (1− 𝜃)𝛾3𝑐
2[(1− 𝜃)𝛾3 + 𝛾3 − 𝛾2] (A.38)
𝑥*3 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
[︃
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2), (𝛾3 − 𝛾2)[𝛽𝛾3(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)− (1 + 𝛽)][(1− 𝜃)𝛾3 − 𝛾2]
]︃
(A.39)
𝑥*3 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
[︃
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
(1− 𝜃) ,
(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)[(1 + 𝛽)− 𝛽𝛾2(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)]
𝛾2𝜃
]︃
(A.40)
139
Conversely, if [(1− 𝜃)𝛾3 − 𝛾2] < 0, we have:
𝑥*3 =
(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)[(2− 𝜃 − ?¯?)𝛾3 − (1 + 𝛽) + 𝑐] + (1− 𝜃)𝛾3𝑐
2[(1− 𝜃)𝛾3 + 𝛾3 − 𝛾2] (A.41)
𝑥*3 = 𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) (A.42)
𝑥*3 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
[︃
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
(1− 𝜃) ,
(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)[𝛽𝛾3(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)− (1 + 𝛽)]
[(1− 𝜃)𝛾3 − 𝛾2] ,
(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)[(1 + 𝛽)− 𝛽𝛾2(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)]
𝛾2𝜃
]︃ (A.43)
The equilibrium exists iff the following condition is satisfied:
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2)ℎ* ≤ 𝑥*3 < 𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) (A.44)
where ℎ* = 1− 𝜃 − ?¯? + 𝜃𝑥*3
𝛽(𝛾3−𝛾2)
∙ Case 3: The demand function is given by:
𝜂 = 𝜃
∫︁ ℎ*
(1+𝛽)𝑤1+𝑥3
𝛽𝛾3
𝑓(ℎ)𝑑ℎ (A.45)
The profit maximisation problem is then:
max
𝑥3
𝜋 = 𝜃
(︃
1− ?¯? − (1 + 𝛽 + 𝑥3)
𝛽𝛾3
)︃
(𝑥3 − 𝑐)
subject to 𝑥3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) > 1 and 𝛽𝛾3[1− ?¯? − (1 + 𝛽)] > 𝑥3
(A.46)
This yields an interior solution and two corner solutions, as follows:
𝑥*3 =
𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯?)− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 + 𝑐
2 (A.47)
𝑥*3 = 𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) (A.48)
𝑥*3 = 𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯? − (1 + 𝛽)) (A.49)
The equilibrium exists iff the following condition is satisfied:
1− ?¯? < 1 ≤ 𝑥
*
3
𝛽(𝛾3 − 𝛾2) (A.50)
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A.7 Deriving Assumptions 6′ for Model Extension
To begin, I use the uniform distribution to calculate values for the conditional expected ability
of each cohort. First, I consider the expected ability of workers in the private university
cohort. There are two possible realisations of 𝑘𝑐 and 𝑘𝑑 respectively, as rich, high-ability
workers may attend private or public university, while rich, low-ability workers may attend
private university or remain non-graduates. Thus, I can write the expected ability of the
private university cohort in each of these scenarios as:
∙ 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′ = {𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 1𝑐, 2𝑑;𝑤𝑘, ℎ*, 𝑥*3, 𝑦𝑖}] is undefined, as the private university
cohort= 0.
∙ 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′ = {𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 1𝑐, 3𝑑;𝑤𝑘, ℎ*, 𝑥*3, 𝑦𝑖}] = 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|ℎ* ≤ ℎ𝑖 ≤ 1] = 1+ℎ
*
2
∙ 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′ = {𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 3𝑐, 2𝑑;𝑤𝑘, ℎ*, 𝑥*3, 𝑦𝑖}] = 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|0 ≤ ℎ𝑖 ≤ 1] = ℎ
*
2
∙ 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′ = {𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 3𝑐, 3𝑑;𝑤𝑘, ℎ*, 𝑥*3, 𝑦𝑖}] = 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|0 < ℎ𝑖 < ℎ*] = 12
Next, I consider the expected ability of workers in the public university cohort. This is
unaffected by the value of the state variable, 𝑠′ (although the equilibrium value of ℎ* will still
be determined by other workers’ choices). The conditional expectation is given by:
𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠′] = 𝐸[ℎ𝑖|ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*] =
∫︁ 1
ℎ*
ℎ𝑓(ℎ)𝑑ℎ = 1 + ℎ
*
2 (A.51)
Now I calculate the capacity constraint required to appropriately restrict the set of equilib-
ria.
Assumption 6′ - Public University’s Capacity Constraint
The purpose of the capacity constraint is to restrict the model equilibria to be reasonable, in
the sense that they are ones in which high-ability, rich workers prefer free public university
to remaining non-graduates. This requires that the following inequality hold in every equi-
librium (that is, for the model parameters and every possible equilibrium value of ℎ*):
𝛽𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠′] > (1 + 𝛽) (A.52)
Substituting in for the expected ability of a public university graduate yields:
𝛽𝛾2
1 + ℎ*
2 > (1 + 𝛽) (A.53)
ℎ* is lowest in the equilibrium described by Case 1, so if the inequality binds for this value
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of ℎ*, it will do so for all other equilibrium values of ℎ*. Thus, we require:
𝛽𝛾2
2
{︃
1 + (1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)(1− 𝜃)
}︃
> (1 + 𝛽) (A.54)
Rearranging then yields the capacity constraint for public universities:
2(1− 𝜃)[𝛽𝛾2 − (1 + 𝛽)]
𝛽𝛾2
> ?¯? (A.55)
A.8 Characterising the Equilibrium of the Model Ex-
tension
A.8.1 Workers’ Decision Rules
A fraction (1 − 𝜃)ℎ* of the population consists of workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 < ℎ*. As in
the previous model, this group always remains non-graduates in equilibrium, as this is the
only choice available to them.
A fraction (1 − 𝜃)(1 − ℎ*) of the population consists of workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*.
The optimal choice for this group is:
𝑑*𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑑2 if 𝛽𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠′] > (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1
𝑑1 otherwise
(A.56)
A fraction 𝜃ℎ* of the population consists of workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 and ℎ𝑖 < ℎ*. The optimal
choice for this group is:
𝑑*𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑑3 if 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′]− 𝑥3 > (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1
𝑑1 otherwise
(A.57)
Finally, a fraction 𝜃(1 − ℎ*) of the population consists of workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐻 and ℎ𝑖 ≥
ℎ*. This group can choose freely amongst all three education alternatives. Nevertheless,
Assumption 6′ makes being a non-graduate a strictly dominated strategy for workers in this
group. Thus, this optimisation problem is now reduced to a simple binary choice between
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private and public university. The optimal choice for this sub-group is:
𝑑*𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑑3 if 𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′]− 𝑥3𝛽 > 𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠′]
𝑑2 otherwise
(A.58)
A.8.2 Worker Sorting in Equilibrium
As in the baseline model, the feasible choice sets and decision rules described above result in
a set of three distinct cut-off values for relative pay-offs:
1. 𝛽𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠′] > (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1
2. 𝑥3 < 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′]− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1
3. 𝑥3 < 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′]− 𝛽𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠]
This allows me to define eight potential Bayesian Nash equilibria for the model economy,
based on the subset of these three inequalities that is satisfied by the model parameters.
Nevertheless, Assumption 6′ allows the elimination of some of these equilibria.
The first candidate equilibrium is one in which none of the three inequalities is satisfied.
The second is one in which only the second inequality is satisfied, and the third is one in
which only the third inequality holds. The fourth candidate equilibrium is one in which only
the first two inequalities holds, while the fifth is one in which only the second and third
inequalities are satisfied. These are all impossible by Assumption 6′, which requires the first
inequality always to be satisfied. The sixth candidate equilibrium is one in which only the first
inequality holds. This equilibrium is possible, and defines the shut-down condition for private
universities. All high-ability workers attend public university, while all low-ability workers
remain non-graduates. The seventh candidate equilibrium is one in which only inequalities
1 and 3 hold, and the eighth is one in which all three inequalities hold. These are both
possible.
Thus, I have reduced the number of candidate equilibria to three. I now consider workers’
sorting behaviour under each of these. All workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 maintain the same optimal
behaviour behaviour across all three equilibria, namely that all workers with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and
ℎ𝑖 < ℎ
* always remains non-graduates, while the sub-group with 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝐿 and ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ* always
attends public university. Thus, I now characterise the three candidate equilibria in terms of
the sorting behaviour of the two remaining sub-groups: namely, rich workers, of both high
and low ability:
∙ Case 1′: Inequalities 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied
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In this equilibrium, all rich workers (regardless of ability) attend private university.
∙ Case 2′: Inequality 1 is satisfied
In this equilibrium, all rich, high-ability workers attend public university, while rich,
low-ability workers remain non-graduates. This defines the shut-down condition for
private universities.
∙ Case 3′: Inequalities 1 and 2 are satisfied
In this equilibrium, all rich, high-ability workers attend public university, while rich,
low-ability workers attend private university.
A.9 Public and Private University Equilibrium Behaviour
in Model Extension
A.9.1 Public University’s Decision
Public universities set ℎ* in order exactly to fill the available number of seats, ?¯? . There are
2 possible equilibrium values of ℎ*.
∙ Case 1′
ℎ* is chosen to satisfy the following equation:
?¯? = (1− 𝜃)(1− ℎ*) (A.59)
This yields the equilibrium value of ℎ*:
ℎ* = 1− 𝜃 − ?¯?1− 𝜃 (A.60)
∙ Case 2′ or Case 3′:
ℎ* is chosen to satisfy the following equation:
?¯? = (1− ℎ*) (A.61)
This yields the equilibrium value of ℎ*:
ℎ* = 1− ?¯? (A.62)
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A.9.2 Private University’s Decision
As in the baseline model, the demand function for private university consists of two groups.
Recall that rich, high-ability workers choose private university if the following condition is
satisfied:
𝑥3 ≤ 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′]− 𝛽𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠] (A.63)
Conversely, rich, low-ability workers with ability choose private university if the following
condition is satisfied:
𝑥3 ≤ 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′]− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 (A.64)
The private university now has three options. It can set 𝑥3 = 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′]−𝛽𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈
𝑛2, 𝑠] and serve both groups (this yields the pooling equilibrium described by Case 1′); it can
set 𝑥3 = 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠′] − (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 and serve only rich, low-ability workers (this yields
the separating equilibrium of Case 3′), or it can shut down (this yields the equilibrium of
Case 2′). Thus, to see which equilibrium is optimal for the private university, I now calculate
and compare equilibrium profit for each case.
Firstly, however, it is important to note that, in any equilibrium in which the private uni-
versity stays open, one of the two inequalities above must bind and the other must be slack.
(Suppose not. Then the private university can always profitably increase 𝑥3, which means
that the original value of 𝑥3 is not an optimum.)
Case 1′:
The equilibrium tuition fee and profit are given by:
𝑥*3 =
𝛽𝛾3
2 −
𝛽𝛾2(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
2(1− 𝜃) −
𝛽𝛾2
2 (A.65)
𝜋* = 𝜃
(︃
𝛽𝛾3
2 −
𝛽𝛾2(1− 𝜃 − ?¯?)
2(1− 𝜃) −
𝛽𝛾2
2 − 𝑐
)︃
(A.66)
The set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of this equilibrium is:
𝑥3 ≤ 𝛽𝛾32 − (1 + 𝛽) (A.67)
𝑥3 ≤ 𝛽𝛾32 −
𝛽𝛾2(1 + ℎ*)
2 (A.68)
1− 𝛽𝛾2?¯?
𝛽𝛾3?¯?2 − 2𝛽𝛾3?¯? − 2(1 + 𝛽)(1− ?¯?) + 2?¯?𝑐+ 2𝛽𝛾2
< 𝜃 < 1 (A.69)
The third condition describes the requirement that profit under Case 1′ exceeds profit under
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Case 3′.
To see that it is indeed an equilibrium, recall that, by Assumption 6′, high-ability rich workers
always prefer some form of university education to remaining a non-graduate. When ℎ* is
set sufficiently low, such that the condition above binds, and expected ability of the private
university cohort is unaffected by the value of ℎ*, the relative gain in terms of expected
ability from moving to a public university is low. Thus, their best response is to choose
private university over public. This is because the larger productivity boost provided by
private university outweighs the benefit from being perceived to be of high average ability
through attending public university.
Low-ability, rich workers prefer private university to being a non-graduate by Assumption
4, and are constrained from deviating to public university. High-ability, poor workers prefer
public university to being a non-graduate by Assumption 4, and prefer public to private
by the condition above. Low-ability, poor workers never have any choice but to remain
non-graduates. Thus, no-one deviates.
Case 2′:
The equilibrium tuition fee and profit are given by:
𝑥*3 >
𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯?)
2 − (1 + 𝛽) (A.70)
𝜋* = 0 (A.71)
The set of necessary and sufficient conditions for this equilibrium is:
𝑥3 > 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠 = 𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 3𝑐, 3𝑑]− (1 + 𝛽)𝑤1 (A.72)
𝑥3 > 𝛽𝛾3𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛3, 𝑠 = 𝑘𝑎, 𝑘𝑏, 3𝑐, 3𝑑]− 𝛽𝛾2𝐸[ℎ𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝑛2, 𝑠] (A.73)
In this equilibrium, private universities shut down. Both rich and poor workers with ℎ𝑖 ≥ ℎ*
attend public university, while all other workers remain non-graduates. Note that, in this
equilibrium, the high demand for public university pushes up the cutoff in order to keep
intake equal to the university’s capacity constraint, ?¯? .
Case 3′:
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The equilibrium tuition fee and profit are given by:
𝑥*3 =
𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯?)
2 − (1 + 𝛽) (A.74)
𝜋* = 𝜃(1− ?¯?)
(︃
𝛽𝛾3(1− ?¯?)
2 − (1 + 𝛽)− 𝑐
)︃
(A.75)
Recall that, in this equilibrium, all high-ability workers attend public university, all rich,
low-ability workers attend private university, and all poor, low-ability workers remain non-
graduates. The set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of this equilibrium
is:
𝑥3 ≤ 𝛽𝛾3ℎ
*
2 − (1 + 𝛽) (A.76)
𝑥3 >
𝛽𝛾3ℎ
*
2 −
𝛽𝛾2(1 + ℎ*)
2 (A.77)
0 < 𝜃 ≤ 1− 𝛽𝛾2?¯?
𝛽𝛾3?¯?2 − 2𝛽𝛾3?¯? − 2(1 + 𝛽)(1− ?¯?) + 2?¯?𝑐+ 2𝛽𝛾2
𝑜𝑟𝜃 = 1 (A.78)
The third condition describes the requirement that profit under Case 3′ exceeds profit under
Case 1′. This equilibrium is inefficient because now all of the highest-ability workers in the
economy attend public university, which gives a lower productivity boost than does private.
To see that it is indeed an equilibrium, recall that, by Assumption 6′, rich, high-ability
workers always prefer some form of university education to remaining a non-graduate. When
ℎ* is set sufficiently low, such that the condition above is satisfied, and the expected ability of
the private university cohort is decreasing in ℎ*, attending private university implies a signal
of such low ability that their best response is to choose public university over private. This is
because the benefit from being perceived to be of higher average ability outweighs the larger
productivity boost provided by private university. Low-ability, rich workers prefer private
university to being a non-graduate by Assumption 4, and are constrained from deviating to
public university. High-ability, poor workers prefer public university to being a non-graduate
by Assumption 4, and prefer public to private by the condition above. Low-ability, poor
workers never have any choice but to remain non-graduates. Thus, no-one deviates.
A.10 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the structural parameters using the ability score, rather
than the ETS score, as the chosen measure of ability. As Table A.1 shows, the results are
largely invariant to this change.
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Table A.1: Estimated Structural Parameters using Ability Score
Armenia Bolivia Colombia Georgia Ghana Kenya
university marginal cost, 𝑐 0.10 2.4 0 2 6.7 0-0.4
private university productivity, 𝛾3 5.94 19.01 20.82 14.92 25.97 34.60
public university productivity, 𝛾2 5.69 10.12 14.22 12.69 27.89 23.61
A.11 Defining “Rich” and “High-Ability” in the Data
To determine who is “rich” in the data, I proceed in the following manner. First, I obtain
auxiliary data on private university tuition fees in the STEP countries. I do so by searching
the websites of 2-3 randomly-selected private universities in each country, and then taking
an average of the posted tuition fees. I then compute the fraction of workers whose annual
wage income is greater than or equal to this average. Finally, I select as the cut-off for ”rich”
the value of the household rank score which matches this fraction. This results in a cut-off
score of 7.
To determine who is of “high ability” in the data, I consider my two measures of ability (ETS
score and ability score) separately. The ability score ranges between 1 and 4, so I define any
worker with a score of 4 to be a “high-ability” worker. This includes approximately 24 per
cent of the workforce across all countries.
The ETS score ranges between 4 and 20, but the maximum value observed is much lower,
and varies across countries. Thus, for each country, I define a “high-ability” worker to be
one with the highest observed ETS score for that particular country. This results in a cut-off
score of 8 for Georgia, 9 for Armenia, Bolivia, Colombia and Kenya, and 13 for Kenya.
A.12 Calculating the Social Planner’s Optimal Alloca-
tion
The social planner’s optimal allocation of human capital is one in which each worker’s choice
of education is informed solely by his marginal productivity in the graduate and non-graduate
sectors and the marginal cost of education. I assume, as with public university education,
that this cost is financed via a lump-sum tax on all workers.
The difference in marginal productivity between working in the graduate and non-graduate
sector is given by 𝛾3ℎ𝑖−2, as non-graduates contribute a single unit of output in both periods.
The marginal cost is the change in the tax burden. This is simply 𝑐, assuming the government
takes over the running of these universities. Thus, a worker should attend private university
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if and only if 𝛾3ℎ𝑖 > 2 + 𝑐, and should remain a non-graduate otherwise.
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Computing Parental Wealth
First, I compute household wealth for families in the GLSS 2012 using a rich household asset
module. Household wealth is defined as the sum of the listed value of all household durable
goods, savings, livestock and agricultural equipment.
Second, I regress the log of this wealth measure on the education level, occupation and
geographic region of males aged 35 to 60 (35 is the youngest reasonable age for a father
of workers aged at least 15). Education is measured on a 12-point scale ranging from no
education to a post-graduate degree. Occupations are classified by 8 major groups based on
the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). Results are shown in
Table B.1.
Table B.1: Wealth Regression for Men Aged 35 to 60
(1)
log wealth
Constant 8.692***
(0.148)
education dummies Yes
occupation dummies Yes
region dummies Yes
𝑁 5701
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
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Third, I use the coefficients from this regression to predict the wealth of sampled individu-
als’ fathers based on information regarding the latter’s education and occupation, and the
former’s birth region. Figures B-1, B-2 and B-3 show the variation in household wealth over
fathers’ education, occupation and region, respectively.
Figure B-1: Parental Wealth and Father’s Educational Attainment for Males Aged 16-50
To test the performance of this measure, I consider its correlation with the child’s educational
attainment. Table B.2 shows that this correlation is strongly positive, as expected.
Table B.2: Parental Wealth and Educational Attainment for Males Aged 16-50
(1)
years of education
log parental wealth 1.657***
(0.137)
cons -4.714***
(1.073)
𝑁 9059
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
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Figure B-2: Parental Wealth and Father’s Occupation for Males Aged 16-50
Figure B-3: Parental Wealth and Birth Region for Males Aged 16-50
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B.2 Stylised Facts: Robustness Checks
Table B.3 replicates the results for Ghana from Table 2.1 using a probit specification in place
of a linear probability model.
Table B.3: GLSS 2012 Parental Wealth and Male Unemployment: Probit (Average Marginal
Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 15-29
Unemployed = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployed = 1
Age 15-29
Unemployed = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployed = 1
log parental wealth 0.055*** 0.009 0.039** 0.009
(0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
age -0.007*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
urban 0.070*** 0.006 0.060*** 0.006
(0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
education dummies No No Yes Yes
𝑁 3328 7172 3328 7172
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
Table B.4 uses a different dependent variable, namely the number of years between the
end of schooling and the start of the first job, and demonstrates a positive and significant
relationship between parental wealth and this new measure of youth unemployment.
Table B.5 replicates the results from Table 2.1 using a secondary data source, namely the
first three rounds of the Ghana Urban Household Panel Survey (2004-2006), which include
information on respondents’ labour market histories. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. The results are very similar to those in Table 2.1.
To show that these patterns are not unique to the Ghanaian context but, rather, may also be
present in other sub-Saharan African countries, I replicate the trio of stylised facts outlined
in Section 2.2 for Uganda, using data from the fourth round of the Uganda National Panel
Survey (2013/2014). Note that this data source has no substantive data available for workers
older than 50 years.
First, the 2012 unemployment rate among Ugandan men aged 15-24 is 4.7%. Second, I repli-
cate the educational attainment results from Figure 2-1 in Figure B-4. Finally, I replicate
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Table B.4: GLSS 2012 Parental Wealth and Male School-to-Work Transition Duration
(1) (2)
Age 30-60
transition years
Age 30-60
transition years
log parental wealth 7.748*** 7.078**
(2.301) (2.212)
log parental wealth2 -0.472*** -0.420**
(0.141) (0.135)
age 0.021** 0.022**
(0.007) (0.007)
urban 0.680*** 0.665***
(0.127) (0.132)
region dummies Yes Yes
education dummies No Yes
mean (transition years) 3.800 3.800
𝑁 3598 3598
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
Data Source: GLSS 2012
Table B.5: Ghana UHPS: Parental Wealth and Male Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 15-29
Unemployed = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployed = 1
Age 15-29
Unemployed = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployed = 1
log parental wealth 0.048** 0.028 0.044** 0.034
(0.016) (0.025) (0.017) (0.025)
age -0.007*** -0.000 -0.006** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
education dummies No No Yes Yes
𝑁 6846 7297 6797 7255
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
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the results from Table 2.1 in Table B.6. The patterns are very similar across both countries:
youth unemployment is low; educational attainment is very low, with only a small proportion
of workers completing high school; and parental wealth is a positive and significant determi-
nant of youth unemployment, but does not affect workers’ unemployment status later in life.
Note that these patterns hold despite the stark sub-regional differences between Ghana and
Uganda, the former a part of West Africa, and the latter located in East Africa.
Figure B-4: Educational Attainment of Ugandan Males Aged 20-60
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Table B.6: Uganda National Panel Survey: Parental Wealth and Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 15-29
Unemployed = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployed = 1
Age 15-29
Unemployed = 1
Age 30-60
Unemployed = 1
log parental wealth 0.183*** 0.054 0.129** 0.055
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049)
age -0.007 -0.003 -0.012* -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
urban 0.031 0.007 -0.010 0.009
(0.041) (0.034) (0.042) (0.037)
region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
education dummies No No Yes Yes
𝑁 422 251 422 251
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
B.3 Model Assumptions: Employment is an Absorbing
State
To justify the assumption that workers stay in a single job for their lifetime in the model
framework of this paper, I use data from the Ghana Urban Household Panel survey (2004) to
show that job-to-job transitions in this context are very low, as Table B.7 shows. Note that I
use this auxiliary dataset because the GLSS 2012 (the main dataset used in this paper) does
not contain information about individuals’ labour market histories.
I restrict the sample to workers aged between 30 and 40 years, because the labour market
history data goes back to a maximum of 20 years, such that including older workers would
lead to a potential underestimation of the number of jobs per worker. Similarly, including
younger workers, who have spent only a short while in the labour force, would also lead to
an underestimation.
Table B.7: Lifetime Jobs per Worker: Age 30-40
N mean s.d.
575 1.95 0.95
Data Source: Ghana Urban Household Panel Survey 2005
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B.4 Summary Statistics: Male Labour-Force Partici-
pants Aged 16-50
Table B.8: Summary Statistics: Male Labour-Force Participants Aged 16-50
observations 9059
urban (%) 38.03
highly-educated (%) 24.33
mean s.d.
age (years) 33.47 9.22
education (years) 8.24 6.19
median parental assets (US$) 513.97 508.78
Figure B-5: Employment Status by Education
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B.5 Estimating Earnings Growth Parameters
Table B.9: Log Earnings and Age for Low-Education Males Aged 31-50
(1) (2) (3)
wage-employed agric. self-employed entrepreneurs
age 0.00638 0.00442 0.0101
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
cons 7.903*** 6.701*** 7.994***
(0.271) (0.234) (0.363)
𝑁 680 2018 627
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
Table B.10: Log Earnings and Age for High-Education Males Aged 31-50
(1) (2) (3)
wage-employed agric. self-employed entrepreneurs
age 0.0276*** 0.0431 0.0236
(0.007) (0.028) (0.017)
cons 7.791*** 5.414*** 7.693***
(0.282) (1.100) (0.670)
𝑁 574 124 206
Standard errors in parentheses
* 𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, *** 𝑝 < 0.001
B.6 Ability and Unemployment Duration byWealth
As discussed in Section 2.3.5.4, the relationship between ability and unemployment duration
has an ambiguous sign, as the “asset de-accumulation” channel is negative, and the “sectoral
shift” channel is positive. Further, the relationship is not constant along the support of initial
wealth; specifically, the “sectoral shift” channel becomes relatively more, and the “asset de-
accumulation” channel relatively less, important at higher levels of wealth. This is because
the difference between high- and low-ability workers in the value of wage employment and
entrepreneurship is decreasing in wealth. Formally:
𝜕2(𝑉𝑀𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑡|ℎ𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻)
𝜕𝑎2𝑖0
<
𝜕2(𝑉𝑀𝑖,𝑚,𝑘,𝑡|ℎ𝑖 = 𝐻𝐿)
𝜕𝑎2𝑖0
∀ 𝑚 ∈ {𝑤, 𝑒} (B.1)
Figure B-6 shows this quite clearly for the high-education wage-employment sector. The in-
tuition underlying this is that, as the value of employment for high- and low-ability workers
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draws closer together at high wealth levels, the differences across ability types in consump-
tion behaviour while unemployed become negligible, such that the “asset de-accumulation”
channel diminishes in influence, such that high-ability workers become relatively more likely
to remain unemployed.
Figure B-6: Value of High-Education Wage Employment by Log Wealth
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